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Abstract 
Data Warehouses (DWs) store sensitive data that encloses many business 
secrets. They have become the most common data source used by 
analytical tools for producing business intelligence and supporting 
decision making in most enterprises. This makes them an extremely 
appealing target for both inside and outside attackers. Given these facts, 
securing them against data damage and information leakage is critical.  
This thesis proposes a security framework for integrating data 
confidentiality solutions and intrusion detection in DWs. Deployed as a 
middle tier between end user interfaces and the database server, the 
framework describes how the different solutions should interact with the 
remaining tiers. To the best of our knowledge, this framework is the first 
to integrate confidentiality solutions such as data masking and encryption 
together with intrusion detection in a unique blueprint, providing a broad 
scope data security architecture. 
Packaged database encryption solutions are been well-accepted as the best 
form for protecting data confidentiality while keeping high database 
performance. However, this thesis demonstrates that they heavily increase 
storage space and introduce extremely large response time overhead, 
among other drawbacks. Although their usefulness in their security 
purpose itself is indisputable, the thesis discusses the issues concerning 
their feasibility and efficiency in data warehousing environments. This 
way, solutions specifically tailored for DWs (i.e., that account for the 
particular characteristics of the data and workloads are capable of 
delivering better tradeoffs between security and performance than those 
proposed by standard algorithms and previous research.  
This thesis proposes a reversible data masking function and a novel 
encryption algorithm that provide diverse levels of significant security 
strength while adding small response time and storage space overhead. 
Both techniques take numerical input and produce numerical output, 
using data type preservation to minimize storage space overhead, and 
simply use arithmetical operators mixed with eXclusive OR and modulus 
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operators in their data transformations. The operations used in these data 
transformations are native to standard SQL, which enables both solutions 
to use transparent SQL rewriting to mask or encrypt data. Transparently 
rewriting SQL allows discarding data roundtrips between the database 
and the encryption/decryption mechanisms, thus avoiding I/O and 
network bandwidth bottlenecks. Using operations and operators native to 
standard SQL also enables their full portability to any type of DataBase 
Management System (DBMS) and/or DW. Experimental evaluation 
demonstrates the proposed techniques outperform standard and state-of-
the-art research algorithms while providing substantial security strength. 
From an intrusion detection view, most Database Intrusion Detection 
Systems (DIDS) rely on command-syntax analysis to compute data access 
patterns and dependencies for building user profiles that represent what 
they consider as typical user activity. However, the considerable ad hoc 
nature of DW user workloads makes it extremely difficult to distinguish 
between normal and abnormal user behavior, generating huge amounts of 
alerts that mostly turn out to be false alarms. Most DIDS also lack assessing 
the damage intrusions might cause, while many allow various intrusions 
to pass undetected or only inspect user actions a posteriori to their 
execution, which jeopardizes intrusion damage containment. 
This thesis proposes a DIDS specifically tailored for DWs, integrating a 
real-time intrusion detector and response manager at the SQL command 
level that acts transparently as an extension of the database server. User 
profiles and intrusion detection processes rely on analyzing several distinct 
aspects of typical DW workloads: the user command, processed data and 
results from processing the command. An SQL-like rule set extends data 
access control and statistical models are built for each feature to obtain 
individual user profiles, using statistical tests for intrusion detection. A 
self-calibration formula computes the contribution of each feature in the 
overall intrusion detection process. A risk exposure method is used for 
alert management, which is proven more efficient in damage containment 
than using alert correlation techniques to deal with the generation of high 
amounts of alerts. Experiments demonstrate the overall efficiency of the 
proposed DIDS. 
Keywords: Data Security, Data Warehousing, Data Masking, Encryption, 
Database Intrusion Detection, Database Security Frameworks. 
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Resumo 
As Data Warehouses (DWs) armazenam dados sensíveis que muitas vezes 
encerram os segredos do negócio. São actualmente a forma mais utilizada 
por parte de ferramentas analíticas para produzir inteligência de negócio e 
proporcionar apoio à tomada de decisão em muitas empresas. Isto torna as 
DWs um alvo extremamente apetecível por parte de atacantes internos e 
externos à própria empresa. Devido a estes factos, assegurar que o seu 
conteúdo é devidamente protegido contra danos que possam ser causados 
nos dados, ou o roubo e utilização ou divulgação desses dados, é de uma 
importância crítica.  
Nesta tese, é apresentada uma framework de segurança que possibilita a 
integração conjunta das soluções de confidencialidade de dados e detecção 
de intrusões em DWs. Esta integração conjunta de soluções é definida na 
framework como uma camada intermédia entre os interfaces dos 
utilizadores e o servidor de base de dados, descrevendo como as diferentes 
soluções interagem com os restantes pares. Consideramos esta framework 
como a primeira do género que combina tipos distintos de soluções de 
confidencialidade, como mascaragem e encriptação de dados com detecção 
de intrusões, numa única arquitectura integrada, promovendo uma 
solução de segurança de dados transversal e de grande abrangência. 
A utilização de pacotes de soluções de encriptação incluídos em servidores 
de bases de dados tem sido considerada como a melhor forma de proteger 
a confidencialidade de dados sensíveis e conseguir ao mesmo tempo 
manter um nível elevado de desempenho nas bases de dados. Contudo, 
esta tese demonstra que a utilização de encriptação resulta tipicamente 
num aumento extremamente considerável do espaço de armazenamento 
de dados e no tempo de processamento e resposta dos comandos SQL, 
entre outras desvantagens ou aspectos negativos relativos ao seu 
desempenho. Apesar da sua utilidade indiscutível no cumprimento dos 
pressupostos em termos de segurança propriamente ditos, nesta tese 
discutimos os problemas inerentes que dizem respeito à sua aplicabilidade, 
eficiência e viabilidade em ambientes de data warehousing. 
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Argumentamos que soluções especificamente concebidas para DWs, que 
tenham em conta as características particulares dos seus dados e as 
actividades típicas dos seus utilizadores, são capazes de produzir um 
melhor equilíbrio entre segurança e desempenho do que as soluções 
previamente disponibilizadas por algoritmos standard e outros trabalhos 
de investigação para bases de dados na sua generalidade.  
Nesta tese, propomos uma função reversível de mascaragem de dados e 
um novo algoritmo de encriptação, que providenciam diversos níveis de 
segurança consideráveis, ao mesmo tempo que adicionam pequenos 
aumentos de espaço de armazenamento e tempo de processamento. 
Ambas as técnicas recebem dados numéricos de entrada e produzem 
dados numéricos de saída, usam preservação do tipo de dados para 
minimizar o aumento do espaço de armazenamento, e simplesmente 
utilizam combinações de operadores aritméticos conjuntamente com OU 
exclusivos (XOR) e restos de divisão (MOD) nas operações de 
transformação de dados. Como este tipo de operações se conseguem 
realizar recorrendo a comandos nativos de SQL, isto permite a ambas as 
soluções utilizar de forma transparente a reescrita de comandos SQL para 
mascarar e encriptar dados. 
Este manuseamento transparente de comandos SQL permite requerer a 
execução desses mesmos comandos ao Sistema de Gestão de Base de 
Dados (SGBD) sem que os dados tenham de ser transportados entre a base 
de dados e os mecanismos de mascaragem/desmascaragem e encriptação/ 
decriptação, evitando assim o congestionamento em termos de I/O e rede. 
A utilização de operações e operadores nativos ao SQL também permite a 
sua portabilidade para qualquer tipo de SGBD e/ou DW. As avaliações 
experimentais demonstram que as técnicas propostas obtêm um 
desempenho significativamente superior ao obtido por algoritmos 
standard e outros propostos pelo estado da arte da investigação nestes 
domínios, enquanto providenciam um nível de segurança considerável. 
Numa perspectiva de detecção de intrusões, a maioria dos Sistemas de 
Detecção de Intrusões em Bases de Dados (SDIBD) utilizam formas de 
análise de sintaxe de comandos para determinar padrões de acesso e 
dependências que determinam os perfis que consideram representativos 
da actividade típica dos utilizadores. Contudo, a carga considerável de 
natureza ad hoc existente em muitas acções por parte dos utilizadores de 
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DWs gera frequentemente um número avassalador de alertas que, na sua 
maioria, se revelam falsos alarmes. Muitos SDIBD também não fazem 
qualquer tipo de avaliação aos potenciais danos que as intrusões podem 
causar, enquanto muitos outros permitem que várias intrusões passem 
indetectadas ou apenas inspeccionam as acções dos utilizadores após essas 
acções terem completado a sua execução, o que coloca em causa a possível 
contenção e/ou reparação de danos causados. 
Nesta tese, propomos um SDIBD especificamente concebido para DWs, 
integrando um detector de intrusões em tempo real, com capacidade de 
parar ou impedir a execução da acção do utilizador, e que funciona de 
forma transparente como uma extensão do SGBD. Os perfis dos 
utilizadores e os processos de detecção de intrusões recorrem à análise de 
diversos aspectos distintos característicos da actividade típica de 
utilizadores de DWs: o comando SQL emitido, os dados processados, e os 
dados resultantes desse processamento. Um conjunto de regras tipo SQL 
estende o alcance das políticas de controlo de acesso a dados, e modelos 
estatísticos são construídos baseados em cada variável relevante à 
determinação dos perfis dos utilizadores, sendo utilizados testes 
estatísticos para analisar as acções dos utilizadores e detectar possíveis 
intrusões. Também é descrito um método de calibragem automatizado da 
contribuição de cada uma dessas variáveis no processo global de detecção 
de intrusões, com base na eficiência que vão apresentando ao longo do 
tempo nesse mesmo processo. Um método de exposição de risco é definido 
para fazer a gestão de alertas, que é mais eficiente do que as técnicas de 
correlação habitualmente utilizadas para este fim, de modo a lidar com a 
geração de quantidades elevadas de alertas. As avaliações experimentais 
incluídas nesta tese demonstram a eficiência do SDIBD proposto. 
 
Palavras-chave: Segurança de Dados, Data Warehousing, Mascaragem de 
Dados, Encriptação, Detecção de Intrusões em Bases de Dados, 
Frameworks de Segurança em Bases de Dados. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Data is a major asset for any enterprise, not only for knowing the past, but 
also to support today’s business and to predict future trends [Baer, 2004; 
Kobielus, 2009]. Data Warehouses (DWs) gather all the relevant historical 
and current business data, reflecting the business measures and its results, 
as well as how and when it occurs. Given its nature, this data translates 
into business knowledge, providing invaluable information to generate 
added business value and support decisions.  
In fact, DWs are today’s backbone for enterprise business intelligence, 
playing a main role in the enterprise’s outcome [Kobielus, 2009]. Given 
these facts, we may state that DWs are the core of sensitive business data 
and store the secrets of the business itself. This makes them a major target 
for both inside and outside attackers. Consequently, securing DWs against 
data damage and information leakage is a critical goal.  
The awareness of the importance of data security has been growing in the 
recent years. In fact, a survey on enterprise data security conducted by the 
Independent Oracle Users Group (IOUG) in 2012 [McKendrick, 2012], 
shows that almost 50% of the inquired companies increased their 
investment in IT security, while 9% of the inquired companies stated that 
they had sustained security breaches in company data. The same report 
also shows that almost 40% of the companies are expecting a security 
breach in 2013.  
Although several other studies have also demonstrated that efficiently 
securing sensitive data has become an imperative concern in many 
enterprises [McKendrick, 2012; Yuhanna, 2009], database attacks are 
increasing every year in number and complexity, and the caused damage 
is frequently only discovered after a significant loss of business or financial 
value [Yuhanna, 2009]. As organizations scale up, the amount of data 
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moving across their systems and business units, and the risk of data 
breaches and abuse also grows [McKendrick, 2012]. This introduces the 
need for integrating effective security measures into databases, given that 
they are the central component of enterprise information systems. 
Regardless of their security purpose, the techniques that are selected for 
implementing data security in DWs need to consider that data 
warehousing environments have unique types of user activities, as well as 
database features1 and performance requirements, which do not exist in 
any other type of database system. Therefore, the implementation and 
usage of the chosen techniques must not jeopardize the feasibility, 
efficiency and effectiveness of those features and requirements. 
In this thesis, we focus on enhancing data security in databases, specifically 
in the context of data warehousing environments, namely in what concerns 
data masking, encryption and intrusion detection. The following sections 
characterize data security in databases, summarily describing the most 
commonly used techniques, and point out the main issues presented by 
these techniques from a data warehousing perspective. The chapter 
continues by presenting the thesis statement, its main achievements and 
contributions, as well as the structure of the document, which concludes 
this chapter. 
1.1 Data Security in Databases 
In this thesis, we adopt the security concepts and definitions described in 
[Avizienis et al., 2004]. Thus, when referring to data security in databases, 
it is defined as the composite set of the following attributes:  
 Integrity: absence of improper modification or deletion of data that 
may compromise its correctness, completeness, consistency or 
authenticity; 
 Confidentiality: absence of improper disclosure of data, i.e., users do 
not access data they are not supposed to access; 
                                                     
1 In this thesis, we consider a feature as a variable for assessing the characteristics 
of a given subject. For example, a database feature can be the storage size of a 
database or its throughput, among other variables. 
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 Availability: readiness of service, i.e., the required database service 
and data are always available whenever requested. 
To comply with these attributes, many techniques have been proposed in 
the past. These can be divided in two classes: preventive and reactive 
techniques. Preventive data security techniques effectively protect data in 
advance of security problems or attacks, and independently from the 
occurrence of those problems or attacks (e.g. data masking, encryption, and 
data access policies, among others), while reactive security techniques are 
used to effectively respond to the occurrence of a security problem or 
attack, either while it occurs or after it has taken place (e.g. intrusion 
detection and prevention systems). The following subsections summarily 
describe the most common types of techniques for each class. 
1.1.1. Preventive Data Security Techniques 
Besides basic data integrity rules such as the enforcement of referential 
integrity and low-level hardware and/or software data storage integrity 
checks against data corruption such as data block checksum functions and 
error-correcting codes (e.g. CRC), used in all databases, the most commonly 
used preventive data security techniques for protecting sensitive data are 
probably those that include data masking, encryption and the 
implementation of data access policies [Huey, 2008].  
As one of the earliest methods for protecting data, DataBase Management 
Systems (DBMS) traditionally use some form of access control to enforce 
policies regarding the data they manage. Using data access policies allows 
defining the data that each user is authorized to access and the actions that 
s/he is authorized to execute. This is accomplished through user 
authentication, which is the process of verifying the user’s identity in the 
system and applying the set of policies defined for the user or the role to 
which s/he belongs. 
Data masking, as the term itself indicates, is the process of obscuring data, 
either by replacing true values with false values or by hiding a part of its 
values, in specific data elements. In databases, the main goal of data 
masking is to replace stored true data with realistic but unreal data, so the 
true data is unavailable to unauthorized users. An extensive survey on data 
masking techniques is given in [Ravikumar et al., 2011]. To assure a 
significant level of security, the false values should not allow attackers to 
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easily discover ways of retrieving the true values, either by comparison or 
inference techniques. Organizations have strived to solve privacy issues 
with hand-crafted solutions or repurposed data manipulation tools within 
the enterprise to solve the problem of sharing sensitive information. The 
most common solutions are probably to use scripts with triggers in order 
to mask and unmask each value, use built-in DBMS data masking packages 
such as the Oracle Data Masking (ODM) pack [Natan, 2005; Oracle, 2010c], 
or to embed the masking/unmasking logic within user applications 
themselves. 
Data encryption techniques are an evolutionary and more complex form of 
data masking which intends to strengthen the security level, obeying to a 
series of universal principles defined by the encryption research 
community. It is defined that an encryption algorithm is a procedure or 
function that handles a given input, performs a series of rounds composed 
by mixing and transformation actions with that input or part(s) of it, 
depending on a given encryption key or set of keys, and generates a given 
output from those mixes and transformations [Vaudenay, 2006]. The 
algorithms of these procedures or functions are either developed internally 
within the enterprise to be used in a private manner, or publically disclosed 
for discussing its merits and proving its secureness by the research 
community and entities such as the National Institution of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), so it can be accepted for usage. In the recent past, 
encryption packages have been progressively implemented in many 
commercial and open source DBMS such as Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server 
and MySQL. 
1.1.2. Reactive Data Security Techniques 
Currently, all main DBMS have audit control, comply with ACID 
(Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability) requirements, and supply 
extensive authentication, authorization, and access control (AAA) features 
for assuring that the right users access and/or modify only the data that 
they are supposed to access and/or modify. All main DBMS also have 
available data masking and encryption packages that can be used 
transparently with databases and user applications in a straightforward 
manner. These preventive techniques work effectively in guaranteeing that 
only authorized users may access and manage the data that they are 
supposed to access and manage. However, they are unable to distinguish 
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if the user that has logged in is truly who s/he is supposed to be and/or if 
that user has or not malicious intentions; if a masqueraded user or 
malicious insider that has gained clearance by hacking or taking advantage 
of valid login credentials, those preventive mechanisms are unable to 
protect data.  
Given the increase of sophisticated attacks (e.g. Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks) and rising internal theft, traditional AAA features along 
with data masking and/or encryption are no longer enough to protect data 
[McKendrick, 2012; Yuhanna, 2009]. Additionally, attackers that gain 
direct access to databases mostly represent authorized users logging with 
permission to access data, meaning that they are able to bypass traditional 
intrusion detection systems (IDS), which typically work at the network and 
operating systems (OS) levels. This has lead to the development of reactive 
data security techniques, which monitor and analyze user actions in the 
database and try to determine if they are harmful or not in order to 
adequately deal with them, protecting data from attackers that bypass 
preventive security techniques.  
Gartner Research has identified Database Activity Monitoring (DAM) as 
one of the most important strategies for decreasing information leakage in 
organizations [Mogull, 2006; Nicolett and Wheatman, 2007]. Considering 
an intrusion as an unauthorized attempt to violate the integrity, 
confidentiality or availability of a system, the detection of intrusion actions 
against data and inherent database services is the main goal of Database 
Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDS) [Lappas and Pelechrinis, 2007]. DIDS are 
mainly host-based intrusion detection systems that operate at the database 
level, i.e., they inspect user commands and/or data workloads just before, 
during or after that data and/or workloads are processed by the database 
server. In DIDS there is typically a learning phase (i.e., previous to intrusion 
detection), in which database and/or user activity logs assumed as having 
“normal” or intrusion-free activity are used in order to build the “non-
intrusive” normal user behavior profiles. To perform intrusion detection, 
there are mainly two types of approaches: misuse detection, looking for 
well-known predefined attack patterns; and anomaly detection, looking 
for deviations from the typical user behavior [Newman, 2011]. 
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1.2 Issues concerning Data Security in Data Warehouses 
In spite of the diversity of available data security techniques, their 
feasibility, efficiency and effectiveness in data warehousing environments 
has not been undoubtedly proven. On the contrary, in this thesis we 
demonstrate that several of the currently available data security techniques 
are in fact unfeasible or, at least, introduce lacks of efficiency and 
effectiveness or performance overheads with orders of magnitude that 
jeopardize their feasibility. In the next sections, we point out the issues 
concerning the data security techniques focused in this thesis, from a data 
warehousing perspective. 
This thesis focuses on enhancing data masking, encryption and DIDS 
specifically designed for usage in DWs. Therefore, in the following 
subsections we point out the main issues of each of these techniques from 
a data warehousing perspective, which make the ground for our work. 
1.2.1. Data Masking 
Data masking routines are generally simpler in complexity and faster than 
encryption routines. However, they provide lower security strength 
[Ravikumar et al., 2011]. As we previously mentioned, encryption 
algorithms intended to be accepted and widely used by the database 
community are typically published with open access in order to enable 
discussing its merits and proving its secureness by both security and 
database research communities and entities such as the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST). This means that before they are put 
to use, most encryption algorithms go through very thorough and 
exhaustive analysis and testing processes. If they have been approved, 
those processes confer a sense of secureness to whoever intends to use 
them.  
For example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [AES, 2001] 
became an encryption standard only after a five year long standardization 
process that included extensive benchmarking on a variety of platforms. 
Since the appearance of the encryption field within data security, both 
database developers and users feel much more confident and relaxed with 
using encryption, rather than simple masking, to protect their sensitive 
data. This has introduced a confidence issue concerning the use of data 
masking in highly sensitive databases such as those in DWs. 
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Data masking routines provided by most commercial tools such as Oracle 
Data Masking (ODM) typically change data in an irreversible manner, i.e., 
after masking data it is not possible to subsequently retrieve the original 
true values. Oracle states that the ODM should be used as a fast and easy 
way to generate production databases for supporting outsourcing and 
software development. The ODM can also be used to mask Microsoft SQL 
Server and DB2 databases for the same purpose. ODM requires new data 
to be loaded into the database first, and only applies the masking 
procedures afterwards. It is not possible to load previously masked data; 
masking in the ODM is an a posteriori process. Most commercial solutions 
work in a similar fashion as the ODM [Gartner, 2009; Huey, 2008].  
As not being able to retrieve the original values makes data masking 
solutions useless in live end user databases [Bertino and Sandhu, 2005a; 
Gartner, 2009; Huey, 2008; Nadeem and Javed, 2005; Natan, 2005; 
Ravikumar et al., 2011; Yuhanna, 2009], the lack of confidence in their 
security strength in some cases and their irreversibility in other cases has 
made masking techniques the main choice for protecting published data or 
production data, instead of protecting data in live sensitive end user 
databases such as DWs.  
1.2.2. Data Encryption 
Published research and best practice guides state that encryption is the best 
method to protect sensitive data at the database level while maintaining 
high database performance [Agrawal et al., 2004; Ge and Zdonik, 2007; 
Hacigumus et al., 2004; Huey, 2008; Natan, 2005; Oracle, 2005; Oracle, 
2010a; Oracle, 2010c; Vimercati et al., 2007]. However, despite their security 
strength, encryption techniques introduce performance key costs from a 
data warehousing point of view: 
 Large processing time/resources for encrypting sensitive data, since DWs 
require accessing and processing huge amounts of data, this creates 
a high demand on computational resources that significantly rises 
processing time and the required storage space in their databases; 
 Extra storage space of encrypted data, since DWs usually have many 
millions or billions of rows, even a small modification of any 
datatype size to hold encrypted output introduces large storage 
space overhead; 
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 Overhead of query response time and allocated resources for decrypting 
data to process those queries. Given the huge amount of data typically 
accessed in order to process DW queries, this is probably the most 
significant drawback concerning the use of encryption in DWs 
[Agrawal et al., 2004]. 
As the number and complexity of “data-mix” encryption rounds increase, 
their security strength often improves while performance degrades, and 
vice-versa. Balancing performance with security in DWs is a complex issue, 
which depends on the requirements and context of each particular 
environment. Most encryption algorithms are not suitable for DWs 
because they have been designed as a “one fits all” security solution for 
general-purpose data. Thus, they are designed for encrypting blocks of 
text, i.e., sets of character-values by default. This has led DBMS to 
implement encryption routines that just output textual or binary attributes.  
Since in most enterprises the business facts are essentially numerical 
values, it is fair to state that most DW columns store numerical values 
[Kimball and Ross, 2013]. Thus, using encryption means that they need to 
be converted to a textual or binary format. When those values are 
decrypted for query processing, they need to be converted back into 
numerical format in order to process sums, averages, etc. Since most 
decision support queries process mathematical functions and calculus 
against numerical attributes, conversion operations add computational 
overheads with considerable performance impact and represent a 
potentially critical drawback. 
Although many encryption algorithms such as [Agrawal et al., 2004; Ge 
and Zdonik, 2007; Hacigumus et al., 2004; Radha and Kumar, 2005; 
Vimercati et al., 2007] and built-in DBMS packages such as [Oracle, 2010a] 
for specific use within databases have been proposed in the past, the 
introduced performance costs in DWs are very significant and may 
jeopardize their feasibility or make them unacceptable to users, as we 
demonstrate in this thesis. 
1.2.3.  Database Intrusion Detection Systems 
Most Database Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDS) rely on command-
syntax analysis to compute data access patterns and dependencies for 
building user profiles [Mathew et al., 2010]. However, as we have 
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previously mentioned, the considerable ad hoc nature of Data Warehouse 
(DW) decision support workloads makes it extremely difficult to 
distinguish between normal and abnormal user behavior. Although 
several DIDS proposed in the recent past are available to be used in DWs, 
they suffer from a series of drawbacks in these environments: 
 Most are poor at detecting novel attacks in dealing with ad hoc 
workloads such as those in DWs and typically spawn too low true 
intrusion detection rates (allowing many intrusions to pass 
undetected) or too high false alarm rates [Pietraszek, 2004; 
Pietraszek and Tanner, 2005; Srivastava et al., 2006; Treinen and 
Thurimella, 2006]; 
 Thresholds2 are typically used to assess the probability of a given 
action being an intrusion. Given the sensitivity of DW data, using 
low thresholds is preferable (which consequently generates more 
alerts), because the potential cost of non-detection is often too high 
or unacceptable. However, in this case the number of false alarms 
is often so large that it frequently leads to wasting immense time 
and resources, or they are simply just too much to be checked 
[Pietraszek, 2004; Srivastava et al., 2006]; 
 Although alert correlation techniques have been proposed to deal 
with large amounts of generated alerts and decrease false positive 
rates, they are not the best choice for alert management in DW 
environments. In fact, as these techniques filter sets of alerts in 
order to decide if each alert is relevant or not, they may allow true 
intrusions that are capable of producing a great amount of damage 
to pass undetected, even though they were initially alerted; 
 Most DIDS do not assess the damage that each potential intrusion 
is capable of causing to the data and/or enterprise. Given the 
business value of DWs, this is a critical issue because it would allow 
to define which alerts should be checked first, since different data 
also has different importance to the enterprise; 
                                                     
2 When mentioned in intrusion detection processes, the term threshold is typically 
a value that sets the limit between normal and abnormal behaviour, given a range 
domain of possible values that are outputted by those processes. 
Chapter 1 
10 
 Many DIDS execute the intrusion detection (ID) process a posteriori, 
i.e., after the intrusion action has finished its execution. This 
disables intrusion response and prevention while the intrusion 
occurs. Given their value, avoiding corruption or exposure of data 
in DWs as early as possible is a critical issue, making real-time 
intrusion detection and response capabilities is an essential 
requirement. 
The overstated number of alerts and false alarms, together with the 
potentially low reliability on correlation techniques and the hypothesis 
that many intrusions may only be detected and dealt with a posteriori 
jeopardizes the credibility, efficiency and effectiveness of existing DIDS 
[Bockermann et al., 2009; Lee, 2002; Pietraszek, 2004; Pietraszek and 
Tanner, 2005; Treinen and Thurimella, 2006]. 
Another problem that makes it difficult to develop adequate DIDS is the 
absence of intrusion detection benchmarks at the database level. 
Benchmarks are an essential instrument used in the development and 
implementation of many systems. They are widely used because they 
provide a manner to test those systems and supply solution providers and 
clients with measures that allow comparing between different solutions, 
while providing feedback to developers that enables them to improve 
those solutions. In the past, the KDD99 benchmark [DARPA] has been 
widely used for testing intrusion detection solutions. However, this 
benchmark focuses on intrusion actions at the network and operating 
system (OS) level. In what concerns databases, a need arises for dealing 
with intruders that are able to bypass intrusion detection mechanisms 
working at the network and OS level. In spite of the criticality of protecting 
DW data against intrusions and the importance of having available 
benchmarks for testing and improving DIDS, to the best of our knowledge 
there is no benchmark focusing on the specific features3 of intrusion 
detection in DW environments at the data level. 
                                                     
3 The explicit mention to intrusion detection features refer to the variables that are 
used for building user profiles and that are employed for intrusion detection 
purposes. For example, the DIDS proposed in this thesis uses features such as the 
elapsed time for processing each SQL user command, the number of processed 
rows, the size of the resulting dataset, etc. 
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1.2.4. Data Security Research Challenges in Data Warehousing 
The two main characteristics that differentiate one data confidentiality 
solution from the other is its ability to secure the protected data against 
attacks and its speed and efficiency in doing this. Given the specificities of 
data warehousing environments, we believe there are specific security and 
performance issues and tradeoffs to evaluate and discuss, regarding the 
use of data masking and encryption solutions in DWs, which can lead to 
the development of solutions with better tradeoffs. We also believe that 
higher efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved in DIDS for DWs if they 
are designed and/or improved taking in consideration those specificities of 
data warehousing environments. These are our motivations, which 
establish the foundations for the research work presented in this thesis. 
1.3 Thesis Statement and Main Contributions 
This thesis makes several contributions for enhancing data security in DWs 
at the database server level. We propose specific solutions for 
implementing data confidentiality, namely novel data masking and 
encryption techniques, as well as a Database Intrusion Detection System, 
which consider the unique specificities of data warehousing environments. 
A framework for integrating all the proposed solutions together is also 
proposed, supporting the implementation of a unique system that allows 
increasing the DW’s overall security strength.  
In detail, the main contributions of this thesis are: 
 A body of knowledge on performance of encryption solutions in 
large analytical databases. While encryption solutions are typically 
characterized and analyzed from a security perspective, we present 
research findings concerning their performance. It is not within the 
scope of this thesis to discuss the scientific merit or soundness of 
the security strength of each technique, but rather to evaluate their 
impact in database performance and applicability in data 
warehousing environments. This is obtained by analyzing the 
design and measured performance of several state-of-the-art and 
standard encryption algorithms in DWs of various sizes. 
 A body of knowledge on performance of database intrusion 
detection techniques focusing on their applicability in data 
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warehousing environments. We present state-of-the-art intrusion 
detection techniques and make a clear distinction between them 
given the way that they determine which features to use and how 
they manage intrusion detection. Based on this and on the 
characteristics of typical data warehousing environment 
workloads, we discuss the suitability or unsuitability of each 
distinct type of technique for detecting intrusions in DWs. We also 
point out alert management and intrusion response issues, which 
can become a critical matter in intrusion damage containment. 
 A novel data masking technique that introduces small database 
performance overheads while providing considerable security 
strength. The technique is used transparently by means of a 
middleware security broker and sustains the reversible features to 
retrieve the true original values from the masked values, which 
makes it useful in live databases such as DWs. It also promotes user 
action auditing and accountability. Although its security strength 
is not as high as that of encryption techniques, we believe that this 
data masking technique is secure enough to be used in scenarios 
where the performance overheads introduced by encryption are 
unacceptable, presenting itself as a feasible solution by balancing 
security and performance tradeoffs. 
 A novel data encryption algorithm for numerical values that 
provides considerable security strength while introducing small 
database performance overhead. Similarly to the data masking 
technique, our encryption solution is used transparently by means 
of a middleware security broker and promotes user action auditing 
and accountability. The proposed encryption technique avoids 
storage space and computational overhead by preserving each 
encrypted column’s original datatype. Each encrypted column may 
have its own security strength by defining the number of 
encryption rounds to execute, which also defines how many 
encryption keys are used, since each round uses a distinct key (thus, 
the true key length is the number of rounds multiplied by the length 
of each round’s encryption key). This enables columns that store 
less sensitive information to be protected with smaller-sized keys 
and rounds and thus, process faster than more sensitive columns. 
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Both data masking and encryption techniques maintain the stored 
data masked or encrypted at all times, requiring only rewriting SQL 
user commands to function properly and minimal changes to the 
original data schemas. They use only standard SQL operations and 
operators, which makes them directly implementable and 
executable in any DBMS and database setup in a low-cost and 
straightforward manner. Contrarily to solutions that pre-fetch data 
to perform masking and unmasking or encryption and decryption, 
by simply rewriting SQL commands we avoid I/O and network 
bandwidth congestion due to data roundtrips between the database 
and the encryption/decryption or masking/unmasking 
mechanisms, and consequent response time overhead. 
 A specifically designed DIDS for DWs that works as an extension 
of any DBMS, adding real-time intrusion detection and response 
capabilities for each user action executed. The solution acts 
transparently at the application layer between user applications 
and the database without affecting their joint functionality. While 
other DIDS just analyze the user command or its resulting dataset, 
the proposed DIDS analyzes four distinct aspects of the user’s 
action: SQL command, plus the accessed and processed data, plus 
the resulting dataset, and enables stopping the user actions, both 
before and after they are executed by the DBMS, with the ability to 
avoid the disclosure of their results to the user or application that 
requested the execution. A declarative SQL-like form for defining 
intrusion detection and response rules at a fine-grain level is also 
proposed. These rules allow defining a large spectrum of 
possibilities for the detection of a wide range of intrusions as well 
as adequately dealing with them. 
 A risk exposure approach to be used in the DIDS for ranking alerts, 
improving the efficiency of damage or leakage containment by 
pointing out the intrusions that might cause more damage. In cases 
where the number of generated alerts to be checked is high, the 
approach enables handling intrusions that indicate a potentially 
higher risk to the enterprise more rapidly, efficiently and effectively 
than using correlation techniques. 
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 A security framework that integrates the proposed data masking 
and encryption solutions with the DIDS into a single conformed 
workflow between users and the database, which provides a mean 
for increasing the overall security strength of any DW by enabling 
each solution to optionally function individually or all together. 
The framework also defines the guidelines for each type of solution, 
given the characteristics of DWs and each solution’s individual 
purpose. 
 Although not included as fully developed and tested research and 
therefore, not included as a regular chapter, in Appendix D we 
include an initial proposal for a DW Intrusion Detection 
Benchmark to test DIDS in DWs at the SQL level, given a controlled 
DW environment with mixed intrusion and non-intrusion SQL 
workloads. The main contribution of the benchmark is to provide a 
feasible and objective mean for evaluating the efficiency of the 
intrusion detection processes and impact on database performance 
at the SQL level for DW DIDS. The proposed measures intend to 
produce insight for aiding developers in the improvement of their 
solutions and allow providers and users to compare between 
different solutions. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This chapter discussed the importance of DWs and securing them. It 
presented key definitions and issues concerning data security in data 
warehousing environments, creating the ground for the research presented 
in this thesis. The chapter also presented the objectives and main 
contributions of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 discusses background and related work in the domain 
background. We characterize data warehousing environments and 
describe the current state-of-the-art solutions and techniques in data 
masking, encryption and database intrusion detection. We conclude the 
chapter by pointing out the issues in each of these subjects from a data 
warehousing perspective [Santos et al., 2011a; Santos et al., 2012a, Santos et 
al., 2014]. 
Chapter 3 presents the integrated security framework, describing each of 
its components and how they work together to accomplish their security 
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goals. The framework is defined in a generic way to demonstrate how each 
individual solution can come together to form a broad scoped overall 
security approach. The set of principles that drived the development of 
each data masking, encryption and intrusion detection solution proposed 
in this thesis is also included. 
Chapter 4 proposes a novel reversible data masking technique for 
numerical values that provides significant security strength and complies 
with the principles defined in the security framework [Santos et al., 2011b; 
Santos et al., 2011c]. Besides demonstrating the proof of the masking 
solution’s security strength, this chapter also includes an experimental 
evaluation to demonstrate that the proposed approach is computationally 
faster than existing standard and state-of-the-art encryption solutions.  
Chapter 5 proposes a novel encryption algorithm for numerical values 
[Santos et al., 2013]. This technique also complies with the set of principles 
defined by the security framework. The chapter includes the proof of the 
proposed solution’s security strength along with an experimental 
evaluation that also show that it is computationally faster than standard 
and state-of-the-art encryption solutions. 
Chapter 6 presents our approach to develop a DIDS focusing on the 
specificities of data warehousing environments, which is based on the 
detection of anomalous user activities by joining the syntax-based analysis 
of the user commands with features of the processed data and the 
command execution’s resulting datasets [Santos et al., 2012b; Santos et al., 
2012c]. The DIDS works transparently as an extension of the database 
server, placed between the user interface(s) and the DBMS, and uses a risk 
exposure alert management approach that enables it to be more efficient 
than commonly used alert correlation techniques. An experimental 
evaluation is included to demonstrate its efficiency against other state-of-
the-art intrusion detection solutions proposed in former research. 
The last chapter presents the conclusions on this thesis and points out 
future research directions derived from our work. 
Appendix A describes the Sales DW purpose along with its data schema, 
scale and storage sizes, as well as a list of queries that make up the decision 
support workloads used in the experimental evaluations presented in the 
thesis. 
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Appendix B shows the data masking and encryption experimental results 
included in Chapters 4 and 5, with its respective statistical measures 
(averages and standard deviations). 
Appendix C shows the intrusion detection experimental results included 
in Chapter 6, with its respective statistical measures. 
Finally, Appendix D describes in detail our initial proposal for a DW 
intrusion detection benchmark. 
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Chapter 2  
Background and Related Work 
Data Warehouses present unique characteristics that differ from other 
types of database systems. In order to discuss data security from a data 
warehousing perspective, summarizing those characteristics along with 
those belonging to the data security solutions focused in this thesis is an 
essential requirement. This chapter summarily describes the concepts 
concerning DWs and presents relevant background and related work 
focusing on standards and state-of-the-art solutions proposed by research 
in the data security domains focused in this thesis, namely data masking, 
encryption and DIDS.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 summarizes the concepts 
of data warehousing and the typical characteristics of those environments 
in what concerns database features and workloads, while Sections 2.2 and 
2.3 respectively describe the state-of-the-art data masking and encryption 
techniques that are currently available for usage in DWs and discusses the 
issues concerning their use in these analytical environments. Section 2.4 
describes the main intrusion techniques and methods used in DIDS and 
discusses their applicability from a data warehousing perspective. Finally, 
Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
2.1. Data Warehousing 
In an enterprise, the transactional (alias operational) systems typically 
consist of a set of applications and data sources that enable accomplishing 
and storing business transactions, and guarantee their operationability 
[Kimball and Ross, 2013]. Transactional databases are designed to manage 
the data for supporting each individual business transaction instead of 
cross-enterprise business analysis. Transactional systems typically consist 
of many users reading and writing small amounts of data; for example, on 
an ATM bank system, there are hundreds or thousands of users accessing 
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their account balances at the same time, or withdrawing/transferring a 
given amount of money. Another characteristic of the ATM system is that 
it does not require keeping long periods of historical data; it only needs the 
current balance and latest movement records to be able to adequately 
support user requests and business transactions.  
In contrast, Decision Support Systems (DSS) are usually accessed by fewer 
users but that query large amounts of data to obtain business analysis 
information to aid decision making. Using the same bank ATM system as 
an example, the difference is that the people from the bank that need to 
make decisions regarding the business (i.e., business managers, 
administrators, executives, etc.) want to know the average balance for the 
last six months or a year for the accounts with certain geographical region, 
for instance, in order to make strategic decisions like opening a new branch 
office or encourage people to increase their investments by offering better 
interests. To execute this kind of query, the system needs to keep historical 
data of the balances plus it would read millions of records of all clients 
within certain region and compute that average.  
These type of analytical actions result in very demanding data access 
patterns, that if running on top of a transactional database can lock large 
amounts of data and consume computational resources in a way that could 
compromise the transactional system’s availability, ultimately making it 
incapable of supporting the business transactions. Moreover, many 
transactional systems operate isolated from each other with little or no 
integration, and each system typically manages its own dataset. As a result, 
the same data is represented and stored in many different ways throughout 
the enterprise, one for each system. Consequently, there can be multiple 
distinct versions of the truth, which can be inaccurate, outdated or simply 
invalid. 
To relieve resource consumption, reduce the operational risk in the 
transactional applications that support business, deliver a unique source of 
true information and provide an optimized data structure for analytical 
cross-enterprise decision support purposes, Data Warehouses are used, 
clearly separating the analytical business processes from the transactional 
business processes. In the next subsection, we present the concepts and 
definitions concerning DWs. 
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2.1.1. The Data Warehouse: Concepts and Definitions 
The origin of the Data Warehouse concept can be traced back to the research 
carried out at the Massachussets Institute of Technology and at IBM in the 
late 1970s, focusing on ways to define an architectural model for the flow 
of data from operational systems to decision support environments. From 
this research work at MIT, for the first time a differentiation between the 
operational and analytical processing is made. In 1988, Devlin and Murphy 
from IBM introduced the term “Business Data Warehouse” [Devlin and 
Murphy, 1988] that precedes the actual “Data Warehouse” term.  
In 1992, Bill Inmon published the first edition of his book “Building the 
Data Warehouse” [Inmon, 1992] where he defines the term “Data 
Warehouse” and also consolidated the terms and techniques that have 
been the foundation for DWs since then. In 1996, Ralph Kimball defined 
the Star Schema and Multidimensional modeling techniques [Kimball, 
1996], which enriched the DW definitions. The Inmon and Kimball 
approaches were widely accepted by research and commercial database 
communities and became the common guidelines for building DWs. 
In the past, there have been many definitions on what is a Data Warehouse. 
Although the Inmon and Kimball approaches differ from each other, as 
well as other derived approaches, they agree on most characteristics that 
define the concept of what a DW is.  
A generic definition of a DW is given by [Kimball, 1996; Kimball and Ross, 
2002; Kimball and Ross, 2013]:  
“A Data Warehouse consists of a considerable sized database, which 
consistently aggregates all the historical data belonging to a given 
specific business field or business area, in a previously well-defined 
level of detail that is considered adequate and relevant for decision 
support purposes by the business itself. The data in a DW can be 
separated and combined by means of every possible measure in a 
business”. 
According to [Simitsis, 2005], the most popular definition of DW is that in 
[Inmon, 1996; Inmon, 2002]: 
“A Data Warehouse is a centralized repository for the entire 
enterprise, containing data that is used for analyzing the business and 
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supporting decision making. The Data Warehouse has four main 
attributes: it is subject-oriented (meaning the data in it is organized so 
that all the data elements relating to the same business event or 
subject are linked together and that the DW is developed in a way 
that satisfies the analytical requirements of the users that will query 
it); it is non-volatile (meaning that the data loaded into the database is 
never erased or over-written, i.e., once the data is committed it 
remains static and read-only and is retained for future reporting and 
analysis); it is integrated (meaning it joins data from several 
operational data sources into a conformed format in a consistent 
way); and it is time-variant (meaning that it stores the history of the 
business to which it was designed for).” 
Based on these definitions, in this thesis we consider a DW as a large-sized 
non-volatile cross-enterprise analytical database that stores historical, non-
volatile, integrated, consolidated, updated and consistent data, in a level of 
detail and format considered adequate for providing decision support 
information in a given business area or field by the business stakeholders. 
Having explained the principles and concepts that define a DW, it is also 
important to understand the environments in which they function. 
Therefore, in the next subsection we characterize data warehousing 
environments. 
 
2.1.2. Data Warehousing Environments 
The DW obtains its data from the operational data sources (which may 
consist of transactional databases, flat files, legacy systems, etc.) through 
the execution of Extraction, Transformation and Loading (ETL) processes, but 
clearly separates the analytical decision support processes (which mainly 
consist on executing On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) operations in 
order to generate a diverse variety of Business Intelligence (BI) reports) 
from the transactional business processes.  
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Figure 2-1 shows the traditional generic functional architecture of a DW, 
composed by the ETL Layer, and the Data and Metadata Repository Layers4. 
The ETL Layer is responsible for the execution of ETL processes and 
typically contains a staging area which is used to store extracted and 
transformed data until it is time to load that data into the DW database(s). 
The Data and Metadata Layer contains all DW databases, in which the 
Metadata Repository is used to describe in detail all DW objects and their 
relationships. In some DWs, the databases are divided into data structures 
named as Data Marts, which focus on storing the decision support data for 
a specific business subject within the enterprise. The Presentation Layer 
represents all front-end interfaces that are available to the DW end users 
for accessing its data. 
 
Figure 2-1. Generic Data Warehouse Functional Architecture 
Separating the analytical business processes from the operational 
transactional business processes allows the enterprise to gain at least two 
major advantages: 
 It enables physically and logically separating the transactional 
databases from the analytical databases and defining adequate specific 
allocated resources for each type of process. This means that each 
                                                     
4 Diverse architectures such as that defined in [Kimball and Ross, 2013] also 
include the Presentation Layer as part of the DW itself, but in this thesis we consider 
the first two layers as the DW core and the third as a separate tier representing the 
user interfaces. 
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database can be designed and defined the best possible way in order 
to adequately fulfill its purposes and maximize its performance 
regarding those purposes; 
 Reporting and ad hoc decision support querying is requested by the 
Presentation Layer to the mechanisms existing in the Data and Metadata 
Layer, which are isolated apart from the transactional business 
databases and thus, does not affect the functionality and/or availability 
of the operational source systems and vice-versa. 
Bearing in mind the way a DW operates, there have been several 
definitions of what is considered a data warehousing environment. 
According to [Chaudhuri et al., 1997]: 
“Data Warehousing is a collection of decision support technologies 
that aim at enabling an enterprise to make better and faster 
decisions.” 
Another definition of data warehousing is given in [Castro, 2009]: 
“The concept of data warehousing consists of architectures, tools, 
technologies, algorithms and methodologies that allow for the 
construction, usage, management and maintenance of the hardware 
and software used for a data warehouse, as well as the data itself.” 
Based on these definitions, in this thesis we consider data warehousing 
environments as the full setup of hardware and software in which the ETL 
processes and databases belonging to DWs operate, plus their user 
workloads. 
In what concerns the characterization of the type of users in data 
warehousing environments - considering users as anyone who may 
regularly access the DW database(s) for any reason - we consider three 
main classes of users, given their typical activities: 
1) The Database Administrator (DBA) or similar, which is anyone that can 
create or modify any database object. Typical actions on behalf of this 
user are the creation or modification of tables, indexes and views in 
the DW, for example. DBAs typically have full (or almost) access 
privileges to the databases. 
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2) The ETL User, which is any person or software responsible for 
updating the contents of the DW. Typical actions are new row inserts 
in fact tables and new row inserts or row updates in dimensional 
tables. 
3) The DW End User, which is any person belonging to the business that 
queries the databases with the purpose of obtaining decision support 
information or produce business knowledge, either by directly 
querying it or by using business intelligence and OLAP tools. 
In the next subsection, we describe the differences between operational 
systems and data warehousing environments. 
2.1.3. Data Warehousing Environments vs Operational Systems 
From a perspective attending to its purpose, as we have previously 
explained, a DW is mainly a database (or set of databases) system that has 
been specifically designed to provide decision support information and 
produce business knowledge, while an operational system is specifically 
designed to support individual business transactions and store its 
respective data. Given that the business often requires the operational 
system to be online in order to accomplish a transaction, operational 
system requirements focus on enabling high availability in order to avoid 
compromising the accomplishment of the transactions themselves. On the 
other hand, since most decision support queries often require processing a 
large amount of data, DWs focus on enabling high throughput [Kimball 
and Ross, 2013].  
From a perspective attending to the size and shape of its contents, a DW is 
composed of consolidated historical business data, mostly conformed and 
within data schemas that allow optimizing the execution of OLAP queries 
by tools that deliver the intended decision support information and 
produce the intended business knowledge. In most cases, storing the 
complete business history implies taking up a very large amount of storage 
space, often ranging from gigabytes to terabytes. In contrast, operational 
systems aim to keep their data sources “light”, i.e., small in size and 
content, in order to minimize processing efforts and consequently keep 
their availability as high as possible, therefore keeping only the exact 
amount of data which is required to support current and near-future 
business transactions. 
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In what concerns their data schemas, transactional databases have highly 
normalized schemas, mainly to avoid data redundancy and keep each table 
small-sized, while DWs have denormalized schemas. Most DW database 
schemas are based on star schemas, where business facts are stored in a 
central table called fact table (e.g. sales table) and the tables containing the 
business descriptors are called dimension tables (e.g. customer and product 
tables) [Kimball and Ross, 2013]. Dimension tables are linked to the fact 
table by their primary keys (e.g. CustomerID and ProductID) and are 
usually small in size (typically less than 10% of DW total storage space) 
and have a small amount of rows (up to tens of thousands), when 
compared with fact tables, which are typically very large in size and a huge 
amount of rows (millions or billions). Business facts are mainly stored in 
numerical-typed attributes within fact tables; since fact tables typically 
take up at least 90% of the DW total storage size, in many cases DW 
databases are mostly composed by numerical values [Kimball and Ross, 
2013]. 
Attending to the user’s responsibility among the business, the typical DW 
user is a business manager or someone that holds a considerable role of 
responsibility in the enterprise, while the typical user of operational 
systems are mainly transactional operators with low responsibility and 
with few or none decision making privileges. Since they mainly consist of 
business managers and decision makers, the number of DW users it 
typically low (a few tens).  
While in operational systems end users typically execute intensive read 
and write instructions, DW end users only execute read-only instructions 
such as queries, i.e., they are not allowed to change data, while DBAs and 
ETL users may insert or modify data. More than 90% of actions executed 
in DWs are typically decision support queries, (i.e. SELECT statements), 
mainly executed against fact tables [Kimball and Ross, 2013]. Reporting (i.e. 
periodically running reports for answering predefined decision support 
queries) is typical in DWs. Besides predefined reporting, in many cases a 
very significant amount of decision support queries are ad hoc, which 
makes them mostly unpredictable in their syntax and frequency. In 
operational systems, the queries are almost fully simple and predefined 
and repetitive. 
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Although decision support queries may typically access huge amounts of 
data, their response usually results in small datasets with a few hundred 
bytes and a relatively low number of columns (no more than a few tens). 
Most queries in DWs are CPU intensive and can take up to hours, while 
operational system queries are intended to be computationally fast and 
deliver very small response times. 
Table 2-1 summarizes the main differences between operational systems 
and DWs, based on [Inmon, 2002; Kimball and Ross, 2013; Ponniah, 2010]. 
 
Table 2-1. Main Differences between Operational Systems and Data Warehouses 
 Operational Systems Data Warehouses 
Workload nature/purpose Transactional Analytical 
Temporal nature of the data Current Historical and current 
Typical database storage size As small as possible Very large to huge 
Typical number of tables Medium to high Small 
Typical data schema type Highly normalized Denormalized 
Typical number of users Medium to large Small 
Typical user’s responsibility 
towards the business 
Low High 
Typical type of command 
Read/Write of small 
amounts of data 
Read-only on large 
amounts of data 
Typical command complexity Simple Medium to High 
Typical operation dynamics 
Static, predefined, 
predictable and 
repetitive 
Dynamic, ad hoc, 
random and iterative 
Typical command response time Small Large 
Typical command action 
Read/write of a single 
row or few rows 
Reporting and 
aggregation on many 
rows, with roll-up, drill-
down, slice and dice 
Amount of data typically 
processed by each command 
Small Large or Very Large 
Typical data update frequency 
Often in a given period 
of time 
Once periodically 
Dataset size typically resulting 
from a command execution 
Small Variable (often Small) 
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Conclusively, it is widely recognized that DW/BI systems have profoundly 
different needs, clients, structures, and rhythms than those of operational 
systems. DW users have drastically different needs than operational 
system users [Kimball and Ross, 2013]. Thus, we can make the assumption 
that data warehousing environments also require distinct security 
solutions that are designed taking those specific characteristics under 
account and that are able to cope with those specific requirements and 
needs.  
The following sections present the background in data masking, 
encryption and intrusion detection. 
2.2. Data Masking 
An extensive survey on data masking (alias data obfuscation) techniques 
is given in [Ravikumar et al., 2011]. The main goal of data masking is to 
replace true data with realistic but not real data, so the true data is not 
readable by unauthorized users. To assure a significant level of security 
strength, the masked values should not allow attackers to easily discover 
ways of retrieving the true values.  
In this section, we shall explain the diverse forms of masking data, refer 
available commercial masking packages and discuss the issues concerning 
the use of data masking in data warehousing environments. 
2.2.1. Forms of Data Masking 
One way to accomplish data masking is to use value referencing, i.e., to 
create and use a reference table for each masked value, as shown in Figure 
2-2. 
Original Values  Reference Table  Masked Values 
16  Original Masked  3 
12  9 1  2 
9  12 2  1 
31  16 3  5 
9  23 4  1 
16  31 5  3 
23    4 
Figure 2-2. Data masking using a reference table 
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Another way is to use a function against each original value to produce a 
new masked value, such as shown in Figure 2-3. 
Original Values (xi)  Masking Function f(xi)  Masked Values (yi) 
16   
 
 
f(xi)=(3+9xi)MOD17 
 11 
12   9 
9   16 
31   10 
9   16 
16   11 
23    6 
Figure 2-3. Data masking using a masking function 
There are several types of functions as shown in Figure 2-3 that can be used 
for data masking, such as:  
 Deterministic masking: A deterministic function f(x) = yi, where f(xi) 
always produces the same yi for a given value xi; 
 Condition-based masking: Applying different mask formats to the 
same dataset depending on the rows that match specific conditions 
(e.g. applying different national identifier masks based on country of 
origin); 
 Compound masking: A set of related columns is masked as a group 
to ensure that the masked data across the related columns retain the 
same relationship (e.g. city, state, and zip code values may need to be 
consistent after masking, for maintaining referential integrity). 
These functions are mainly used in two ways, which can be used separately 
or mixed together: 
 Substituting, where each value is replaced by the output of a 
deterministic function or reference (e.g. Figures 2-2 and 2-3); 
 Shuffling, where values switch places. This occurs by swapping the 
values between two or more predefined similar typed columns in the 
same row or in different rows, or swapping the characters that 
compose the value in a predefined form (e.g. 12345 becomes 52143), or 
mixing both these types of swap. 
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The references and functions shown in Figures 2-2 and 2-3 show data 
masking operations that are reversible, i.e., the original value can be 
retrieved from the masked value if an authorized user executes a valid 
query that should obtain a true result. This is the typical DW setting, where 
data should be masked for avoiding disclosure to unauthorized users, but 
all authorized user queries must be able to retrieve the true exact response. 
However, there are situations in which the released data should not reveal 
their true values or, at least, not all their true values, in any case (including 
authorized users). These cases mostly refer to published data for public 
consulting or outsourcing purposes, or the creation of production and 
testing databases for aiding software development processes. In these 
cases, several typical types of techniques allow the disclosure of only part 
of the true data or entirely false data, such as: 
 Random number generators (RNG), widely used for generating 
statistically independent and apparently random values for simply 
replacing the original true values in whole or in part; 
 Random shuffling, where shuffling is used in conjunction with RNG 
for randomly swapping the values; 
 Nulling, where sensitive values that should not be disclosed are 
simply replaced by a null value; 
 Deleting, where rows with sensitive values are erased; 
 Masking out, where predefined parts of the sensitive values are 
replaced by universal characters (e.g. credit card number 9255 0614 
0015 8925 becomes 9255 XXXX XXXX 8341 or 9X5X 0X1X 0X1X 8X2X); 
 A mix of the previous techniques. 
More recently, research has also proposed non-deterministic methods for 
masking data, such as perturbation techniques [Agrawal et al., 2005; 
Procopiuc and Srivastava, 2011; Xiao et al., 2009]. The work in [Agrawal et 
al., 2005] proposes a solution based on data perturbation techniques and 
explains data reconstruction for responding to queries, in a data 
warehousing environment. Recent similar work proposing data 
anonymization solutions which rely on perturbation or differential 
techniques have been published in [Procopiuc and Srivastava, 2011] and 
[Xiao et al., 2009]. 
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2.2.2. Commercial Data Masking Solutions 
Many similar commercial data masking packages have been developed. 
Oracle, for instance, has developed the Oracle Data Masking (ODM) pack 
[Oracle, 2010c], protecting data by replacing real values with realist-
looking data with the same type and characteristics as the original data. 
ODM provides masking primitives such as random numbers, dates and 
constants, as well as other built-in routines that shuffle the values in a 
column across different rows. However, once applied, the ODM does not 
allow retrieving the real values, i.e., the original values are forever 
inaccessible.  
ODM provides a centralized library of out-of-the-box mask formats for 
common types of sensitive data such as credit card and phone numbers, 
national identifiers (e.g. social security numbers), etc. By leveraging the 
ODM Format Library, data privacy rules can be applied across enterprise-
wide databases from a single source, ensuring consistent compliance with 
regulations. ODM supports the concept of application masking templates, 
which are XML representations of the mask definitions. Security 
administrators, software vendors or service providers can then import 
these predefined XML templates into the ODM in order to ease and 
accelerate the data masking implementation process. The ODM 
automatically identifies and ensures referential integrity.  
Oracle states that ODM is to be used mainly as a fast and easy way to 
generate production databases for supporting outsourcing and software 
application development. The ODM can also be used to mask Microsoft 
SQL Server and DB2 databases for the same purposes. ODM requires new 
data to be loaded into the database first, and only applies the masking 
procedures afterwards. It is not possible to load previously masked data. 
Masking in ODM is an a posteriori process. Most commercial data masking 
solutions work in a similar fashion as ODM. 
2.2.3. Using Data Masking in Data Warehouses 
Organizations have partly strived to solve confidentiality and privacy 
issues by using hand-crafted solutions or repurposed data manipulation 
tools developed within the enterprise to solve the problem of sharing 
sensitive information. The most common solution is probably to use scripts 
with triggers in order to mask and unmask each value, or to embed the 
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masking/unmasking logic within the user applications themselves, 
keeping their secrecy aspects mostly within the development team.  
However, these proprietary solutions are not the best way to achieve a 
standard data masking solution. On one hand, embedding them into 
applications makes their maintenance complex and costly. On the other 
hand, not disclosing them to the security and database research 
communities and keeping them as a hidden black box solution keeps their 
security strength unproven. Another common solution is to use standard 
commercial masking tools such as ODM. 
Since DWs mainly require masking solutions to guarantee that the masked 
values can be reengineered to retrieve their original true values, we can 
state that using RNG, random shuffling, nulling, deleting, and masking out 
techniques are mostly not suitable for data warehousing environments. 
Thus, most leading commercial data masking packages such as ODM are 
also not applicable to most data warehousing scenarios. Consequently, to 
be useful, DW data masking routines must be based on reversible shuffling 
or substituting techniques. 
Designing an efficient substitution or shuffling routine is far from being a 
trivial task. If the masking values produced by those methods can be easily 
determined by comparison or other type of inference then the original true 
data can be easily retrieved by attackers, making the routines useless. For 
example, if the shuffle algorithm simply runs down a table swapping the 
column data of the sensitive columns in between every group of two rows, 
it would not take much effort from the attacker to break security.  
Shuffling routines can ensure higher security strength than simple 
substitution routines, because they shuffle the values and can add the use 
of a value-function for changing their values before or after the shuffle. 
However, shuffling routines may become extremely complex, namely in 
determining how to swap the values in order to guarantee both an 
acceptable security strength and processing time overheads. On one hand, 
limiting the shuffling between columns of the same row allows minimizing 
data access time for the masking actions but reduces security strength, 
compared with shuffling throughout the typically huge number of rows in 
DW sensitive fact tables. On the other hand, shuffling the values spaced 
throughout those table rows greatly increases the leaps the DBMS engine 
needs to execute in the datafile to retrieve the true data in the correct order, 
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since the masked values for each row are distributed up and down the 
table. Given the large amount of data typically processed in DW queries, 
the number of leaps to orderly access the data may easily produce dramatic 
and unacceptable response time overheads.  
When using data referencing, if the number of possible values to substitute 
a certain value has low cardinality (e.g. swapping values TRUE and FALSE 
for a boolean column with masking values 1 and 2) the reference lookup is 
fast but there is a security problem because the attacker can easily infer 
which is which. On the other hand, if the cardinality of the column to mask 
by referencing is high, then the number of rows to seek in the reference 
table will also be high, increasing security but decreasing response time for 
retrieving each value. Thus, there is always a tradeoff between security and 
performance to deal with: if the security level increases, performance 
typically decreases.  
Substitution and shuffling techniques also present important security and 
performance issues. The main problem is that developing a value 
substitution function that uses one or more linear transformations is not 
secure because the attacker can build systems of equations and inference 
models to discover how the function masks a value. To deal with this 
problem, other bit-level manipulation operations need to be included, 
along with the execution of a significant number of rounds. These features 
are the basis for data encryption, which we explain in the next section. Data 
encryption solutions are the successors of the simpler forms of data 
masking substitution techniques and obey common principles and rules 
established by the security research and regulations communities and 
organizations. 
For decision support purposes, in most DWs the user queries need to 
obtain a true and accurate result. Given this requirement, since 
perturbation techniques produce errors in data reconstruction, they should 
be avoided and are mainly inadequate from a data warehousing 
perspective. 
Therefore, the following needs to be considered when applying data 
masking in DWs: 
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 Since it is not easy to ensure strong security strength (mainly when 
compared with encryption solutions), data masking has been 
considered a poor solution to protect data for real live DW databases, 
from the security perspective; 
 The data masking routines provided by most standard commercial 
tools typically change data in an irreversible manner, i.e., transform 
data in a way that makes it not possible to subsequently retrieve the 
original true values, making them useless for real live DW databases;  
 On the other hand, solutions that allow retrieving the true original 
data mostly rely on cross-referencing actions, which imply huge 
table joins in DWs. Given the consequent high performance 
degradation, they have been discarded for use with real-live DWs;  
 Given those security, usability and performance issues and 
drawbacks (assumed by the research and commercial communities), 
data masking is mostly recommended as an easy, efficient and fast 
solution in the development lifecycle of user applications and not for 
real-live databases. These facts have pushed data masking to a type 
of solution used mainly for testing software development rather than 
protect live sensitive data [Gartner, 2009; Huey, 2008; Natan, 2005; 
Oracle, 2005; Oracle, 2010a; Oracle, 2010c; Ravikumar et al., 2011; 
Yuhanna, 2009]. 
The next section describes standard and state-of-the-art encryption 
techniques and discusses the issues involving the use of data encryption 
solutions in DWs. 
2.3. Data Encryption 
The high security requirements for confidentiality in many scenarios 
involving end-to-end data communication have led to the development of 
encryption algorithms. The frontier between data masking and encryption 
is often blurry, since they mainly aim to achieve the same purposes. 
However, while data masking can be simply considered as any action that 
changes a given value or set of values into another value or set of values 
that should not allow retrieving the original value or set of values by 
unauthorized users, encryption is mainly defined as a set of actions that 
obey a strict number of principles and rules defined and accepted by the 
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security communities and is always a reversible action [Vaudenay, 2006]. 
Encryption makes ground on cryptography, defined as applying a coding 
algorithm to a plaintext (alias original input value) that results in a 
ciphertext (encrypted output value), which allows reversible action in 
order to retrieve the plaintext once again [Vaudenay, 2006].  
Typical encryption algorithms include iterative bit shifting and exclusive 
Or (XOR) operations executing in a predefined number of rounds. These 
operations rely on a key, which influences the “data mix” output of each 
round. The higher the key length and the number of rounds executed, the 
higher is the assumed security strength, given that the attacker typically 
needs to generate a large amount of possible key values and decryption 
rounds in order to break security [Elminaam et al., 2010]. Thus, encryption 
is an advanced form of data masking, with well-accepted and well-defined 
assumptions and high complexity, in order to make it extremely difficult 
for attackers to break security when compared with simpler forms of data 
masking.  
We consider describing and analyzing ciphers according to the principles 
following the Shannon Theory, where the Shannon Encryption Model is as 
illustrated in Figure 2-4 [Vaudenay, 2006]: 
“The purpose of encryption is to ensure communication secrecy. We 
assume that we want to communicate, which means to transmit 
information through a channel.” 
Plaintext 
Source
Encipherer CK
Plaintext X Decipherer C-1Ciphertext Y
Key Source
Key K
X
 
Figure 2-4. The Shannon Encryption Model (adapted from [Vaudenay, 2006])  
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Following the Shannon Theory, a cipher is given by: 
1) A plaintext source (with its corresponding distribution); 
2) A secret key or keys; 
3) A ciphertext space; 
4) A rule or set of rules represented as 𝐶𝐾, which transform any 
plaintext X with a key K into a ciphertext Y as 𝑌 =  𝐶𝐾(𝑋); 
5) A rule or set of rules represented as 𝐶𝐾
−1 which enables recovering 
plaintext X from the ciphertext Y using key K as 𝑋 = 𝐶𝐾
−1 (𝑌). 
Categorization methods for encryption techniques commonly used in data 
security are based on the form of the input data they operate on. The two 
types are Block Ciphers and Stream Ciphers. 
A block cipher is a type of symmetric-key encryption algorithm that 
transforms a fixed-length block of plaintext (unencrypted text) data into a 
block of ciphertext (encrypted text) data of the same length. All intermediate 
blocks are called states. This transformation takes place under the action of 
a user-provided secret key. Decryption is performed by applying the 
reverse transformation to the ciphertext block using the same secret key. 
The fixed length is called the block size. 
Stream ciphers take a string (the encryption key) and deterministically 
generate a set of random-seeming text (called keystream) from that key. 
That keystream is then XORed against the message to encipher. To 
decipher the text, the recipient simply hands the same key to the stream 
cipher to produce an identical keystream and XORs it with the ciphertext, 
thus retrieving the original message. 
In the following subsections, we shall describe the standard encryption 
techniques and algorithms as well as state-of-the-art encryption algorithms 
that have been specifically proposed by research to be applied in databases, 
and discuss the issues concerning their use in data warehousing 
environments. 
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2.3.1. Standard Encryption Techniques and Algorithms 
Data Encryption Standard (DES). The Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
was the first encryption standard to be approved and recommended by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and became a 
standard in 1977 [DES, 1977]. DES is a 64 bit block cipher, which means 
that data is encrypted and decrypted in 64 bit chunks, and uses a 56 bit 
encryption key. This has implications in short data lengths. Even 8 bit data, 
when encrypted by the algorithm will always result in a 64 bit chunk. Its 
algorithm is thus a set of permutations over the set of 64 bit block strings. 
DES consists of a 16-round Feistel scheme, which is the most popular block 
cipher skeleton [Vaudenay, 2006]. It is fairly easy to use a random function 
in order to construct a permutation. In addition, encryption and decryption 
hardly require separate implementations. A Feistel scheme is a ladder 
structure which creates a permutation from a function. In each round, the 
input string is split into two parts of equal length, and the result of passing 
one part through a round function is XORed to the other part, then 
obtaining two parts which are then exchanged (except in the final round). 
The round function uses subkeys derived from a secret key. 
The round function of DES has a 32-bit input, 48-bit subkey parameter 
input, and a 32-bit output. For every round, the 48-bit subkey is generated 
from a secret key by a key schedule. Basically, every 48-bit subkey consists 
of a permutation and a selection of 48 out of the 56 bits of the secret key. 
The round function is illustrated in Figure 2-5, consisting of [Vaudenay, 
2006]: 
 An expansion of the main input (one out of two input bits is duplicated 
in order to get 48 bits); 
 A XOR with the subkey; 
 Eight Substitution Boxes (S-boxes) which transform a 6-bit input into 
a 4-bit output; and 
 A permutation of the final 32 bits. 
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Figure 2-5. DES Round Function [Vaudenay, 2006]  
As referred, the DES cipher uses eight S-boxes in its round function (S1 to 
S8). In cryptography, an S-box (Substitution-box) is a basic component of 
symmetric key algorithms which performs substitution. In block ciphers, 
they are typically used to obscure the relationship between the key and the 
ciphertext. In many cases, the S-boxes are carefully chosen to resist 
cryptanalysis. In general, an S-box takes some number of input bits, m, and 
transforms them into a number of output bits, n: an m×n S-box can be 
implemented as a lookup table with 2m words of n bits each. Fixed tables 
are normally used, as in DES, but in some ciphers the tables are generated 
dynamically from the key; e.g. the Blowfish encryption algorithm [Radha 
and Kumar, 2005]. 
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3DES. DES has been proven to be an insecure cipher [Kim et al., 2010]. 
There has considerable controversy over its design, particularly in the 
choice of a 56 bit key [Nadeem and Javed, 2005]. As an enhancement of 
DES, the Triple DES (3DES) encryption standard was proposed [3DES, 
2005]. In 3DES encryption algorithm is similar to the original DES 
algorithm, but it is applied three times to increase the encryption level, 
using three different 56 bit keys. Thus, the effective key length is 168 bits. 
Since the algorithm increases the number of cryptographic operations it 
needs to execute, it is a well known fact that the 3DES algorithm is one of 
the slowest block cipher methods. 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). After the DES standard was 
deemed as no longer appropriate, the US Government started a process 
leading to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The AES is a 
symmetric block cipher algorithm defined in the Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS) no. 197 [AES, 2001]. The AES algorithms are 
block ciphers with a significant increase in the block size – from the old 
standard of 64 bits up to 128 bits. AES provides three approved key 
lengths: 128, 192 and 256 bits.  
The AES consists of several rounds of a substitution-permutation network. 
Its design consists of writing 128-bit message blocks as a 4x4 square matrix 
of bytes. Encryption is performed through 10, 12 or 14 rounds depending 
on whether the key size is 128, 196 or 256 bits. Each round (except the final 
one) consists of four transformations: 
1) SubBytes, a byte-wise substitution defined by a single table of 256 
bytes; 
2) ShiftRows, a circular shift of all rows (row i of the matrix is rotated 
by i positions to the left for i = 0, 1, 2, 3); 
3) MixColumns, a linear transformation performed on each column 
and defined by a 4x4 matrix of GF(28) elements (explained further); 
4) AddRoundKey, a simple bitwise XOR with a round key defined by 
another matrix. 
The final round is similar, except for MixColumns which is omitted. The 
round keys are generated by a separate key schedule. 
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More formally, one block s is encrypted by the following process, in which 
W is the output subkey sequence from the key schedule algorithm, as 
shown in Figure 2-6. 
 
Figure 2-6. AES Step-by-Step Algorithm [Vaudenay, 2006]  
The block s is also called state and represented as a matrix of terms si, j for 
i, j  {0, 1, 2, 3}. Each term is a byte, i.e., elements of a set Z of cardinality 
256. SubBytes(s) is defined as follows: 
FOR i = 0 TO 3 DO 
     FOR j = 0 TO 3 DO 
          si, j = S-box(si, j)  
Where S-box is the substitution table. Mathematically, it is a permutation 
of {0, 1, …, 255}. ShiftRows(s) is defined as follows: 
REPLACE [s1,0, s1,1, s1,2, s1,3] by [s1,1, s1,2, s1,3, s1,0] 
     {ROTATE row 1 BY ONE POSITION TO THE LEFT} 
REPLACE [s2,0, s2,1, s2,2, s2,3] by [s2,2, s2,3, s2,0, s2,1] 
     {ROTATE row 2 BY TWO POSITIONS TO THE LEFT} 
REPLACE [s3,0, s3,1, s3,2, s3,3] by [s3,3, s3,0, s3,1, s3,2] 
     {ROTATE row 3 BY THREE POSITIONS TO THE LEFT} 
Defining the set Z as the set of all the 256 possible combinations 
     a0 + a1.x + a2.x2 + … + a7.x7 
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where a0, a1, a2, …, a7 are either 0 or 1 and x is a formal term. Elements of Z 
are thus defined as polynomials of degree at most 7. AddRoundKey(s, k) is 
defined as follows: 
FOR i = 0 TO 3 DO 
     FOR j = 0 TO 3 DO 
          si, j = si, j   ki, j  
Here, the  operation over Z is defined as an addition modulus, i.e. 
(∑ 𝑎𝑖  . 𝑥
𝑖
7
𝑖=0
)   (∑ 𝑏𝑖 . 𝑥
𝑖
7
𝑖=0
) = ∑(𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2). 𝑥
𝑖
7
𝑖=0
 
Given that a multiplication  in Z defined as follows: 
1) Perform the regular polynomial multiplication; 
2) Make the Euclidian division of the product by the x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 
polynomial and take the remainder; 
3) Reduce all its terms modulus 2. 
This provides Z with the structure of the unique finite field of 256 elements. 
This finite field is denoted by GF(28). This means that any addition, 
multiplication, or division by any nonzero element of Z with the same 
properties always results in a regular number. Matrix operations with 
terms in Z can be further defined. Thus, MixColumns(s) can be defined as: 
FOR i = 0 TO 3 DO 
     LET v BE THE 4-DIMENSIONAL VECTOR WITH COORDINATES 
     s0,i, s1,i, s2,i, s3,i  
     REPLACE s0,i, s1,i, s2,i, s3,i BY THE COORDINATES OF M  v 
Where M is a 4x4 matrix over Z defined by 
 
The substitution table S-box is defined by the inversion operation x-1 
(except for x = 0, which is mapped to zero) in the finite field GF(28). This 
operation has good nonlinear properties [Vaudenay, 2006].  
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AES is considered fast and able to provide stronger encryption, compared 
to other well-known encryption algorithms such as DES [Nadeem and 
Javed, 2005]. Brute force attack (in which the attacker tries all the possible 
key combinations to unlock the encryption) is the only known effective 
attack known against it. 
2.3.2. Other Encryption Techniques and Algorithms 
Besides the existence of standard encryption algorithms, the data security 
research community has also proposed several solutions for encrypting 
databases.  
One of the main issues in database performance due to using encryption is 
the inability to effectively manage useful indexing, since encryption 
changes data values and thus renders the traditional index building as 
useless. One way to deal with this is to ensure order preservation of the 
generated encrypted values. Based on this principle, several approaches 
have been proposed in order to enable direct querying against encrypted 
data.  
Order Preserving Encryption Scheme (OPES). In [Agrawal et al., 2004] an 
Order Preserving Encryption Scheme (OPES) for numeric data is proposed, 
flattening and transforming plain text distributions onto target 
distributions defined from value-based buckets, given the attribute’s 
domain values. This solution allows any comparison operation to be 
directly applied on encrypted data, such as equality and range queries, as 
well as SUM, AVG, MAX, MIN and COUNT queries. The authors define a 
threat model with the following assumptions, given the transparent 
encryption setting shown in Figure 2-7: 
 The storage system used by the database software is vulnerable to 
compromise; 
 The database software (DBMS) is trusted; 
 All disk-resident data (alias data-at-rest) is encrypted. 
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Figure 2-7. Transparent Encryption Setting for OPES [Agrawal et al., 2004]  
OPES works as a three stage process [Agrawal et al., 2004]: 
1) Model: The input and target distributions are modeled as piece-wise 
linear splines; 
2) Flatten: The plaintext database P is transformed into a “flat” database 
F such that the values in F are uniformly distributed; 
3) Transform: The flat database F is transformed into the ciphered 
database C such that the values in C are distributed according to the 
target distribution. 
The results of query processing over data encrypted by OPES are exact. 
They neither contain any false positives nor miss any answer tuple. OPES 
also handles updates gracefully; a value in a column can be modified or a 
new value can be inserted without requiring changes in the encryption of 
other values. The basic idea of OPES is to take as input a provided target 
distribution and transform the plaintext values in such a way that the 
transformation preserves the order while the transformed values follow 
the target distribution. 
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Executing SQL over Encrypted Data in the Database-Service-Provider 
Model. A similar solution for processing queries without decrypting data 
was proposed earlier by [Hacigumus et al., 2002], which uses the “Database 
as a Service” provider model based on Internet availability. The authors 
focus on assuring the owner of the data that the data stored in the service-
provider site is protected against those service providers themselves, if 
they cannot be trusted, by keeping data always encrypted and executing 
SQL queries directly against the encrypted data. To accomplish this, they 
propose splitting the computation of the queries into two phases: the first 
phase computes as much as possible against the encrypted data at the 
service provider server without having to decrypt it, and a second phase 
which processes the results obtained in the first phase at the client. The 
data in the service provider is protected because the decryption only occurs 
at the client side. The service-provider architecture for this solution is 
shown in Figure 2-8. 
 
Figure 2-8. Encryption-as-a-Service Service-Provider Model [Hacigumus et al., 2002]  
The encrypted data is stored at the service-provider according to the 
following: 
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 For each relation R(𝐴1, 𝐴2, …, 𝐴𝑛) of the original plaintext data, an 
encrypted relation RS(etuple, 𝐴1
𝑠, 𝐴2
𝑠 , …, 𝐴𝑛
𝑠 ) is stored on the service-
provider server; 
 The attribute etuple stores an encrypted string that corresponds to a 
tuple in relation R; 
 Each attribute 𝐴𝑖
𝑠 corresponds to the index for attribute 𝐴𝑖 that will be 
used for query processing at the server. 
Thus, each original unencrypted table is mapped to an encrypted table at 
the service-provider server. To accomplish this, they define a series of 
partitions on that server for each attribute, given the domain values of 
attributes R. 𝐴𝑖, define an identification function to assign an identifier to 
each partition of each attribute, and finally define a mapping function to 
those partitions which ensures order-preservation of the attribute’s 
original values. A practical evolution of the initial proposal was published 
in [Hacigumus et al., 2004], based on the same model. In this work, the 
authors focus on improving their transformation and mapping functions, 
by exploring homomorphism techniques to support aggregation in 
relational databases against encrypted data without decryption in the 
presence of logical predicates. 
Encryption in Column-Oriented DBMS. The authors of [Ge and Zdonik, 
2007] propose a lightweight database encryption scheme for column-stores 
in DWs with trusted servers, named FCE. This technique introduces low 
decryption overhead to enable making comparisons of ciphertexts and 
hence makes indexing operations fast. The authors also propose a relaxed 
measure of security to demonstrate FCE’s security strength based on 
information theoretic concepts. Using this same measure, they also show 
that order-preserving encryption techniques are insecure under 
straightforward attack scenarios.  
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA). In an effort to trying to simplify 
encryption algorithms, the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) [Wheeler 
and Needham, 1994] was proposed in 1994. This simple algorithm uses a 
larger number of rounds against a small number of data transformations 
than, rather than a more complex set of transformations with few rounds.  
The main objective of the authors of the TEA was to provide a very simple 
encryption algorithm instead of a complicated one. The authors claim that 
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it uses little setup time and does a weak non-linear iteration a sufficient 
number of rounds that makes it secure enough. There are no preset tables 
or long setup times. It assumes 32 bit words and the authors suggest 
executing 32 rounds. The TEA schema is shown in Figure 2-9. 
 
Figure 2-9. TEA Schema  
The proposed encoding routine, written in C, using four 32 bit keys k[0] to 
k[3] (making up a 128 bit key), executing 32 rounds to encrypt 64 bits of 
data in v[0] and v[1], is [Wheeler and Needham, 1994]: 
void code(long* v, long* k) { 
unsigned long y = v[0],z = v[1], sum = 0, /* set up */ 
         delta = 0x9e3779b9, /* a key schedule constant */ 
         n=32; 
while (n-->0) { /* basic cycle start */ 
   sum += delta ; 
   y += ((z<<4)+k[0]) ^ (z+sum) ^ ((z>>5)+k[1]) ; 
   z += ((y<<4)+k[2]) ^ (y+sum) ^ ((y>>5)+k[3]) ; 
} /* end cycle */ 
v[0]=y ; v[1]=z ;  
} 
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TEA is a Feistel type routine although addition and subtraction are used as 
the reversible operators rather than XOR. The routine relies on the alternate 
use of XOR and ADD to provide nonlinearity. A dual shift causes all bits 
of the key and data to be repeatedly mixed. The top five and bottom four 
bits are probably slightly weaker than the middle bits. These bits are 
generated from only two versions of z (or y) instead of three, plus the other 
y or z. Thus, the convergence rate to even diffusion is slower. However, the 
shifting evens this out with a possible delay of one or two extra cycles 
[Wheeler and Needham, 1994]. 
Blowfish Encryption Algorithm. The Blowfish encryption algorithm 
[Schneier, 2013] is one of the most common public domain encryption 
algorithms. Blowfish is a variable length key, 64 bit symmetric block 
cipher. This algorithm was first introduced in 1993. Each round of the 
algorithm consists of a key-dependent permutation and a key-and-data-
dependent substitution. All operations are based on XORs and additions 
on 32-bit words. The key has a variable length (with a maximum length of 
448 bits) and is used to generate several subkey arrays. It has been 
extensively analyzed and deemed “reasonably secure” by the 
cryptographic community. Though it suffers from weak keys problem, no 
attack is known to be successful against it [Nadeem and Javed, 2005]. A 
graphical representation of the Blowfish algorithm can be seen in Figure 2-
10. 
As shown in Figure 2-10, a 64-bit plaintext message is first divided into 32 
bits. The “left” 32 bits are XORed with the first element of a P-array to create 
a new value named as P’, run through a transformation function called F, 
then XORed with the “right” 32 bits of the message to produce a new value 
named as F’. F’ then replaces the “left” half of the message and P’ replaces 
the “right” half, and the process is repeated 15 more times with successive 
members of the P-array. The resulting P’ and F’ are then XORed with the 
last two entries in the P-array (entries 17 and 18), and recombined to 
produce the 64-bit ciphertext. 
A graphical representation of the F transformation function is shown in 
Figure 2-11. The function divides a 32-bit input into four bytes and uses 
those as indices into an S-array. The lookup results are then added and 
XORed together to produce the output. 
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Figure 2-10. The Blowfish Algorithm  
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Figure 2-11. The Blowfish Transformation Function (F) 
The P-array and S-array values used by Blowfish are precomputed based 
on the user’s key. In effect, the user’s key is transformed into the P-array 
and S-array; the key itself may be discarded after the transformation. The 
P-array and S-array need not be recomputed (as long as the key doesn’t 
change), but must remain secret. The P and S-arrays are summarized as 
follows (according to [Schneier, 2013]):  
 P is an array of eighteen 32-bit integers; 
 S is a two-dimensional array of 32-bit integer of dimension 4x256; 
 Both arrays are initialized with constants, which happen to be the 
hexadecimal digits of π (a pretty decent random number source); 
 The key is divided up into 32-bit blocks and XORed with the initial 
elements of the P and S arrays. The results are written back into the 
array. A message of all zeros is encrypted; the results of the encryption 
are written back to the P and S arrays. The P and S arrays are now 
ready for use. 
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Snuffle (alias Salsa20) Encryption Algorithm. Recently, the Snuffle 2005 
encryption algorithm (also known as Salsa20) was proposed [Bernstein, 
2005; Bernstein, 2008]. The goal of Salsa20 is to produce a 64-byte block 
given a key, nonce5 and block counter. The author recommends executing 
a number of 20 rounds, although 8 or 12 rounds are acceptable when 
required to gain speed against sacrificing some security. This solution can 
be seen as a 256-bit stream cipher and is based on a hash function with a 
long chain of simple operations, instead of a short chain of more complex 
operations (typical in standard encryption algorithms), on 32-bit words: 
 32-bit additions, producing the sum a + b mod 232 of two 32-bit words 
a, b (which breaks linearity over Z/2); 
 32-bit exclusive-or (XOR), producing a  b of two 32-bit words a, b 
(which breaks linearity over Z/232); and 
 Constant-distance 32-bit rotation, producing the rotation a <<< b of a 
32-bit word a by b bits to the left, where b is constant (diffusing changes 
from high bits to low bits). 
The author of Salsa20 states that although these operations may be 
considered too simplistic, they can easily emulate any circuit and are 
therefore capable of reaching the same security level as any other selection 
of operations. The real question for the cipher designer is whether a 
different mix of operations could achieve the same security level at higher 
speed. 
Salsa20 expands a 256-bit key and a 64-bit nonce (unique message number) 
into a 270-byte stream. It encrypts a b-byte plaintext by XORing the plaintext 
with the first b bytes of the stream and discarding the rest of the stream. It 
decrypts a b-byte ciphertext by XORing the ciphertext with the first b bytes 
of the stream. There is no feedback from the plaintext or ciphertext into the 
stream. 
Salsa20 generates the stream in 64-byte (512-bit) blocks. Each block is an 
independent hash of the key, the nonce, and a 64-bit block number; there 
                                                     
5 In cryptography, a nonce is an arbitrary number used only once in a 
cryptographic communication. It is often a random or pseudo-random number 
issued in an authentication protocol to ensure that old communications cannot be 
reused in replaying attacks. [Vaudenay, 2006] 
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is no chaining from one block to the next. The Salsa20 output stream can 
therefore be accessed randomly, and any number of blocks can be 
computed in parallel. 
There are no hidden preprocessing costs in Salsa20. In particular, Salsa20 
does not preprocess the key before generating a block; each block uses the 
key directly as input. Salsa20 also does not preprocess the nonce before 
generating a block; each block uses the nonce directly as input. 
This solution is relatively simple when compared with other standard 
encryption algorithms such as AES and has been recognized by the 
cryptology research community as an interesting alternative to those 
algorithms in contexts where speed is more important than confidence 
[Tsunoo et al., 2007; Bernstein, 2008]. 
2.3.3. DBMS Data Encryption Packages 
Many DBMS vendors such as Microsoft SQL Server and Oracle TDE 
provide built-in standard encryption packages. These routines run in the 
DBMS kernel and are optimized to work against their data structures and 
across a large diversity of platforms. 
Oracle has developed TDE (Transparent Data Encryption) [Oracle, 2005; 
Oracle, 2010a] incorporating both AES and 3DES, providing column and 
tablespace encryption. These routines can be used transparently without 
requiring user application source code modifications. As Oracle, Microsoft 
SQL Server also provides column and datafile 3DES and AES encryption 
routines. 
When using Oracle TDE tablespace encryption, all data in the tablespace’s 
physical datafiles is encrypted and almost no storage space overhead is 
generated. When using column encryption, a storage space overhead 
between 1 and 52 bytes per encrypted value is added. The generation of 
independently encrypted values for each column is done by using an 
optional feature (SALT) in the encryption, which implies adding 16 bytes 
of the storage space per encrypted column to each row. If the NO SALT 
option is used, those extra 16 bytes are saved, but all encrypted values in 
the column rely on one key only in the encryption algorithm, which lowers 
its security strength. Tablespace encryption uses only the database master 
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key and the tablespace’s encryption key, which makes its security level 
lower than column encryption.  
Encryption in Oracle TDE is transparently handled, including index 
operations and table joins, even if the columns for the join condition are 
encrypted. In TDE column encryption, the index needs to be a normal B-
Tree index. With TDE column encryption, the data remains encrypted in 
the RAM (in the database cache), but with TDE tablespace encryption the 
Oracle database will automatically decrypt data before it arrives in 
database memory (SGA). This means that all data in the SGA is always 
decrypted, which must be considered a weakness in security for this type 
of encryption. 
2.3.4. Using Data Encryption in Data Warehouses 
One of our main objectives in this thesis is to discuss if the commonly used 
data encryption algorithms are too slow for DWs. We are not interested in 
discussing in detail each step of each algorithm focusing on their security, 
but rather to compare and analyze the generic guidelines of the different 
types of encryption algorithms and how their performance is affected as 
well as how it affects DW performance. 
When processing SQL on encrypted data, there are many database 
performance issues that arise. For example, certain basic queries are not 
supported, i.e., they cannot be executed because they cannot be handled by 
the encryption/decryption schemas, or their execution is too inefficient 
(especially joins and ordering operations), resulting in the introduction of 
large response time overhead. Regarding this last issue, if no order 
preserving scheme is ensured by the encryption solution indexing becomes 
mostly useless, with its corresponding impact in database performance. 
Many decision support workloads are based on actions in which the end-
user interacts with the system, like performing an OLAP analysis through 
ad hoc querying or performing drill-down or roll-up reporting. When 
performing this type of analysis, the end user is typically in front of a 
computer waiting for the system to answer the query; therefore, if the 
DBMS is slow the end-user can lose interest in the business analysis, leave 
the query running and forget the business question s/he originally wanted 
or feel exasperated by having to wait for a long time to get the answer 
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[Castro, 2009]. This may compromise the acceptability and credibility of 
the DW system among its users and ultimately, jeopardize its usefulness.  
As we have mentioned earlier, encryption algorithms typically execute a 
significant number of bit management operations using one or more 
encryption keys. In what concerns performance issues, the quality of each 
set of operations in achieving the intended “data mix” affects how fast the 
algorithm can execute. When comparing encryption algorithms referring 
to what, how and how many operations they execute, most encryption 
algorithms such as AES carry out considerably short chains of complex 
operations, while other hash-based solutions such as Salsa20 execute 
longer chains of simpler operations. 
The argument in favor of using complicated operations such as the use of 
S-boxes is that they provide a large amount of mixing at reasonable speed 
on many CPUs, and thus achieve many desired security levels more 
quickly than simple operations on those CPUs; a single table lookup can 
mangle its input quite thoroughly – more thoroughly than a chain of 
simple integer operations – in fewer rounds. This provides a large amount 
of mixing at reasonable speed on many CPUs, reaching many desired 
security levels more quickly than simple operations. The counterargument 
is that potential speedup is fairly small and is accompanied by huge 
slowdowns on other CPUs.  
On the other hand, simple operations such as bit additions and XORs are 
consistently fast, independently from the CPU. It is also not obvious that a 
series of S-box lookups (even with rather large S-boxes, as in AES, 
increasing L1 cache pressure on large CPUs and forcing different 
implementation techniques for small CPUs) is generally faster than a 
comparably complex series of simpler integer operations. 
In what concerns the use of packaged encryption routines in DBMS’, 
Oracle recommends the use of tablespace encryption when there is no way 
of determining which columns are sensitive and which are not, or when 
the majority of the data in the tablespace is sensitive [Oracle, 2010a]. They 
state that column encryption should be preferred when a small number of 
well defined columns are sensitive. This last scenario is typical in data 
warehousing environments, which makes column encryption the 
recommended solution according to Oracle. However, as we have shown 
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in [Santos et al., 2012a], when applying column encryption in DWs the 
storage overhead will be very significant. 
On the other hand, since DWs are business knowledge data sources by 
nature, we can assume that most of its data is sensitive. In this sense, we 
may also state that TDE tablespace encryption should also be highly 
considered. Nevertheless, data coming from tablespace encryption is made 
immediately transparent once that data is loaded into the SGA (located in 
RAM), making decryption straightforward and minimizing resource 
consumption, but also allowing third party access to the real data, lowering 
the level of security. Although we are focused on performance, we believe 
this is a very relevant drawback in data security and that it should not be 
considered a good solution, given the risk of data exposure. 
There are also many situations where certain users or applications may 
require querying data that is less sensitive or not sensitive at all to the 
business. Since tablespace encryption encrypts the entire content of the 
tablespace, in these scenarios using tablespace encryption would require 
giving those users or applications the encryption keys or passwords that 
allow them to access the data. Using column encryption would enable to 
keep the columns that store less sensitive data unencrypted is this 
desirable, avoiding the disclosure of security keys or passwords to ensure 
the access to that data. Furthermore, tablespace encryption adds 
computational overhead to decrypt less sensitive or non-sensitive columns 
for query processing, that wouldn’t be selected for encryption when using 
column encryption.  
Other encryption solutions proposed by research work such as [Agrawal 
et al., 2004] distribute data in well-defined groups to allow direct 
operations on encrypted data. However, the impact in performance 
produced by these solutions, in response time and storage space overhead, 
depends on the skew in the target distributions, which can be a very 
serious problem in DWs. There is no easy way around this. The proposal 
from [Hacigumus et al., 2002] also suffers from the same problem.  
The lightweight encryption in column-oriented DBMS proposed in [Ge 
and Zdonik, 2007] aims on providing low decryption overheads. However, 
their experiments show at least 50% of response time overhead to retrieve 
the encrypted tuples, which is still extremely high for many DW scenarios, 
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such as long running queries. The fact that is aimed at column-DWs also 
narrows its applications. 
Topologies involving middleware solutions such as [Radha and Kumar, 
2005] typically request the encrypted data from the database a priori and 
execute the decrypting actions themselves locally. The proposal in [Radha 
and Kumar, 2005] aims to ensure efficient query execution over encrypted 
databases, by evaluating most queries at the application server and 
retrieving only the necessary records from the database server. Only one 
query (Q6) of the TPC-H benchmark is used in their experimental 
evaluation, against a very small data subset (ranging from 10MB to 50MB, 
where query execution time rises up to 5 times for the last).  
This dataset size cannot be considered realistic for DWs, given its typical 
very large sized databases. In a DW environment, previously transporting 
all the required data from the database to the middleware is unreasonable, 
since the amount of data accessed for processing decision support queries 
is typically much larger than a few tens of MB. This would strangle the 
network due to bandwidth consumption of data roundtrips between 
middleware and database, jeopardizing data throughput and 
consequently, response time. Thus, all encrypted data should be processed 
at the DBMS itself, eliminating network overhead from the critical path. 
After considering the referred issues that influence performance (and 
security tradeoffs) of the described encryption solutions and to finish this 
discussion, we have come to the following conclusions: 
 Both standard encryption algorithms and specific research database 
encryption solutions show large performance overheads; 
 The type and number of operations for producing the “data mix” 
output in each round of the algorithm, the length of the used 
encryption keys, the size of the input and output blocks, and the 
number of rounds to execute, are all variables that affect both security 
and performance; 
 In many software implementations of the security techniques, the CPU 
architecture also varies the performance outcome; 
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 Typically, most secure encryption algorithms will execute between 8 
and 20 rounds against 64, 128 bit (or more) sized blocks, using a 128 or 
256 bit key; 
 Encryption algorithms which make use of chains of simple operations 
such as bit additions and XORs scale better and have reduced CPU 
dependency than solutions that make use of more complex operations 
such as S-box lookups; 
 Salsa20 seems to provide consistent speed in a wide variety of 
applications across a wide variety of platforms. It is faster and simpler 
than the complex-operations approach of the standard algorithms 
3DES and AES, while granting significant security strength. However, 
most commercial vendors just include AES and 3DES routines. The 
AES became a standard only after a five-year long standardization 
process that included extensive benchmarking on a variety of 
platforms ranging from smart cards to high end parallel machines. 
Thus, the adoption of encryption standards is probably only due to 
legal impositions and public reliability issues, given that only AES and 
3DES are the current well-accepted encryption standards. 
 All major DBMS provide encryption to be used transparently by user 
applications; 
 When using tablespace encryption, the requested data is decrypted 
and loaded into RAM memory (in the database cache) as clear text, 
while column encryption does not and is thus more secure; 
 Tablespace encryption does not create significant storage space 
overhead, while column encryption does; 
 Despite the well-known pros and cons, the best choice between 
tablespace encryption and column encryption isn’t obvious; 
 Leading DBMS use standard encryption algorithms AES and 3DES, 
producing alphanumeric or binary values as a result of the encryption 
process, even for numerical-typed attributes; 
 In DWs, transporting encrypted data to third party decrypting agents 
would create unbearable communication bandwidth consumption 
and compromise throughput. 
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2.4. Database Intrusion Detection Systems 
Generically, intrusion detection (ID) is defined as the process of monitoring 
the events occurring in a computer system and analyzing them for signs of 
possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of violation of 
computer security policies, acceptable user policies, or standard security 
practices [Scarfone and Mell, 2007]. ID systems are typically classified in 
two main types, depending on the environment in which they operate: 
1) Network-based ID systems, which perform surveillance using network 
traffic or other network-based data; 
2) Host-based ID systems, which are located at the host that is aimed to 
be protected, analyzing the activity that happens there. 
In this thesis, we specifically focus on Database Intrusion Detection Systems 
(DIDS), which are host-based ID systems that analyze user actions 
occurring at the database level in order to detect (and eventually stop or 
prevent) intrusion actions. This section characterizes the way a typical ID 
system operates and presents a descriptive analysis of selected samples 
from each different type of approach and/or technique that can be applied 
in DIDS, in order to characterize the broad scope of existing solutions. 
2.4.1. How Intrusion Detection Systems Operate 
The main requirements that ID systems are required to cope with are:  
 The quest for adequately defining and building profiles that accurately 
represent “normal”/“intrusion-free” behavior or workloads, as well as 
identifying attack signatures; 
 Given those profiles and/or attack signatures, define which behavioral 
features as well as techniques and models that maximize the 
performance and accuracy of the intrusion detection processes; 
 Reporting system status to security staff and notifying them about 
generated alerts; 
 Promote a way of stopping or preventing the attack whenever an 
intrusion alert is raised (this feature may or not be present in the ID 
system; if it is the case, literature often refers to the ID system as an 
Intrusion Detection and Response System, or an Intrusion Detection 
and Prevention System). 
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The typical components of an ID system according to [Scarfone and Mell, 
2007] are shown in Figure 2-12 and are described as: 
 A Sensor or Agent, which are responsible for capturing both the 
information relating to the ID features that is necessary for building 
the “normal”/“intrusion-free” profiles and/or attack signatures, as 
well as the required information to execute the ID processes; 
 A Management Server, which is a centralized device that receives the 
information from the Sensor or Agent and manages the profile 
building processes and the intrusion detection and response processes 
of the ID system; 
 A Repository, for storing the behavior profiles and/or attack signatures, 
activity logs, generated alert information and other relevant data that 
is useful to the ID system; and 
 A Console, which is the interface responsible for the interaction 
between security managers/staff and the ID system, i.e., it enables a 
mean for configuring the ID system and displays the required 
information concerning the behavior profiles, system status, generated 
alerts, etc. 
Sensor or Agent Management Server
Repository
Console
Activity Source
 
Figure 2-12. Typical ID System Architecture (adapted from [Scarfone and Mell, 2007]) 
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Referring to Figure 2-12, the Activity Source is where the activity that should 
be analyzed is generated; in a DIDS, it can represent a user or an 
applications that generates SQL workloads to execute against the DW. This 
activity is then captured by the Sensor or Agent and sent on to the 
Management Server either to build behavior profiles and previously define 
attack signatures (if the activity is considered “intrusion-free” and the ID 
system is in the learning phase) or to perform intrusion detection and 
consequent alert generation (and/or response actions if this is required). 
The Management Server will both read and write data from the Repository in 
order to retrieve or store all relevant information accordingly with what it 
needs to do. The Console allows the security managers/staff to configure the 
ID system and retrieve all relevant information for assessing system status, 
user behavior and alert notifications. 
In DIDS systems there is typically a learning or training phase (i.e., 
previous to intrusion detection), in which database and/or user logs 
assumed as having “normal” or intrusion-free activity are used in order to 
build the user behavior profiles and/or define attack signatures[Newman, 
2011]. After this learning phase, the intrusion detectors match user actions 
against those profiles and/or attack signatures to find significant deviations 
which are signaled as potential intrusions. 
From the intrusion perspective, an intruder in a data warehousing 
environment can be one of the following [Treinen and Thurimella, 2006]: 
 An authorized user, which is someone belonging to the enterprise that 
has regular access to authorized database interfaces and acts with 
malicious intent (also commonly referred to as the insider threat); 
 A masqueraded user, which is someone that obtains the credentials of an 
authorized user and impersonating that user takes control of an 
authorized interface (which refers to the insider threat when the 
attacker is someone from within the enterprise but without regular 
authorized database access, and refers to an outsider threat when it 
someone from outside the enterprise that manages to obtain the 
credentials); 
 An external attacker (commonly referred to as the outsider threat), which 
is someone from outside the enterprise that is able to bypass the 
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database security and gain direct database access using SQL injection6 
or other exploiting techniques; 
 Any combination of the above. 
Considering the possible intruders’ intentions, there are mainly three types 
of attacks mobilized against DWs [Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004]: 
 Attacks aiming at corrupting data (integrity attacks). In these types of 
attack, the intruder seeks access to the database for executing actions 
that compromise its integrity, such as corrupting or deleting the data 
in a given database object (e.g. such as a table or view); 
 Attacks aiming at stealing information (confidentiality attacks). In these 
attacks, the intruder is focused on breaking confidentiality issues, such 
as stealing business information, rather than damaging data; 
 Attacks aiming at making the DW unavailable (availability attacks). These 
attacks aim on making database services unavailable to users, i.e., they 
are mainly Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (e.g. flooding database 
services and bandwidth with a large number of requests, halting or 
crashing database server instances, deleting database objects, etc). 
The way how ID processes are designed to operate is mainly based on two 
approaches, depending on what they intend to search for:  
1) Misuse or signature-based detection, which searches for well-known 
attack patterns and signatures defined a priori to the attack itself; and  
                                                     
6 SQL injection is a type of attack executed through means of a third party interface 
(e.g. a web application) in which the attacker appends malicious code to an 
authorized command that will be executed on behalf of that interface. SQL 
injection is often considered as a particular form of attack on its own, following 
very well-defined guidelines. Although the actions performed through SQL 
injection can also be detected by DIDS, the forms of detecting SQL injection attacks 
have been extensively studied and belong to a category of security mechanisms 
that are differentiated appart from those that we intend to focus on in this thesis. 
As a reference, the work in [Halfond et al., 2006; Kim, 2011; Kindy and Pathan, 
2012] presents detailed surveys and countermeasures on SQL injection. 
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2) Anomaly detection, which searches for deviations from typical user 
behavior by matching their actions against assumed “intrusion-free” 
profiles that significantly represent that typical user behavior.  
The first approach is mainly efficient against previously well-known and 
expected intrusion actions. However, they are mostly incapable of acting 
against intrusions that reveal new forms of attack or malicious actions that 
seem “normal” (which, in many cases, refer to the insider threat), opening 
a much wider spectrum of analysis possibilities that results in a threat that 
is much harder to tackle and mitigate. Given the published work that refers 
trends indicating an increase of attacks referring to the insider threat 
[Jabbour and Menasce, 2009], to overcome those issues anomaly detection 
techniques have been proposed in the most recent DIDS. 
In the past, several types of intrusion detection techniques and methods 
have been proposed to build behavior profiles and perform intrusion 
detection processes that may be used in DIDS, which we shall describe and 
discuss in the following subsections.  
2.4.2. Intrusion Detection Techniques 
The most common way to distinguish between distinct ID techniques is to 
classify the way they select and analyze the features used for building user 
profiles and execute the intrusion detection processes. In this subsection, 
we distinguish and describe a set of main types/classes of analysis 
techniques, referring prominent research work in each of these classes. 
Temporal Analysis. These techniques focus on temporal features such as 
the time span between user actions and the duration of those actions.  
The approach in [Lee et al., 2000] uses a mean and standard deviation 
model built from time signatures to check for outliers within a predefined 
range in real-time database systems. This solution considers a transaction 
as a set of read or write actions for each data object which is executed in 
predefined update time periods. For example, the update of a temporal 
data object (event) can trigger a rule such that the update time is checked 
against the expected update time (condition) and rejects the update (action) 
if the predicate returns false, considering it an intrusion.  
The training period occurs until a significant mean with 99% confidence 
level of a normal distribution is obtained for each object/update pair. 
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Database behavior is monitored by sensors at the transaction level, which 
are assumed to be small in size and have predefined semantics such as 
write-only operations and well-defined data access patterns. If a 
transaction tries to update a temporal data object that has already been 
updated in that period, an alarm is raised. 
Dependency and Relation Analysis. Intrusion detection techniques based 
on dependency and relation analysis determine dependencies and/or 
relations among the distinct sets of user actions and/or accessed data in 
order to determine which columns, rows, tables, etc. and/or which 
commands are usually issued or processed together.  
For example, the DEMIDS system [Chung et al., 1999] builds user profiles 
based on their activity by determining frequent itemsets from 
feature/value pairs and computes distance measures of user activity 
against the learnt frequent itemsets to detect intrusions, given a threshold. 
The features are typically based on the syntactical analysis of user 
commands, where the itemset domains are the sets of attributes issued 
together. 
Another approach using frequent itemset mining is presented in [Zhong 
and Qin, 2004]. This approach summarizes each user command into a tuple 
<Op, F, T, C> where Op is the type of SQL command (insert, select, etc), F 
is the set of attributes, T is the set of tables, C is the constrained condition 
set. An algorithm mines user query profiles using these tuples, based on 
the pattern of the submitted queries at the transaction level. The algorithm 
adapts the support and confidence of association rule mining by adding 
query structure and attribute relations to the computation. 
The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) DIDS proposed in [Kamra et al., 
2008] improves a previous approach [Bertino et al., 2005b] using features 
named quiplets for summarizing each user command. Considering a 
generic command: 
SELECT {Target-List}  
  FROM {Relation-List}  
 WHERE {Qualification} 
A quiplet is defined as (C, PR, PA, SR, SA) where C is the SQL main 
command (insert, select, etc.), PR is the Projection-Relation information, PA 
is the Projection-Attribute information, SR is the Selection-Relation 
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information, and SA is the Selection-Attribute information. The authors 
define three types of quiplets with different granularities: given a relation 
(alias table) R1 with attributes A1, B1, C1, D1 and a relation R2 with 
attributes A2, B2, C2, D2 and given the user command SELECT R1.A1, 
R1.C1, R2.B2, R2.D2 FROM R1, R2 WHERE R1.B1 = R2.B2, will 
generate, as shown in Figure 2-13: 
1) The coarse c-quiplet (select, <2>, <4>, <2>, <2>) 
2) The medium m-quiplet (select, <1,1>, <2,2>, <1,1>, <1,1>) 
3) The fine f-quiplet (select, <1,1>, <[1,0,1,0], [0,1,0,1]>, 
<1,1>, <[0,1,0,0], [0,1,0,0]>) 
 
Figure 2-13. The quiplet construction process [Kamra et al., 2008]) 
For anomaly detection when the database has role-based users (i.e., it is 
possible to link each user action to a given role), a Naïve Bayes Classifier 
(NBC) is used as follows:  
 For all queries in the audit logs, and for each role, the classifier for each 
type of quiplet is built (training phase);  
 For each submitted query, if any of its classifiers is different from the 
ones in its roles, the action is considered an intrusion and an alert is 
generated (testing phase).  
If role-based access policies are not implemented in the database, they 
propose unsupervised anomaly detection. In this case, positional and 
distance functions are defined for the quiplets and clustering techniques 
(k-centers and k-means) map every user to its representative cluster, which 
is the cluster with the highest number of training records for that user after 
the clustering phase (training phase). 
For each new query to test, two approaches can be used:  
1) Given the determination of its representative cluster, use the NBC as 
in the Role-Based anomaly detection to perform a similar test; or  
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2) Verify if the new query is a statistical outlier using the MAD (Median 
of Absolute Deviations) test [Pham-Gia and Hung, 2001], which if 
true considers the action as an intrusion and generates an alert. 
Sequence Alignment Analysis. Sequence alignment mainly consists in 
determining common sequences of events (such as commands, data 
attributes, accessed values, etc). DIDS using this type of techniques 
typically learn and identify the repeatable series of events with significant 
length and eventually break them into smaller-sized subsets to label or 
classify those sequences and their subsets as normal user behavior. In the 
detection phase, each sequence of new events is matched against the learnt 
user sequences and their subsets for measuring how they differ in order to 
evaluate its probability of being an intrusion. 
The solution presented in [Kundu et al., 2010] identifies sequences of 
accessed attributes, commands and tables for building user profiles. The 
proposed features are the command types (insert, select, etc.), designed 
sensitive attributes, all attributes, operations on attributes, and mixes of all 
features. This work also defines criteria for choosing among user-based, 
role-based or organization-based profiles, given the working context of the 
database.  
In the learning phase, it builds sequence models given a threshold for 
determining the maximum number of differences. In the detection phase, 
it also uses a threshold for computing the highest number of differences 
allowed between the tested sequences and those retained in the learning 
phase, to consider the sequences as normal or abnormal. 
Integrating Dependency with Sequence Alignment Analysis. An 
approach for finding dependency relationships among transaction-level 
attributes with high support and confidence rules is proposed in [Hu and 
Panda, 2004]. These authors observed that in real-world applications, 
although the transaction application can often change, the whole database 
structure and essential data correlations rarely change. They assume that 
whenever an attribute is updated, this action is linked to a sequence of 
other events logged in the database (e.g. due to an update of a given 
attribute, other attributes are also read or written). Thus, each update is 
defined by three sets: the read set, a set of attributes that have been read 
because of the update; the pre-write set, a set of attributes that have been 
written before the update and because of it; and the post-write set, a set of 
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attributes that have been written after the update as a consequence of it. 
Transactions that do not follow any of the mined data dependency rules 
are marked as malicious. 
The work in [Srivastava et al., 2006a; Srivastava et al., 2006b] improves that 
of [Hu and Panda, 2004] by considering attribute sensitivity, i.e., giving a 
measure of importance to each attribute. They propose three levels of 
attribute sensitivity, considering its support in the analyzed transactions: 
high, medium and low. A weighted data mining algorithm is used to mine 
the dependencies between database attributes and generate rules that 
reflect that dependency, given the measured sequences of operations (read, 
write) and the sensitivity of each attribute. Any transaction that does not 
follow these rules is identified as malicious. The authors also present an 
extension to the Entity-Relationship model to syntactically capture the 
sensitivity level of the attributes. 
In [Fonseca et al., 2008], a generic learning algorithm for representing 
transactions by directed graphs describing execution paths is proposed. 
New profiles that deviate from the ones learnt from those execution paths 
are seen as unauthorized sequences of SQL commands. The features used 
to build the execution paths are the command type (select, insert, delete, 
etc.), target objects (tables) and selected columns, and restriction attributes, 
all of which are obtained from typical DBMS audit entries [Newman, 2011] 
storing information on the UserID, SessionID, CommandID, 
TransactionID, user command, object owner, and a timestamp of its 
execution. 
Statistical Analysis. Statistical analysis is used in several DIDS for 
computing user activity and/or data statistics ID features.  
The approach presented in [Spalka and Lehnhardt, 2005] makes use of 
statistical functions on reference values obtained from the data in relations 
(alias tables) and -relations (changes of the values of the monitored 
objects/attributes for all reference values, per attribute, between two runs 
of the DIDS) for anomaly detection.  
An extension is defined as the set of all rows of an insertion/modification 
of data and a relation refers to a table or view. The reference values include 
count, minimum, maximum, average, standard deviation, ranges, 
computed ratios, zero length checking and bit counting. A misuse 
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detection method is also included, which works by examining database 
objects (Database, Default, Function, Index, Privilege, Procedure, Rule, 
Schema, Statistics, Table, Trigger, and View) and all operations on them. 
This is done by previously defining if each pair <Database object, 
operation> is dangerous or not. 
The work proposed in [Mathew et al., 2010] is based on computing 
summarized statistics such as counting, maximum, minimum, mean, 
median, standard deviation and cardinality values of each attribute from 
the dataset resulting or affected by the execution of each user command. 
These statistics are stored in a vector with fixed dimension named as an S-
Vector, regardless of how large the command’s result dataset may be. 
When the dataset for obtaining the S-Vector is large, the authors propose 
sampling the dataset by fetching the first initial k tuples or a subset of 
randomly picked k tuples, for maintaining performance and scalability. 
The set of each user’s S-Vectors is then used for applying techniques such 
as clustering, naïve Bayes, support vector machines or decision trees in 
order to obtain models that represent the user’s normal behavior given the 
information in those S-Vectors. In the intrusion detection phase, statistical 
deviation and outlier verification is applied to inspect each user command 
and classify it as normal or abnormal. 
Information-Theoretic Analysis. Approaches using information-theoretic 
analysis compute measures like entropy and information gain for 
characterizing user profiles and compare them with those of subsequent 
user actions to see how they differ from the original ones.  
The work in [Lee and Xiang, 2001] describes such a solution. Features are 
composed by a tuple of audit data with n variables for each data object (e.g. 
IP address, message size, etc). Entropy is used as a measure of regularity 
of audit data (e.g. event types such as a list of commands), where each 
record represents a class; the smaller the entropy, the fewer the number of 
distinct records (i.e., the higher the redundancies), the more regular the 
audit dataset. The fact that many events are repeated (or redundant) in a 
dataset suggests that they are likely to appear in the future. Anomaly 
detection models constructed using datasets with small entropy will likely 
be simpler and have better detection performance. 
Conditional entropy is used to define temporal sequences of audit data. 
H(X|Y) shows how much uncertainty remains for the rest of the audit 
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events in a sequence X after seeing Y. For anomaly detection, it is used as 
a measure of regularity of sequential dependencies. If the audit trail is a 
sequence of events of the same type, then the conditional entropy is 0 and 
the event sequences are deterministic. Conversely, large conditional 
entropy indicates that the sequences are not as deterministic and hence 
much harder to model.  
Relative conditional entropy between distributions is used for measuring 
regularities (distance) between two audit datasets, where the training 
dataset is a validated audit dataset and the tested dataset is the one that 
needs to be inspected. Once again, the best solution is the one with smaller 
relative conditional entropy. Information gain is introduced to aid the 
feature selection and construction process to improve the detection 
performance because of its direct connection with conditional entropy. The 
higher information gain owned by the feature, the smaller conditional 
entropy, and hence the better detection performance. 
Command Template Analysis. Command modeling DIDS use a command 
database log to analyze all the regular user commands and build some sort 
of summarized templates that are able to generically represent the typical 
user workloads.  
In [Lee et al., 2002], an algorithm summarizes a set of supposed 
“legitimate” queries into SQL templates that represent the models of all 
those queries. Each conditional filtering variables in the WHERE clause of 
similar commands are considered as parameters. To see if an unbounded 
variable should be used for each parameter or a finite list of values, a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is done at a 90% confidence level. The algorithm 
also tabulates the frequency of each learnt fingerprint, i.e., how often it 
occurs in the set of SQL statements.  
Taking a new fingerprint F and a previously defined fingerprint F’, F is 
considered legitimate if F differs from F’ only by: 1) any extra conditions 
in the WHERE clause of F that are missing from F’ are joined with the 
AND operator; and 2) F selects an equal or fewer number of columns than 
F’. They also propose a method for deducing missing fingerprints (i.e., 
ranges of queries that are similar to the database log queries used in the 
learning phase), based on mixing the possible combination of conditions in 
the WHERE clause from the previously acquired fingerprints. In the testing 
Chapter 2 
66 
phase, each command significantly differing from the computed 
fingerprints is considered abnormal. 
In [Bockermann et al., 2009] the authors propose applying a grammar-
based analysis using machine-learning techniques instead of commonly 
used vector-based data. This approach applies tree-kernel based learning, 
which has become popular in natural language processing, using the 
parse-tree structure of SQL for correlating commands with applications 
and to differentiate between benign and malicious ones by inspecting 
changes in command syntax trees.  
They derive a distance measure induced by a tree-kernel function to 
measure the similarity of SQL commands using their parse-trees. Support 
vector machines are used in the learning phase and clustering is applied 
for distinguishing benign from malicious commands by outlier detection. 
This method promotes a context sensitive similarity that enables locating 
the nearest non-intrusive command for a malicious statement, which helps 
in root cause analysis. 
Table 2-2 summarizes the approaches previously described, mentioning 
each type of technique along with the actions and user action elements that 
can be analyzed. It also shows if each approach allows implementing 
intrusion prevention, i.e., if it enables stopping the intrusion action a priori 
to its execution. 
In what concerns intrusion prevention, which is the capability of stopping 
the intrusion action when it occurs or even before it occurs, it can be seen 
that several solutions enable full intrusion prevention, while others can 
only partially accomplish this. In [Lee et al., 2000], the temporal analysis 
technique detects any queries that request execution outside a predefined 
time schedule and may therefore deny their execution and prevent the 
intrusion action. The sequence analysis technique used in [Kundu et al., 
2010] may enable intrusion prevention by avoiding subsequent user 
actions when it detects a suspicious sequence of actions. However, it needs 
to wait for a significant amount of actions that make up that sequence, 
meaning that it will probably only detect the intrusion after some of those 
actions have finished their execution, which makes it only capable of 
partial intrusion prevention. 
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Table 2-2. Database intrusion detection techniques and their coverage 
  Elements that can be analyzed Intrusion 
Prevention 
Capability Technique Reference 
Command 
Syntax 
Accessed 
Columns 
Processed 
Rows 
Result 
Dataset 
Temporal Analysis [Lee et al., 2000] X    Yes 
Dependency and 
Relation Analysis 
[Chung et al., 1999] X X   Yes 
[Zhong and Qin, 2004] X X X  Yes 
[Bertino et al., 2005b] X X   Yes 
[Kamra et al., 2008] X X   Yes 
Sequence Analysis [Kundu et al., 2010] X    Partial 
Integrated        
Dependency and  
Sequence Analysis 
[Hu and Panda, 2004] X X   Partial 
[Srivastava et al., 2006] X X   Partial 
[Fonseca et al., 2008] X X   Partial 
Statistical Analysis 
[Spalka and Lehnhardt, 2005] X X X  Partial 
[Mathew et al., 2010] X X  X No 
Information-Theory 
Analysis 
[Lee and Xiang, 2001] X    Partial 
Command          
Template Analysis 
[Lee, 2002] X X   Yes 
[Bockermann et al., 2009] X X   Yes 
All the solutions based on dependency and relation analysis that were 
described [Bertino et al., 2005; Kamra et al., 2008; Zhong and Qin, 2004] are 
fully capable of enabling intrusion prevention, since they may check each 
individual user command syntax and if they find those commands 
suspicious their execution can be stopped before their execution occurs. 
The solutions integrating a mix of dependency and sequence analysis such 
as [Fonseca et al., 2008; Hu and Panda, 2004; Srivastava et al., 2006a; 
Srivastava et al., 2006b] are capable of performing only partial intrusion 
prevention, for the same reasons pointed out in the previous paragraph 
concerning the solution proposed in [Kundu et al., 2010]. 
The solutions presented in [Mathew et al., 2010; Spalka and Lehnhardt, 
2005], which are based on statistical analysis, are mostly incapable of 
intrusion prevention, as they mostly rely on analyzing the changes in data 
or execution results after they have been processed. This means they can 
only detect the intrusion a posteriori to the attack. However, the approach 
in [Spalka and Lehnhardt, 2005] can be adapted to check a priori statistical 
data concerning the rows requested to be processed by the user action, 
enabling it to have partial intrusion prevention capabilities. For this same 
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reason, the information-theory analysis approach presented in [Lee and 
Xiang, 2001] may also accomplish partial intrusion prevention. 
The solutions based on command template analysis proposed in 
[Bockermann et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2002] can fully enable intrusion 
prevention due to same reason as those previously mentioned that use 
dependency and relational analysis [Bertino et al., 2005; Chung et al., 1999; 
Kamra et al., 2008; Kamra, 2010; Zhong and Qin, 2004]. 
Besides the previously described specific ID techniques and approaches 
that can be used in databases, other research works have been published 
that can also contribute to this intrusion detection field. For example, 
although it does not present itself as a DIDS, the work in [Motwani et al., 
2008] describes a method for auditing SQL queries to measure their 
suspiciousness from a privacy and confidentiality perspective that may be 
useful for intrusion detection purposes. A generic survey on how data 
mining techniques can be applied to intrusion detection is shown in [Pei et 
al., 2004]. 
2.4.3. Using Database Intrusion Detection Systems in Data Warehousing 
Environments 
By observing Table 2-2 it can be seen that most DIDS focus on analyzing 
user command syntax (i.e., parsing the SQL-expression syntax of queries to 
construct user profiles). As pointed out in [Mathew et al., 2010], the most 
common problems with this type of approach is: 
 Regular user queries may differ widely in syntax yet produce 
“normal” (i.e., good non-intrusive) output, which generates false 
positives (i.e., false alarms); 
 Queries may be crafted by the attacker to differ slightly in syntax from 
the “normal” user behavior profiles yet produce “abnormal” (i.e., 
malicious and intrusive) output, which generates false negatives (i.e., 
attacks that pass undetected). 
Given the expressiveness of the SQL language and the need to determine 
query equivalence or similarity, it is evident that syntax analysis is complex 
and very difficult to perform correctly. In fact, query containment and 
equivalence is NP-complete for conjunctive queries and uncertain for 
queries involving negation [Mathew et al., 2010]. 
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In databases where typical user workloads have a well-defined number of 
distinct commands that are issued repetitively, relying on command 
syntax analysis may be feasible to achieve high ID efficiency. This is 
typically what occurs in transactional systems. However, in analytical 
systems such as DW’s many actions are ad hoc and have variable execution 
times with variable data access patterns and dimension-size frequencies 
and thus, are mostly unpredictable and broad-scoped. This makes 
distinguishing between normal and abnormal commands in DWs an 
extremely difficult task. In such analytical databases, limiting ID to 
command syntax analysis by simply modeling SQL command templates 
or static frequent data access patterns (e.g. which tables or columns are 
accessed) is unreliable or, at least, minimalist. 
Regarding the previously presented characteristics of DW user workloads, 
the ID solutions relying on temporal analysis such as presented in [Lee et 
al., 2000] are inadequate and mostly produce very poor ID results due to 
the unpredictable rate and execution time of those workloads. Due to the 
ad hoc nature of most of those workloads, ID solutions such as [Bockermann 
et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2002] that are based on command template analysis 
lack the necessary dynamics to efficiently perform the ID processes and 
therefore also produce poor ID results. 
Although the approach proposed in [Mathew et al., 2010] adds a data-
centric analysis of each user command execution’s resulting dataset, the 
analysis is performed a posteriori to that execution. Given the time span 
between the start of the intrusion and its detection, together with resource 
consumption and sensitivity of the targeted data, many enterprises can 
suffer huge losses if their DIDS either takes too long to alert a malicious 
intrusion or is unable to prevent or stop its execution. In this sense, these 
approaches alone are not efficient solutions for intrusion detection in DWs. 
Conclusively, the unpredictable execution frequency and ad hoc nature of 
the user workloads make time-based and SQL templating ID approaches 
such as [Bockermann et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2000] mostly 
inadequate. On the other hand, DIDS performing ID at a coarse-grained 
basis such as database sessions or transaction command sets, instead of a 
fine-grained basis such as analyzing each SQL command, risk that a series 
of malicious commands may be executed before the intrusion can be dealt 
with. Therefore, data dependency and sequence alignment approaches 
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such as [Chung et al., 1999] that are able to inspect each user command a 
priori to its execution, but only after a considerable amount of actions have 
been executed, should be used carefully according to each DW context.  
Data-centric techniques such as [Mathew et al., 2010; Spalka and 
Lehnhardt, 2005] are capable of bringing added value to a priori ID 
techniques by executing an a posteriori analysis of the data affected by the 
user action. Combining these techniques with data access pattern analysis 
techniques such as [Bertino et al., 2005; Kamra et al., 2008], that deem the 
processed data, seem a priori the most feasible and efficient DIDS for DWs. 
2.5. Summary 
This chapter presents the background and related work concerning the 
data security domains focused by the research work in this thesis, namely 
data masking, encryption and database intrusion detection.  
The concepts concerning DWs are described and data warehousing 
environments are characterized. The differences and characteristics that 
distinguish operational systems from DWs have also been detailed. 
We have also enumerated and described the standard and state-of-the-art 
techniques and methods in data masking, encryption and database 
intrusion detection systems, and discussed the issues concerning their 
applicability in data warehousing environments. 
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Chapter 3  
Data Warehouse Security 
Framework 
Despite the fact that published research and best practice guides from 
many DBMS vendors state that the best way to protect data in databases is 
to use encryption solutions together with intrusion detection systems, to 
the best of our knowledge there has been no proposal regarding a 
conceptual framework for integrating these distinct solutions together. In 
this chapter, we propose a framework that enables integrating together the 
proposed masking, encryption and intrusion detection solutions, which 
are presented in the following chapters.  
The proposed framework can be seen as a middle tier between the user 
interfaces and the DBMS, working as an extension of the DBMS itself. We 
define the sequence of steps within the scope of the framework, that occur 
from the moment a user statement arrives at the data warehouse to be 
processed, and describe the information flow and each of its components. 
We also define a series of principles that drive the development of the 
masking, encryption and DIDS solution proposed in this thesis. These 
guidelines deal with the issues of data security and provide a body of 
knowledge for the development of specific solutions for data warehousing 
environments. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 details the middle tier and 
how it enables integrating data masking, encryption and intrusion 
detection to deal with user actions in a single pass-through overall process. 
Section 3.2 presents the guidelines for enhancing data masking and 
encryption in data warehouses and Section 3.3 presents the guidelines for 
enhancing intrusion detection in data warehouses. Finally, Section 3.4 
concludes the chapter. 
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3.1. Overview of the Data Warehouse Security Middle Tier 
The typical information flow of data warehouse user actions between the 
interface used by the user and the DW database(s) is shown in Figure 3-1. 
In practice, the user interface typically issues a SQL statement and sends it 
to the DBMS, which then processes it against the respective database(s), 
receive the processed results, and finally send it back to the user interface 
that requested its execution. 
User Interface Data Warehouse 
Database(s)
DBMS
User query
Response
Write
Read
 
Figure 3-1. Typical DW user action information flow 
In the context of our work, each SQL statement is parsed and analyzed once 
it arrives at the DBMS. Whenever required, data masking, encryption and 
intrusion detection are applied given the command itself and its targeted 
data, immediately before the command is executed. Intrusion detection is 
also applied to the processed data and results after its execution finishes 
and before disclosing the results back to the users. The sequence of steps 
given a request to process a SQL statement issued by the user is shown in 
Figure 3-2. 
User Statement 
Submitted
Parse User 
Statement
Analyze User 
Statement
Execute User 
Statement
Analyze 
Processed Data 
and Results
Submit Results 
back to User
Mask/Encrypt or 
Demask/Decrypt 
LEGEND
       Regular Flow (mandatory for all user statements)
       Optional (depending on using masking/encryption or not)
       Conditional (user notification or resulting dataset feedback depending if there is any generated alert against the user statement or not )
Alert Alert
Alert and Intrusion Response Management
 
Figure 3-2. Step sequence of the submittance of a SQL user statement 
As shown in the figure, each user statement is parsed and then analyzed 
before it is executed by the DBMS, to make an a priori verification of its 
suspiciousness. If it is considered an intrusion, then an alert should be 
raised against this user action and its execution can be stopped at this step. 
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Contrarily, if it is not considered an intrusion, then the user statement can 
be processed by the DBMS against the Data Warehouse Database(s) with or 
without use of the data masking or encryption processes, according to the 
security measures defined for the targeted data. After the user statement 
finishes being processed by the DBMS, the processed data and resulting 
dataset are also be analyzed for suspiciousness. If it is considered an 
intrusion, then an alert is also raised against the user action and disclosure 
of the results can be stopped at this step, otherwise the results are sent back 
to the user. 
To accomplish the aimed functionality according to this sequence of steps, 
the framework includes intrusion detection, masking and encryption 
components, defining an information flow as shown in Figure 3-3. 
The middle tier includes mandatory and optional components, considering 
that the intrusion detection processes are mandatory and the masking and 
encryption processes are optional, given the functionalities defined by the 
security administrators. For example, parts of the database may require 
encryption or masking due to security requirements, while other parts of 
the database may not require encryption or masking. This means that a 
user command is always subjected to the intrusion detection components, 
but might not require going through the masking or encryption 
components. 
The main elements of the information flow of the middle tier and each of 
its components are described in the following subsections. 
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Figure 3-3. Integrated Data Warehouse Security Framework 
3.1.1. The Security Framework Database 
The Security Framework Database is a database that stores all the user data 
that enables identifying each DW user (name and password) and his/her 
data access policies (attributed role(s) and SQL grant privileges) and a 
historical command log that stores all the issued user commands against 
the data warehouse database(s), together with the information required for 
each component of the masking, encryption and intrusion detection 
processes. 
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For masking and encryption, the Security Framework Database stores all the 
necessary masking and encryption keys for each DW database that needs 
to be masked or encrypted. On the other hand, for intrusion detection 
purposes, the Security Framework Database stores all the DW user behavior 
profiles that will be used to assess the incoming user statements. It also 
contains the complete history of all the generated alerts in an alert log that 
identifies the user command to which each alert refers and attributes for 
enabling the Data Warehouse Security Administrator to confirm if that alert 
concerns a true intrusion action or a false alarm. The rulebase for the risk 
exposure method and the risk exposure measure computed for each alert 
is also stored in the database. 
3.1.2. The Data Warehouse Security Interface 
The Data Warehouse Security Interface is used by the Data Warehouse Security 
Administrator for managing the Security Framework Database and all the 
masking, encryption and intrusion detection components. Whenever the 
Data Warehouse Security Administrator wants to protect a data warehouse 
database by applying the framework, the following actions should be 
performed: 
 After entering the DBA login and database connection data, the 
Data Warehouse Security Interface scans all the data access policies 
defined in the Data Warehouse Database(s) for identifying authorized 
users and respective permissions; 
 A user command log is created in the Security Framework Database 
for recording all future user actions requested to execute against the 
Data Warehouse Database(s); 
 All user behavior profiles are then built using the Data Warehouse 
Database(s) command log and the existing data. 
The interface allows the Data Warehouse Security Administrator to define the 
rules to be used by the intrusion detection risk exposure method. It also 
displays the information concerning all the generated intrusion alerts and 
allows the Data Warehouse Security Administrator to confirm the authenticity 
of each alert, i.e., if it refers to a true intrusion or a false alarm. 
The Data Warehouse Security Administrator may use the Data Warehouse 
Security Interface to define, at any time, which attributes should be masked 
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or encrypted. Each time this type of action is required, all the data 
concerning such attributes is immediately masked or encrypted by 
replacing the original values with the new masked or encrypted ones. 
Whenever the Data Warehouse Database(s) needs to be updated, this must 
always be done through the middle tier instead of directly through the 
DBMS. 
3.1.3. Analyzing the User Statement a Priori 
Before the user statement can be processed by the DBMS, it must be 
analyzed to verify its suspiciousness and assess if it is an intrusion or not. 
The information flow referring to this initial process is shown in Figure 3-
4. 
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Figure 3-4. Information flow concerning the a priori analysis of the user statement 
First, the user statement must go through the Command Parser component. 
The Command Parser component is responsible for parsing the SQL 
statement, splitting it into its individual sub-queries (if it has any sub-
query) and extracting the relevant intrusion detection features (defined by 
the DIDS – the DIDS proposed in this thesis is explained in Chapter 6, 
including its respective features), which are finally passed to the Command 
Analyzer component. The command itself and the information that traces it 
back to the user that requested its execution, as well as the moment when 
that execution was requested, are stored in the Security Framework Database. 
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Afterwards, the query (and sub-queries’ set) is passed on to the Command 
Analyzer component. An important aspect is that the DBMS should be 
configured to only process SQL statements that have gone through the 
Command Analyzer component. All SQL statements that avoid going 
through the Command Analyzer should be rejected by the DBMS. The 
Command Analyzer retrieves the information regarding the user behavior 
profile to which each command concerns from the Security Framework 
Database, and performs the respective intrusion detection tests on each 
command to verify if it should be considered an intrusion. If the user 
command is considered an intrusion, the Security Framework Database is 
updated by flagging the command as a potential intrusion and an alert is 
generated, which is passed on to the Data Warehouse Security Interface in 
order to be communicated to the Data Warehouse Security Administrator, and 
the user action may be stopped. If the user action is not considered an 
intrusion, it can then be executed by the DBMS against the Data Warehouse 
Database(s), which is the next step. 
3.1.4. Executing the User Statement 
A user statement that has not been considered an intrusion by the Command 
Analyzer component may be executed by the DBMS. There are two 
possibilities:  
1) If the user statement does not contain any reference to masked or 
encrypted columns, then it is immediately executed by the DBMS;  
2) If the user statement contains any reference to masked or encrypted 
columns, then it is passed on to the Command Rewriter component 
to be modified in order to correctly execute against the masked 
and/or encrypted data, and then it is executed by the DBMS. 
The information flow referring to this process of executing the user 
statement is shown in Figure 3-5. In practice, for each user statement 
deemed as a non-intrusion, the Command Analyzer component notifies the 
Response Analyzer component to wait for a response so the targeted 
processed data and the statement’s execution results can also be analyzed. 
As we explain further in chapters 4 and 5, the proposed data masking and 
encryption algorithms only use operators and transformations that are 
native to standard SQL. This allows them to simply rely on SQL rewriting 
to accomplish their masking/unmasking and encryption/decryption 
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purposes. After receiving a user statement from the Command Analyzer, the 
Command Rewriter queries the Security Framework Database(s) to retrieve the 
necessary data masking and encryption keys for that user statement and 
applies the required SQL rewriting to the user statement and sends it to be 
executed by the DBMS. When a user statement completes its execution, the 
results are sent to the Response Analyzer component to perform an a 
posteriori verification. 
Command 
Analyzer
Security 
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Data Warehouse 
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Command 
Rewriter
Response 
Analyzer
DBMS
 
Figure 3-5. Information flow concerning the execution of the user statement 
3.1.5 Analyzing the Processed Data and Dataset Result a Posteriori 
After the user statement has been processed by the DBMS against the Data 
Warehouse Database(s), the results are sent to the Response Analyzer to check 
if the processed data and the results themselves are suspicious, given the 
behavior profile of the typically accessed data and resulting datasets of the 
user to which the statement belongs. The information flow referring to this 
process is shown in Figure 3-6. 
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Figure 3-6. Information flow of the a posteriori analysis of the user statement 
The Response Analyzer retrieves the information from the Security 
Framework Database regarding the features belonging to the behavior 
profile of the typically accessed data and resulting datasets of the user to 
which the statement belongs, and performs the respective intrusion 
detection tests against the values of the processed data and resulting 
dataset to verify if it should be considered an intrusion. If it is considered 
an intrusion, then the Security Framework Database is updated by flagging 
the command as a potential intrusion and an alert is generated, which is 
then passed on to the Data Warehouse Security Interface in order to 
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communicate the event to the Data Warehouse Security Administrator, 
and the user action can be stopped. If the user action is not considered an 
intrusion, the results are simply sent back to the user that requested the 
execution and the Security Framework Database is updated by flagging the 
action as a non-intrusion that has completed its execution. 
3.2. Guidelines for Enhancing Data Masking and Encryption 
Performance in Data Warehousing 
In this section, we present the guidelines that drived the development of 
the data masking and encryption solutions proposed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
These generic principles intend to deal with the data masking and 
encryption issues pointed out in Chapter 2, and establish the foundations 
for each proposed solution in the context of the middle tier presented in 
the previous section. 
3.2.1. Numerical vs Textual Masked or Ciphered Input and Output 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, standard encryption algorithms were 
conceived for encrypting general-purpose data and therefore, receive and 
output textual or binary data, while data warehouse data is mostly 
composed by numerical datatype fact table columns that typically take up 
90% or more of the total storage space [Kimball and Ross, 2013]. Most data 
warehouse user workloads request processing arithmetic functions such as 
sums, averages, etc., which implies that those textual or binary values need 
to be converted back into their numerical format.  
Since working with text values is much more computationally expensive 
than working with numerical values, standard ciphers are much slower 
than ciphers specifically designed for receiving numerical inputs and 
producing numerical outputs. 
Therefore, to avoid the overhead processing time concerning the referred 
datatype conversions, the masking and encryption solutions proposed in 
this thesis were specifically designed to receive numerical input and 
produce numerical output. 
3.2.2. Preserving Column Datatypes 
Considering that numerical datatype sizes usually range from 1 to 8 bytes, 
while standard encryption outputs have lengths of 8 to 32 bytes [Natan, 
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2005] and that data warehouses have a huge amount of rows that typically 
take up many gigabytes or terabytes of space, even a small increase of any 
column size required by changing numeric datatypes to textual or binary 
(in order to store encryption outputs) introduces very large storage space 
overhead. This consequently increases the amount of data to process, as 
well as the required storage and processing resources, which also degrades 
database performance.  
While the importance of encrypting text values might be significant or not 
for data warehouses (depending on its context), efficiently encrypting 
numerical values is critical, as these represent the business facts. The 
masking and encryption solutions proposed in this thesis allow preserving 
the original datatype and length of each encrypted column, which allows 
maintaining their original data storage space. 
3.2.3. Using Only Native SQL Operations to Mask/Encrypt Data 
Another issue previously pointed out concerns the data roundtrips 
between the database and the encryption and decryption mechanisms. 
Topologies involving middleware solutions such as the one proposed in 
[Radha and Kumar, 2005] typically request all the encrypted data from the 
database and execute decrypting actions themselves locally, finally 
sending the decrypted results back to the user that requested them. Given 
the typically large amount of data accessed for processing DW queries, 
previously acquiring all the data from the database for encrypting or 
decrypting in a middle tier is unfeasible. This strangles the database server 
and/or network with communication costs due to bandwidth consumption 
and I/O bottlenecks, jeopardizing throughput and consequently, response 
time.  
As our approach is based on operators supported by native SQL, it requires 
only query rewriting for masking/encrypting and unmasking/decrypting 
actions. In fact, using only native SQL operators and functions brings 
several major benefits: 
 It allows building the sequence of steps for all masking/encrypting 
and unmasking/decryption processes as a unique SQL statement, 
and no external languages or resources need to be instantiated; 
Chapter 3 
82 
 Computing the masking/encrypting and unmasking/decrypting 
operations as a SQL statement enables them to run directly against 
the data, avoiding data roundtrips between the database and the 
masking and encrypting mechanisms and thus, avoiding I/O and 
network overhead from the critical path; 
 Contrarily to what happens with standard encryption algorithm 
implementations, which are typically OS platform and CPU 
dependent, using only native SQL makes our solutions DBMS 
platform independent, making them usable in any data warehouse 
running on any CPU model, without depending on any 
programming language or external OS resource; 
 Since the SQL statements can run directly against the masked or 
encrypted data, it means that the data can remain masked or 
encrypted at all times, only disclosing the computed results back to 
the user which requested the statement’s execution. 
3.2.4. Masking and Encryption Algorithm Design 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the complexity of each transformation round in 
masking and encryption algorithms is directly linked with the security 
strength achieved by the algorithm, as is the number of rounds it executes 
and the size of the used encryption key(s). It is assumed by the security 
community as a general rule that, as the number of complex operations, 
encryption key lengths, and/or number of encryption rounds increase, the 
algorithms security strength also increases or, at least, remains the same 
[Vaudenay, 2006]. However, increasing the complexity of the “data mix”, 
the number of rounds or the encryption key length also introduces a 
performance drawback, since it requires more machine resources and 
processing time. 
In what concerns the design of “data mixing” for each masking or 
encryption round, we discard bit shifting and permutations, commonly 
used by most ciphers [Vaudenay, 2006], since there is no standard SQL 
support for these actions. We also discard the use of substitution boxes (e.g. 
AES uses several 1024-byte S-boxes, each of which converts 8-bit inputs to 
32-bit outputs), because of their complexity and resource consumption. 
Data Warehouse Security Framework 
 
83 
Our masking and encryption approaches are based on the widely used and 
well known XOR and MOD operators, which are available to be 
implemented in native SQL. In practice, we propose the use of a set of 
arithmetic operators combined with XOR and MOD operators to transform 
numerical data. 
The XOR operator is widely used in most encryption algorithms. In fact, it 
is the baseline for achieving perfect secrecy in the most basic encryption 
transformation, the Vernam Cipher7 [Vaudenay, 2006]. Its properties in 
achieving perfect secrecy given certain conditions and its ease in mixing 
up the input values makes the XOR operator an excellent candidate for 
building data transformation functions for masking or encryption 
purposes.  
The modulus (MOD) remainder operator is another good candidate for 
data transformation functions with masking or encryption purposes, 
because it enables building non-invertible functions. For a function to be 
directly invertible, each output must correspond to no more than one 
input, i.e., more than one different inputs cannot generate the same output; 
a function with this property is called one-to-one, or information-
preserving, or an injection [Bartle, 1976]. An injective function is a function 
that preserves distinctness: it never maps distinct elements of its domain 
to the same element of its codomain. From an information theory 
perspective, this means that for an injective function, each input-output 
pair has intrinsically the exact same probability of occurrence. This 
provides information to break the cipher’s key if the attacker has access to 
                                                     
7 The Vernam Cipher was published in 1926 by Gilbert Vernam from AT&T. It is 
based on an encryption key with the same bit length as the input plaintext and 
applies a XOR operation against both values to get the encrypted output. Shannon 
proved that this cipher achieved perfect secrecy if the keys are generated in a 
randomly uniform distribution and the same key is only used once to encrypt one 
input value. In this case, there is no information leakage because the same key is 
never used twice and the attacker needs to test all possible encryption key values 
in each case to guarantee absolute success in the attack, requiring on average half 
of that number in order to succeed. Statistically, perfect secrecy means that the a 
posteriori distribution of the plaintext X after the encrypted ciphertext Y is known 
is equal to the a priori distribution of the plaintext: the conditional distribution of 
X given Y is equal to the original distribution. Formally, for all x and y such that 
Pr [Y = y] ≠ 0, we have Pr [X = x | Y = y] = Pr [X = x]. 
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its algorithm and set of outputs. Therefore, the main objective of a cipher 
should be to assure a maximum of non-injective transformations in order 
to introduce uncertainty over which inputs generate the output, thus 
avoiding information disclosure to break the cipher.  
The MOD operator is non-injective, given that for X MOD Y = Z, the same 
output Z, considering Y a constant, can have an undetermined number of 
possibilities in X as an input which will generate the same value Z when 
applying the operator (e.g. 15 MOD 4=3, 19 MOD 4=3, 23 MOD 4=3, 27 
MOD 4=3, etc). Since MOD operations are non-injective, this means that 
the transformation functions that use MOD are also non-injective. Given 
that injectivity is a required property for having invertibility, masking or 
encryption algorithms that use MOD transformations are therefore, non-
invertible. 
3.3. Guidelines for Enhancing Intrusion Detection in Data Warehousing 
This section presents the guidelines that drove the development of the 
intrusion detection solution proposed in Chapter 6. These principles intend 
to deal with the data warehouse intrusion detection issues pointed out in 
Chapter 2 in the context of the middle tier presented in Subsection 3.1. 
3.3.1. Using Individual User Profiles 
In typical transactional systems, it is normal to have a very high number of 
predefined queries that are issued in a repetitive manner by each user, 
making most queries extremely predictable. For example, each teller in a 
supermarket store is always repeating queries to retrieve individual 
product prices. Furthermore, independently from the number of tellers, all 
of them mostly repeat the same type of query. Considering a generalization 
of this typical operational business environment, it is easy to understand 
that user profiling in transactional systems is relatively simple and user 
role profiles can be built, instead of building an individual profile per each 
user.  
Decision support systems do not have the same user characteristics as 
those of operational transactional systems. As previously mentioned in 
Chapter 2, distinguishing normal from abnormal user behavior in data 
warehouses is a very difficult task, given the typical high amount of ad hoc 
queries issued by the users. On the other hand, given that each user has its 
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own data query demands that are closely linked to his/her business role, 
the portion of ad hoc queries inherent to each user should typically 
contribute to reveal a unique profile that distinguishes each user from the 
remaining. Therefore, in this work we claim that user profiles in DWs 
should be built with the highest detail, i.e., individual profiles should be 
built for each user in order to obtain high intrusion detection rates, against 
role-based profiling as suggested in other approaches such as [Kamra et al., 
2008]. 
3.3.2. Analyzing the Targeted Tables and Columns, Processed Data and 
Resulting Datasets 
None of the intrusion detection techniques proposed in the past is capable 
of analyzing all the aspects directly linked with user behavior in what 
concerns database usage in an integrated manner. For instance, the RBAC 
intrusion detection approach proposed by [Kamra et al., 2008] profiles the 
columns and tables accessed by the users that belong to a given role. In our 
opinion, reducing the analysis of user behavior merely to this type of 
approach is too simplistic.  
Most intrusion detection techniques focus on features that enable the 
analysis of which tables and columns are being targeted by the user 
actions. Few techniques focus on the data processed by the user actions or 
on the resulting datasets themselves, which are a consequence of 
processing those user actions. We argue that such distinct approaches 
should be integrated so the features can reflect the impact produced by the 
user actions for all the previously referred aspects or dimensions. 
Therefore, the DIDS proposed in this thesis uses features that enable 
analyzing the targeted tables and columns included in the user actions, the 
data processed by those actions and its resulting datasets, in an integrated 
manner, which never occurs in current DIDS. 
3.3.3. Intrusion Detection and Prevention a Priori and a Posteriori 
In the past, each DIDS approach for analyzing user actions from a timely 
perspective could be divided into two main groups: 1) analyzing the user 
action a priori to its execution; or 2) analyzing the user action a posteriori, 
i.e., after it finished its execution. Of course, the second type of analysis 
would not be able to provide intrusion prevention, which we consider 
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critical for data warehouses. In this work we consider that both types of 
analysis should be used, before and after the user actions are executed and 
before its results are disclosed.  
The DIDS approach proposed in this thesis focuses not only on building 
user profiles regarding features holding information on the issued SQL 
commands, but also includes features that infer information on the 
processed data and resulting datasets. This enables our solution to perform 
intrusion detection and prevention both a priori and a posteriori to the 
execution of user actions, before the results are disclosed back. 
3.3.4. Using Risk Exposure for Alert Management 
When analyzing user actions, most DIDS output numerical measures that 
require defining thresholds to determine if those values imply considering 
the respective user actions as intrusions or non-intrusions. While defining 
high thresholds could potentially produce less false alarms and give higher 
assurance that a generated alert would in fact refer to a true intrusion, this 
could also potentiate the number of false negatives, i.e., the number of true 
intrusions that pass by undetected. Given the value and sensitivity of data 
warehouse data, it is preferable to define low thresholds for the intrusion 
detection processes. However, this typically generates an extremely high 
number of alerts that mostly turn out to be false alarms, wasting time and 
resources. There can typically be a significant amount of alerts with low 
probability of referring to an intrusion, but those alerts however may 
produce a very high negative impact on the business, given that DIDS 
typically do not assess the damage that those intrusions can produce on 
the business. Furthermore, not all intrusions represent the same potential 
amount of danger to the enterprise. 
In this work we propose a risk exposure method that evaluates the risk to 
the enterprise represented by each alert without excluding any of them, 
given the probability that it really refers to an intrusion and the potential 
impact that the action may produce on the business. This allows 
considering all generated alerts instead of excluding any of them just 
because they have low probability thresholds. Ranking the alerts using a 
measure of risk exposure enables checking them by their order of 
importance, which means that security staff will spend time and resources 
more efficiently, by quickly dealing with intrusions that can produce 
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greater damage rather than wasting time checking for intrusions that 
represent a lower risk of damage. Considering that none of the generated 
alerts are discarded and that ranking them by the risk they present to the 
enterprise, makes the proposed risk exposure method a much more 
reliable and efficient alert management approach than those using 
correlation techniques. 
3.3.5. Fine-Tuning Intrusion Detection Features 
In the proposed DIDS approach, each individual feature can generate 
intrusion alerts. The diversity of user behavior characteristics caught by 
each feature in each data warehouse environment depends on 
heterogeneous (and sometimes unpredictable) events such as the business 
context itself and the role played by each user, for example. This means 
that the same feature can produce very different false positive (i.e., false 
alarm), true positive (i.e., real intrusions detection), true negative (i.e., true 
normal user behavior) and false negative (i.e., intrusions that pass 
undetected) rates in different data warehousing environments.  
Although in most data warehouses it may be very difficult to define a priori 
which features should be deemed as more efficient to the intrusion 
detection processes, the DIDS should be able to fine tune its sensitivity over 
time. Considering that the features that produce the best intrusion 
detection results are the most reliable for the intrusion detection processes, 
these processes should be able to reflect the relative individual efficiency 
between the complete set of feature to improve the overall results.  
The DIDS proposed in this thesis uses a calibration technique that 
computes a measure to assure that the features that show a higher 
efficiency in intrusion detection are those who’s alerts have higher 
probability of referring true intrusions. This is made effective in our 
approach by using this measure in the risk exposure method to assess the 
probability of each alert, given the feature that generated it, i.e., the 
feature’s efficiency measure is directly linked with the probability that the 
generated alert refers to a true intrusion. Through time, the system is self-
adaptive by fine-tuning each feature’s measure according to its intrusion 
detection efficiency, given its true positive and false positive rates. 
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3.4. Summary 
In this chapter we presented the middle tier that enables the integration of 
the proposed data masking, encryption and intrusion detection for data 
warehousing environments, and described each of its components.  
We also described the information flow and how each individual 
component works within the execution path of each individual user action 
to form an overall security solution that deals with those actions in real-
time.  
The guidelines that drove the development of each data masking, 
encryption and intrusion detection solution proposed in this thesis were 
also presented. The following chapters will explain in detail how each of 
these solutions operate and demonstrate their efficiency. 
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Chapter 4  
MOBAT: A Data Masking Solution 
for Data Warehouses 
The irreversibility and lack of proven security strength attributed to data 
masking routines have made them an unacceptable choice when it comes 
to securing sensitive data in live production and reporting databases 
[Natan, 2005; Ravikumar et al., 2011]. On the other hand, data masking is 
the main choice for generating test databases for software development 
environments or when there is a need to publish data that has values with 
privacy issues. However, we argue that it may be worth considering the 
usage of a reversible data masking solution in a data warehousing context, 
as it can effectively provide an alternative solution for protecting data with 
some level of security strength while introducing low overheads in 
database storage space and response time performance.  
In this chapter, we propose MOBAT (MOdulus BAsed data masking 
Technique), a low cost and straightforward data masking technique for 
numerical values that aims at balancing the tradeoff between data security 
and database performance. The data masking function uses the MOD-
modular operator (which returns the remainder of a division expression) 
and simple arithmetic operations to mask data. Storage space overhead is 
avoided by preserving each masked column’s datatype and by simply 
using SQL rewriting to mask and unmask values. This also allows avoiding 
I/O and network bandwidth bottlenecks by discarding data roundtrips 
between the database and the masking and unmasking mechanisms. 
Note that this proposal does not intend to replace any standard encryption 
algorithms currently available as built-in packages in most DBMS, but 
rather should be viewed as an alternative solution for protecting the 
confidentiality of DW data. The main objective is to provide a significant 
level of security while introducing very small overheads in storage space 
and database performance, i.e., acceptable tradeoffs between security and 
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performance, which is a critical issue in order to assure the feasibility of 
these solutions in DWs. 
To evaluate our proposal, we include experiments using two leading 
commercial DBMS, Oracle 11g and Microsoft SQL Server 2008, and one 
open-source DBMS, MySQL Server 5.5. The experiments allow to compare 
the proposed data masking solution against the built-in AES (with 128 bit 
and 256 bit security) and 3DES168 encryption algorithms provided in the 
referred DBMS, as well as research state-of-the-art proposals such as 
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPES) and Salsa20 (alias Snuffle), using the 
TPC-H decision support benchmark and a real-world sales DW.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we 
present and describe our masking technique and point out the main issues 
regarding its use, while Section 4.2 describes its functional architecture. In 
Section 4.3 we discuss our solution’s security and performance issues. 
Section 4.4 presents the experimental evaluations that were conducted 
using the well-known TPC-H decision support benchmark and a real-
world DW to assess the proposed data masking technique’s performance 
and compare it against standard and state-of-the-art encryption 
algorithms. Section 4.5 includes a discussion on the proposed data masking 
solution and on the results obtained in the experiments. Finally, Section 4.6 
presents our conclusions. 
4.1 MOBAT Masking Expression 
Generally, most facts in DWs are columns with numerical values [Kimball 
and Ross, 2013]. Since fact tables usually represent more than 90% of the 
DW’s total size [Kimball and Ross, 2013], it is fair to assume that numeric 
type columns also represent the largest portion of business data. The 
solution proposed in this chapter aims at masking the DW’s numerical 
values while introducing small overheads in the computational efforts for 
query processing.  
Our MOdulus-BAsed data masking Technique (MOBAT), which allows 
replacing sensitive data with realistic (but not real) data without heavily 
impacting database performance, is based on a quite simple masking 
expression. Assume a table T with a set of N numerical columns Ci = {C1, 
C2, C3, …, CN) to be masked and a total set of M rows Rj = {R1, R2, R3, …, RM). 
Each value to mask in the table will be identified as a pair (Rj, Ci), where Rj 
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and Ci respectively represent the row and column to which the value refers. 
The masking expression depends on the following predefinitions: 
 K1 is a 128 bit random generated value, constant for table T; 
 K2 is a 128 bit random generated value, ranging between the 
minimum and maximum positive integer value possible of column 
Ci, given the maximum storage size of the column’s datatype. There 
is a K2 for each column Ci to be masked, represented by K2, i; 
 K3 is a public key based on a 128 bit column appended to each row Rj 
in T, filled in with a random value in [1; 2128], represented by K3, j. 
Assume each value to be masked represented as (Rj, Ci). Each new masked 
value (Rj, Ci)’ is obtained by applying the following Formula (1) for row j 
and column i of table T: 
(Rj, Ci)’ = (Rj, Ci) – ((K3, j MOD K1) MOD K2, i) + K2, i (1) 
Since K1 and K2, i are constant values for the table and each column, 
respectively, and K3, j is stored along with each row in the table, the inverse 
formula of (1) for retrieving the original value is shown as Formula (2): 
(Rj, Ci) = (Rj, Ci)’ + ((K3, j MOD K1) MOD K2, i) – K2, i  (2) 
Given that an independent value of K3, j is required for each row, if the 
values of K3, j were stored in a lookup table separate from table T a heavy 
join operation between those tables would be required to unmask data, 
which should be avoided at all cost due to the typical enormous number of 
rows in fact tables. In order to avoid table joins in query processing when 
using MOBAT, the values of K3, j must be stored along with each row j in 
table T. To accomplish this, there are two possible solutions: 
1) A new column is added to table T for storing each K3, j value;  
2) Table T is recreated with the inclusion of K3, j using the CREATE 
TABLE statement from the start and then restoring the table’s data. 
The second option implies additional efforts and amount of time to rebuild 
table T, depending on its size. However, it should speed up query response 
time, when compared with the first option, since the new column K3, j is 
physically included with the original data in each row from the start; the 
second option may make it to be physically stored apart from the 
remaining original data in the table because it is added a posteriori to its 
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creation. The impact on database performance can be compared be 
observing the results in Section 4.4.  
A third option for defining K3, j values which speeds up MOBAT 
performance is to use any long integer typed column CZ, which is already 
part of the original data structure of table T, as K3, j, instead of creating an 
extra column for K3,j in T. In this case, no changes in table T data structure 
are required, eliminating storage space overhead in T. However, this limits 
the security strength of the masking Formula (1), since the value of K3, j also 
depends on the range and cardinality of the values of CZ, and the 
predictability of knowing the values of CZ on behalf of an attacker. The 
results for this third option for defining K3,j are also shown in Section 4.4. 
As a simple example on how MOBAT is applied, consider the following: 
assume a table T that requires two masked columns, Column1 and Column2. 
Suppose that the generated values for masking keys K1 = 9264 for table T 
and K2,1 = 12 and K2,2 = 78254 for each respective column. Table 4-1 shows 
the original data for T on the left and its resulting masked content on the 
right, represented as T’.  
Table 4-1. Example of original dataset and resulting MOBAT masked dataset 
T – Original dataset  T’ – MOBAT Masked dataset 
Column1 Column2 K3,j  Column1’ Column2’ K3,j 
11 91873 7537  22 162590 7537 
2 38824 1808  6 115270 1808 
18 71624 29636  22 148034 29636 
19 38824 50877  22 112521 50877 
15 84624 34997  22 155673 34997 
12 46926 41395  17 120841 41395 
It can be seen in Table 4-1 that the same original values of Column2 result 
in different masked values and that the same masked values in Column1’ 
also correspond to different original true values in Column1, achieving 
apparent randomness. Of course, this is a very small dataset used only to 
illustrate these features. We discuss MOBAT’s security issues further on in 
Section 4.3. In the next section we explain how to query the masked 
database. 
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4.2 Functional Architecture 
The functional architecture for using MOBAT in practice is shown in 
Figure 4-1, and comprises three key entities:  
 The masked database and its DBMS;  
 The MOBAT security middleware interface;  
 User/client interfaces to query the masked database.  
The MOBAT middleware interface acts as a broker between the masked 
database DBMS and the user interfaces, using the MOBAT masking and 
unmasking methods, ensuring that the queried data is securely processed 
and proper results are returned to those interfaces. All communications are 
executed through SSL/TLS secure connections, to protect SQL instructions 
and returned results between the system’s entities. In the Black Box, the 
middleware will store all the generated masking keys and predefined data 
access policies for the database to which it concerns. 
User 
Interface
MOBAT
Middleware
Interface
DBMS Masked DW 
Database
Black Box
(Masking Keys, 
User Access Definitions, 
SQL Command Log)
User 
Queries
Query 
Results
Query 
Results
Rewritten 
User Queries  
Figure 4-1. The MOBAT Data Security Architecture 
The Black Box is stored in the Security Framework Database database server, 
as described in Chapter 3, and there is one Black Box created for each 
masked DW database. This process is similar to the creation of an Oracle 
Wallet, which keeps all the encryption keys and definitions for each Oracle 
Database [Huey, 2008; Oracle, 2010a]. However, contrarily to what 
happens in Oracle, where the DBA is free to access the Oracle Wallet 
whenever s/he wishes, in our solution only the MOBAT middleware itself 
can access the Black Box, i.e., absolutely no user has direct access to its 
content because it is encrypted using the AES standard encryption 
algorithm [AES, 2001] with a 256 bit key only known by MOBAT.  
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The MOBAT middleware also creates a historical command log for 
recording all the instructions and actions executed against the database, for 
auditing and control purposes. In case of losing the Black Box of a certain 
database, there is no way to restore its true data, except to crack the 
masking keys or restoring a replica that has been previously backed up. 
Masking keys’ privacy depends on where the keys are stored and who has 
access to them. Our solution uses three masking keys (K1, K2 and K3): two 
are private and one is public. The private masking keys are generated by 
the MOBAT middleware, and encrypted and stored by it in the Black Box. 
The values of those keys are never shown or known by the DBA or any 
other user. To obtain true results, all user queries or actions must pass 
through the MOBAT middleware, which will store a copy of those 
instructions in the Black Box command history log.  
Each time a user requests the execution of a query or any other action, the 
MOBAT middleware will receive and parse the instructions, fetch the 
necessary masking keys, rewrite the query, send it to be processed by the 
DBMS and retrieve the processed results, and finally send those results 
back to the user interface that issued the request. Thus, MOBAT is 
transparently used, since SQL command rewriting is transparently 
managed by the middleware. The only change required to user 
applications is that commands should be sent to the middleware, instead 
of directly to the DBMS. 
To mask a database, a DBA must require this action through the MOBAT 
middleware. After inputting the DBA login and database connection 
information, the MOBAT middleware will attempt to log on to that 
database. If it succeeds, it then scans all the data access policies defined in 
the database for identifying authorized users and respective permissions. 
The Black Box is then created for that database and updated with those user 
access definitions and data policies, and an action log for recording all 
further user actions requested to execute in the database is also created, as 
explained earlier. Afterwards, the tables and columns to be masked are 
chosen by the DBA. All the required private masking keys for each table 
and column are then generated, encrypted by an AES256 algorithm and 
stored in the respective Black Box. 
Finally, the MOBAT middleware applies the data masking formula on all 
rows of all columns to be masked, replacing the original values with the 
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new masked values. Inserting new data or modifying or deleting existing 
data must always be done through the MOBAT middleware, which applies 
the masking routine to any value referring to any masked column, and 
stores the masked value directly in place for update and insert actions. 
Contrarily to most standard commercial data masking solutions, MOBAT 
also allows reversing the masked database back to its original data, if 
masking is no longer needed.  
Whenever user applications wish to execute a query, they submit it to the 
MOBAT middleware instead of directly querying the database. The 
middleware then rewrites the received query in order to process it with the 
real data values, using Formula (2) to replace the respective masked 
columns used in the query, and checking the user access definitions in the 
Black Box to see if it comes from an authorized user. To rewrite the user 
query, the MOBAT middleware searches for which tables and columns it 
needs to process, and looks up the Black Box for retrieving the needed K1 
and K2,i data masking keys for each of those tables and columns, as well as 
the additional K3, j key columns used by MOBAT in those tables. 
As an example, suppose the LineItem table of the TPC-H benchmark [TPC-
H] has three numerical fact columns (i = 3) (L_Quantity, L_ExtendedPrice, 
and L_Discount) masked by MOBAT. Suppose also that MOBAT has 
generated and filled in a new column L_KeyK3 for the j rows of the LineItem 
table, which will act as the public K3, j key values, and has stored the value 
of 9342 (for example) for key K1 referring to the LineItem table, as well as K2, 
L_Quantity = 12, K2, L_ExtendedPrice = 51234, and K2, L_Discount = 4 (for example also). 
Consider TPC-H query 6: 
SELECT SUM(L_ExtendedPrice * L_Discount) AS Revenue 
  FROM LineItem  
 WHERE L_ShipDate>=TO_DATE('1994-01-01')  
   AND L_ShipDate<TO_DATE('1995-01-01')  
   AND L_Discount BETWEEN 0.05 AND 0.07 
   AND L_Quantity<24 
The new query, rewritten by the MOBAT middleware and submitted to 
the DBMS is as follows: 
 
 
Chapter 4 
96 
SELECT SUM((L_ExtendedPrice +  
            MOD(MOD(L_KeyK3,9342),51234)-51234)  
            *(L_Discount+MOD(MOD(L_KeyK3,9342),4)-4))  
       AS Revenue 
  FROM LineItem  
 WHERE L_ShipDate>=TO_DATE('1994-01-01')  
   AND L_ShipDate<TO_DATE('1995-01-01')  
   AND (L_Discount+MOD(MOD(L_KeyK3,9342),4)-4) 
         BETWEEN 0.05 AND 0.07  
   AND (L_Quantity+MOD(MOD(L_KeyK3,9342),12)-12)<24 
As shown in the example, query parsing and rewriting is a straightforward 
operation, replacing each masked column with their respective unmasking 
Formula (2). This is valid for any type of query, including equality and 
range queries, as well as built in functions. These changes to the queries 
are handled transparently by the middleware and kept hidden from the 
users. Only the query results are returned to the user interface. 
4.3 Security Issues 
In this section we discuss the security issues concerning the use of the 
proposed data masking technique. We present the threat model, explain 
why we use the MOD operator as the base operation for the masking 
expression and highlight the advantages of having data-at-rest masked at 
all times, and describe the attack costs for breaking MOBAT’s security. 
4.3.1 Threat Model  
All user queries and instructions that come through are managed by the 
MOBAT middleware, which transparently parses and rewrites them to 
query the DBMS and retrieve the intended results. The stored copy of those 
commands can never be changed or erased, and users never see the 
rewritten instructions. For security purposes, any historical logging on the 
DBMS should be shut off or made secure (e.g. via encryption) before 
requesting the execution of the rewritten instructions, so that they are not 
stored in the DBMS as plain text, since this would disclose the masking 
keys. Note that for security auditing and to be able to comply with legal 
auditing regulations, the MOBAT command log always stores a copy of all 
the issued user commands. All communications between user applications, 
the MOBAT middleware and the DBMS are performed through encrypted 
SSL/TLS connections.  In what concerns the Black Box, all contents are 
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encrypted using the standard AES 256 bit algorithm, making it as secure in 
this aspect as any other similar encryption solution for stored data (e.g. 
Oracle 11g TDE and Microsoft SQL Server 2008 TDE). 
The MOBAT middleware allows any user with administration privileges 
to query the read-only historical command log, so anyone can watch over 
anyone to check for misuse. All database access is controlled by the 
middleware, extracting the predefined data access policies in the first 
instantiation with the database to mask, from the data access policies 
previously defined using the DBMS. Subsequent changes in data access 
policies by DBAs must be done through the MOBAT middleware. As these 
changes are also stored in the Black Box history command log, changes in 
data access policies with the purpose of executing malicious actions can 
always be checked.  
The only allowed access to the masking keys in the Black Box is done by the 
middleware, which is managed only by the middleware itself. We assume 
that the DBMS is a trusted server because it is expected to correctly execute 
the SQL commands that are sent to it. However, we consider the database 
as untrusted as it may be compromised by an attacker able to bypass the 
network and MOBAT access controls, gaining direct access to the database 
itself. We also assume that the MOBAT expressions are public, so the 
attacker can replicate the masking and unmasking mechanisms, meaning 
that the goal of the attacker is to obtain the private masking keys in order 
to break security. 
4.3.2 Using Column Datatype Key Lengths and Consecutive MOD 
Operations 
In order to minimize the impact in data storage space and query response 
time overheads, the private keys for each column have the same length as 
the defined column datatype. Although this might imply using small sized 
keys and make the masking expression to produce a small amount of 
possible distinct outputs, it should not be very significant from a practical 
perspective. For example, if the masked column has a bit datatype, there is 
no point in generating masked values in a range of [0…2128], since the 
attacker probably knows a priori that it can only hold a 0 or 1 by observing 
the column’s name. Given that the best practices in DWs suggest using 
meaningful names for the columns in the database tables for the sake of 
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readability [Kimball and Ross, 2013], this also suggests that there is not 
much to gain in incrementing the size of the masked output range of values 
because this will probably not imply an increase of the level of security 
strength. 
As previously mentioned, the MOD operator is used as the main operation 
in the masking expression because it is non-injective, given that for X MOD 
Y = Z, the same output Z, considering Y as a constant, can have an 
undetermined number of possibilities in X as an input that will generate 
the same value Z. This is illustrated in Section 4.1 (Table 4-1), where the 
same original values originate different masked values and vice-versa. 
Since MOD operations are non-injective, the masked outputs are also non-
injective. Given that injectivity is a required property for invertibility, the 
proposed masking expression is thus not directly invertible, enforced by 
using two consecutive MOD operations. Thus, the objective of the attacker 
should be focused on obtaining the private masking keys in order to break 
security. 
4.3.3 Data-at-rest is Always Masked 
Since MOBAT operates simply by rewriting SQL commands to be 
processed against the data, this enables running SQL directly against the 
masked data, which means that the data-at-rest stored within the database 
files is masked at all times. 
This also means that even if someone gains direct access to the database, 
s/he will only see masked data values. As the masked values are realistic-
looking and maintain their original column datatypes, if an attacker was to 
query the database s/he would view expected values, although they would 
be incorrect. This means that MOBAT would potentially be able to produce 
misleading effects against attackers. 
4.3.4 Attack Costs on MOBAT 
As known (and as we assume the attackers have access to the masking 
expression), the level of security of data masking or encryption solutions 
does not depend on its secrecy, but on its keys [Elminaam et al., 2010; 
Nadeem and Javed, 2005]. The quality of each set of operations in achieving 
the intended “data mix” affects the performance of the algorithm. Thus, 
there is always a tradeoff between security and performance in these 
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algorithms, because the achievement of higher complexity often implies 
the consumption of a higher amount of resources and processing time.  
As mentioned before, there keys are used in our proposal: K1 is a unique 
value generated once for each table and made constant for all values to 
mask in that table; K2 is a unique value generated once for each column in 
each table and made constant for all values to mask in that column; and K3 
is a value generated for each row in the table, made constant for all the 
values in the columns to mask in that row. Since K3 is public (given that it 
is stored in the fact table), only key values K1 and K2 need to be discovered 
for retrieving the real data values.  
K1 is a 16 byte integer key, i.e., a set of 128 bits. K2 depends on the maximum 
storage size defined for each column, typically varying between 1 and 128 
bits. This means that our technique implies a minimum of 2129 key 
combinations, for K1 and K2 together (at least 16 bytes + 1 bit), and roughly 
needs an average number of 2128 tests (half of the total amount of possible 
brute force tests = 50% chance) for discovering the keys using brute force, 
for each masked column in the table, since K2 is column dependant. 
Consequently, the minimum number of combinations needed to discover 
all the needed key values for a i number of columns is i * 2129, resulting in 
an average of i * 2128  i * 3.4 x 1038 brute force tests in order to discover the 
keys. 
This is however the worst case scenario for the attacker and executing a 
chosen ciphertext attack would allow the attacker to reduce the key search 
space in the following way (considering the masking expression defined in 
Formula (1)):  
Consider x’1,i and x’2,i as the masked values for two given rows 
(respectively 1 and 2) of column i and x1,i and x2,i as their respective original 
true values, i.e., x’1, i = (R1, Ci)’, x’2, i = (R2, Ci)’, x1, i = (R1, Ci), and x2, i = (R2, 
Ci). In this case, 
x’1, i = x1, i – ((K3, 1 MOD K1) MOD K2, i) + K2, i  
x’2, i = x2, i – ((K3, 2 MOD K1) MOD K2, i) + K2, i   
Knowing that K3, j is a public value key, if the attacker chooses two masked 
outputs where K3, j have very small values (close to zero), then it is highly 
probable that those values are smaller than the K1 private key, i.e., K3, 1 < K1 
and K3, 2 < K1. In this case, the masking expression would be reduced to: 
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x’1, i = x1, i – (K3, 1 MOD K2, i) + K2, i  
x’2, i = x2, i – (K3, 2 MOD K2, i) + K2, i   
where all values are known except for the private key K2, i. 
Building up an expression with the difference between both variables, we 
have: 
(x’1, i – x’2, i) = (x1, i – (K3, 1 MOD K2, i) + K2, i) – (x2, i – (K3, 2 MOD K2, i) + K2, i) 
  = (x1, i – (K3, 1 MOD K2, i)) – (x2, i – (K3, 2 MOD K2, i)) 
Finally, isolating the expressions with known values from those having 
unknown values: 
(x’1, i – x’2, i) – (x1, i – x2, i) = (K3, 1 MOD K2, i – K3, 2 MOD K2, i) 
which would significantly reduce the search space for K2, i. After breaking 
K2, i the attacker could then discover K1 in a similar manner by using the 
original expressions of Formula (1) for the masked values. 
To evaluate the database performance when using the proposed masking 
solution, the following section presents experimental results obtained by 
MOBAT against standard and state-of-the-art encryption solutions. 
4.4 Experimental Evaluation 
To evaluate the proposed masking technique, we used the TPC-H decision 
support benchmark [TPC-H] (1GB and 10GB scale sizes) and a real-world 
sales DW storing one year of commercial data taking up 2GB of storage 
space (full description of TPC-H can be found in [TPC-H Specifications], 
while full description of the sales DW including its description, size, data 
schema and query workload can be seen in Appendix A). We tested all 
scenarios using the Oracle 11g and Microsoft SQL Server 2008 R2 DBMS 
with default settings, on a Pentium IV 2.8GHz CPU with a 1.5TB SATA 
hard disk and 2GB of RAM, 512MB of which devoted to the database 
memory cache. Oracle 11g ran on Windows XP Professional, while SQL 
Server ran on Windows 2003 Server. 
Although we include experiments from both DBMS, it is not our aim to 
compare the results between the DBMS, but rather to compare the 
performance of each standard and research solution with that of MOBAT 
within the same DBMS. 
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The columns chosen for testing the masking solution were those referring 
to numerical datatype columns belonging to the fact tables. The database 
schema of TPC-H has one fact table (LineItem), and seven dimension tables. 
The Sales DW database schema has one fact table (Sales) and four 
dimension tables connected to it. In the TPC-H setups, four columns of 
LineItem were masked (L_Quantity, L_ExtendedPrice, L_Tax and 
L_Discount), given that they are the numerical fact columns. In the Sales 
DW, five numerical columns were masked (S_ShipToCost, S_Tax, 
S_Quantity, S_Profit, and S_SalesAmount), for the same reasons. 
Since our solution is column-based, for fairness we compare it with 
column-based AES128 and 3DES168 encryption algorithms. Note that 
tablespace encryption has functional primitives that speedup performance, 
which makes it unfair to compare it with column-based techniques [Huey, 
2008; Oracle, 2010a]. Moreover, best practices for encryption in the 
documentation from both DBMSs [Huey, 2008; Oracle, 2010a] recommend 
using column-based encryption when the sensitive data consists on a small 
number of well-defined columns. We used the AES128 and 3DES168 
Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) algorithms provided by both DBMS 
for comparison because they are, respectively, the fastest and slowest 
available algorithms in those DBMS [Huey, 2008; Oracle, 2010a], and OPES 
[Agrawal et al., 2004] and Salsa20/20 [Bernstein, 2005; Bernstein, 2008]. 
OPES and Salsa20 were implemented using C#. 
Table 4-2 shows the experimental encryption/masking scenarios. The 
results for MOBAT where the new K3, j masking key columns are added to 
the fact tables are referenced as MOBAT_AddCol; and the results for 
MOBAT where the K3, j columns are added in the fact tables from the start 
and completely rebuilt are referenced as MOBAT_CreateCol. The results for 
the tests using an existing table column as K3, j instead of adding a new 
column to the fact table is referred as MOBAT_ColKey, where L_OrderKey 
and S_SaleID are used as CZ in the TPC-H and real-world sales DW, 
respectively; i.e., each value of L_OrderKey and S_SaleID in each row j of 
tables LineItem and Sales, respectively, function as K3, j for MOBAT.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
102 
Table 4-2. Experimental Encryption/Masking Scenarios 
Reference/Label Description 
Standard Standard data without masking/encryption 
AES128 Col Data encrypted with TDE AES 128 bit key column encryption 
3DES168 Col Data encrypted with TDE 3DES168 column encryption 
OPES Data encrypted with Order-Preserving Encryption [Agrawal et al., 2004] 
Salsa20 Data encrypted with Salsa20/20 encryption [Bernstein, 2008] 
MOBAT AddCol 
Data masked by MOBAT formula (1), where a column for masking keys 
K3, j has been added to the existing fact table 
MOBAT CreateCol 
Data masked by MOBAT formula (1), where a column for masking keys 
K3, j was added to the fact table, which has been completely recreated 
MOBAT ColKey 
Data masked by MOBAT formula (1), using a numerical column from 
the original fact table data structure as key K3, j 
All loading time and query response time results shown in this section are 
an average of six executions in each described setup/scenario. Given the 
resulting standard deviations are relatively small assures that this number 
of executions if sufficient enough to be representative for comparisons. The 
complete set of results and respective statistical measures can be seen in 
Appendix B. 
4.4.1 Analyzing Storage Space 
Figures 4-2a and 4-2b respectively show the results of total data storage 
space (in MB) and percentage of storage space overhead for loading the 
TPC-H 1GB LineItem fact table in Oracle, while Figures 4-3a and 4-3b show 
the same results in SQL Server. To execute the loading processes, all 
indexes were dropped on the fact tables.  
As shown, the standard storage space for the TPC-H LineItem fact table 
without using any sort of encryption or masking solution takes up 772MB 
of storage space in Oracle and 1237MB of storage space in SQL Server. 
There is a significant difference in the standard data storage space sizes 
between the DBMS because they have distinct ways of storing data, in 
which Oracle standardly uses a type of compression algorithm while SQL 
Server does not.  
Note that the resulting values registered for MOBAT refer to 
MOBATAddCol (adding a column to the fact table) and MOBATCreateCol 
(recreating the fact table with the addition of a column), involving the 
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creation of an extra public key column (referred to as K3,j as described in 
the previous sections). The MOBAT ColKey setup (in which the column 
used as the public key column is a column that originally belongs to the 
fact table) is not included, since it does not require changing the fact table 
data structure to handle the implementation of MOBAT. Thus, the 
overhead for MOBATColKey is actually inexistent, making it the best 
technique in what concerns avoiding storage space overhead. 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Fact Table Storage Size (MB) 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Storage Size Overhead (%) 
 
      
 
        
 
Figure 4-2a. Storage Size in Oracle 
for the TPC-H 1GB Fact Table per 
Solution 
 
Figure 4-2b. Storage Overhead (%) 
in Oracle for the TPC-H 1GB Fact 
Table per Solution 
 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Fact Table Storage Size (MB) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Storage Size Overhead (%) 
 
      
 
        
 
Figure 4-3a. Storage Size in SQL 
Server for the TPC-H 1GB Fact Table 
per Solution 
 
Figure 4-3b. Storage Overhead (%) 
in SQL Server for the TPC-H 1GB 
Fact Table per Solution 
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As shown, OPES and MOBAT produce much smaller storage space 
overheads than the remaining solutions. OPES shows a 2% overhead for 
both DBMS, corresponding to an extra 18MB of storage space in Oracle and 
21MB in SQL Server, and 12% and 8% overhead for MOBAT respectively 
in Oracle and SQL Server, corresponding to an extra 96MB and 102MB of 
storage space. OPES produces a small storage space overhead because the 
smallest and largest gaps between the sorted values for its target 
distributions are mostly small in the TPC-H database. This attests what is 
explained in [Agrawal et al., 2004], where the authors express that they 
would expect a small increase of the required space for the ciphertexts. 
Salsa20 introduces more storage space overhead than OPES and MOBAT, 
namely 38% in Oracle, corresponding to adding 292MB, and 26% in SQL 
Server, which adds 316MB of extra storage space. The standard encryption 
solutions produce the highest overhead, with AES being the worst by 
requiring 154% in Oracle and 95% in SQL Server of storage space overhead, 
corresponding to respectively adding 1188MB and 1173MB and 154%, 
while 3DES168 produced a storage space overhead of 104% in Oracle and 
76% in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to 800MB and 944MB of 
extra storage space. 
Figures 4-4a and 4-4b respectively show the results of total data storage 
space (in MB) and percentage of storage space overhead for loading the 
TPC-H 10GB LineItem fact table in Oracle, while Figures 4-5a and 4-5b show 
the same results in SQL Server. Figures 4-4a to 4-5b show that the extra 
storage space added to the 10GB database by each solution is 
approximately proportional to those of the 1GB database, which means ten 
times bigger. Thus, the analysis of the results for the 10GB sized TPC-H 
database is similar to that of the 1GB sized TPC-H database.  
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Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Fact Table Storage Size (MB) 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Storage Size Overhead (%) 
 
       
 
        
 
Figure 4-4a. Storage Size in Oracle 
for the TPC-H 10GB Fact Table     
per Solution 
 
Figure 4-4b. Storage Overhead (%) 
in Oracle for the TPC-H 10GB Fact 
Table per Solution 
 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Fact Table Storage Size (MB) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Storage Size Overhead (%) 
 
        
 
         
 
Figure 4-5a. Storage Size in SQL 
Server for the TPC-H 10GB Fact Table 
per Solution 
 
Figure 4-5b. Storage Overhead (%) 
in SQL Server for the TPC-H 10GB 
Fact Table per Solution 
Figures 4-6a and 4-6b show the total data storage space (in MB) and 
percentage of storage space overhead for loading the Sales DW fact table 
in Oracle, while Figures 4-7a and 4-7b show the same results in SQL Server. 
It can be seen that the standard storage space for the Sales fact table without 
using any encryption or masking solution takes up 1664MB of storage 
space in Oracle and 1932MB of storage space in SQL Server. 
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Oracle Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Fact Table Storage Size (MB) 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Storage Size Overhead (%) 
 
        
 
        
 
Figure 4-6a. Storage Size in Oracle 
for the Sales DW Fact Table           
per Solution 
 
Figure 4-6b. Storage Overhead (%) 
in Oracle for the Sales DW Fact 
Table per Solution 
 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Fact Table Storage Size (MB) 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Storage Size Overhead (%) 
 
        
 
        
 
Figure 4-7a. Storage Size in SQL 
Server for the Sales DW Fact Table  
per Solution 
 
Figure 4-7b. Storage Overhead (%) 
in SQL Server for the Sales DW Fact 
Table per Solution 
As shown in Figures 4-6a to 4-7b, OPES and MOBAT continue to produce 
much smaller storage space overheads than the remaining solutions, 
similarly to the occurred with TPC-H. OPES shows a 4% overhead for both 
DBMS, corresponding to an extra 64MB of storage space, and MOBAT 
presents 25% and 33% overhead respectively in Oracle and SQL Server, 
corresponding to an extra 415MB and 636MB of storage space. OPES 
continues to present the best results because of the same reasons that were 
previously mentioned, i.e., the data values in the Sales DW allow it to 
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generate target distributions which do not require much additional space 
to store the ciphertexts. 
Salsa20 also introduces more storage space overhead than OPES and 
MOBAT, namely 88% in Oracle, corresponding to adding 1464MB, and 
94% in SQL Server, which adds 1818MB of extra storage space. The 
standard encryption solutions produce the highest overhead, with AES 
also being the worst by requiring 462% in Oracle and 591% in SQL Server 
of storage space overhead, corresponding to respectively adding 7688MB 
and 11424MB of storage space, while 3DES168 produced a storage space 
overhead of 308% in Oracle and 390% in SQL Server, respectively 
corresponding to 5125MB and 7532MB of extra storage space. 
Tables 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 summarize the fact table storage space results 
respectively for the TPC-H 1GB, TPC-H 10GB and Sales DW, for each 
DBMS, highlighting the best solutions in each case. 
Table 4-3. TPC-H 1GB Lineitem Fact Table Storage Size Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB  
Storage Size (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB  
Storage Size (Overhead) 
Standard 772MB 1237MB 
AES128/256 1960MB (+1188MB / 154%) 2410MB (+1173MB / 95%) 
3DES168 1572MB (+800MB / 104%) 2181MB (+944MB / 76%) 
OPES 790MB (+18MB / 2%) 1258MB (+21MB / 2%) 
Salsa20 1064MB (+292MB / 38%) 1553MB (+316MB / 26%) 
MOBAT 868MB (+96MB / 12%) 1339MB (+102MB / 8%) 
 
Table 4-4. TPC-H 10GB Lineitem Fact Table Storage Size Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB  
Storage Size (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB  
Storage Size (Overhead) 
Standard 7712MB 12272MB 
AES128/256 19580MB (+11868MB / 154%) 23909MB (+11637MB / 95%) 
3DES168 15704MB (+7992MB / 104%) 21637MB (+9365MB / 76%) 
OPES 7892MB (+180MB / 2%) 12480MB (+208MB / 2%) 
Salsa20 10629MB (+2917MB / 38%) 15407MB (+3135MB / 26%) 
MOBAT 8671MB (+959MB / 12%) 13284MB (+1012MB / 8%) 
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Table 4-5. Sales DW 2GB Fact Table Storage Size Overhead 
 
 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB  
Storage Size (Overhead) 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB  
Storage Size (Overhead) 
Standard 1664MB 1932MB 
AES128/256 9352MB (+7688MB / 462%) 13356MB (+11424MB / 591%) 
3DES168 6789MB (+5125MB / 308%) 9464MB (+7532MB / 390%) 
OPES 1726MB (+62MB / 4%) 2005MB (+73MB / 4%) 
Salsa20 3128MB (+1464MB / 88%) 3750MB (+1818MB / 94%) 
MOBAT 2079MB (+415MB / 25%) 2568MB (+636MB / 25%) 
 
4.4.2. Analyzing Loading Time 
In this subsection, we analyze the loading time for populating the fact table 
of each DW, which is affected by both the execution of the masking or 
encryption processes and the need to write additional data taking up extra 
storage space. Figures 4-8a and 4-8b respectively show the results of total 
loading time (in seconds) and percentage of time overhead for loading the 
TPC-H 1GB LineItem fact table in Oracle, while Figures 4-9a and 4-9b show 
the same results in SQL Server. It can be observed that the standard loading 
time for the TPC-H LineItem fact table without using any sort of encryption 
solution is 310 seconds in Oracle and 212 seconds in SQL Server. 
As shown in the figures, MOBAT produces much smaller loading time 
overheads than the remaining solutions, introducing between 3% and 8% 
of overhead in both DBMS, respectively corresponding to adding between 
6 and 25 seconds of loading time. OPES comes after MOBAT in loading 
time performance, showing an overhead of 49% in Oracle and 44% in SQL 
Server, which respectively correspond to adding 151 and 93 seconds. 
Salsa20 introduces more loading time overhead than OPES and MOBAT, 
namely 73% in Oracle, corresponding to adding 227 seconds, and 70% in 
SQL Server, which adds 149 seconds of extra loading time.  
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Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
     
 
          
 
Figure 4-8a. Loading Time in Oracle 
for the TPC-H 1GB Fact Table per 
Solution 
 
Figure 4-8b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in Oracle for the TPC-H 1GB Fact 
Table per Solution 
 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
    
 
           
 
Figure 4-9a. Loading Time in SQL 
Server for the TPC-H 1GB Fact Table 
per Solution 
 
Figure 4-9b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in SQL Server for the TPC-H 1GB 
Fact Table per Solution 
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Similarly to what occurred with storage space, the standard encryption 
solutions produced the highest loading time overheads. AES with 128 bit 
security produced 190% in Oracle and 123% in SQL Server, respectively 
corresponding to adding 589 and 260 seconds to the standard loading time. 
AES with 256 bit security shows an overhead of 209% in Oracle and 139% 
in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to 648 and 295 seconds of extra 
loading time. 3DES168 introduces 192% loading time overhead in Oracle, 
corresponding to adding 596 seconds, and 129% in SQL Server, which adds 
273 seconds of extra loading time. 
Figures 4-10a and 4-10b respectively show the results of total loading time 
(in seconds) and percentage of loading time overhead for loading the TPC-
H 10GB LineItem fact table in Oracle, while Figures 4-11a and 4-11b show 
the same results in SQL Server. 
From observing the results in Figures 4-10a to 4-11b, it can be seen that the 
extra loading time added to the 10GB database by each encryption solution 
is approximately over-proportional to those of the 1GB database, as 
occurred with the storage space, which means slightly over ten times 
bigger. Thus, the analysis of the results for the 10GB sized TPC-H database 
is also similar to that of the 1GB sized TPC-H database. 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
      
 
             
 
Figure 4-10a. Loading Time in 
Oracle for the TPC-H 10GB Fact 
Table per Solution 
 
Figure 4-10b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in Oracle for the TPC-H 10GB Fact 
Table per Solution 
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SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
      
 
           
 
Figure 4-11a. Loading Time in SQL 
Server for the TPC-H 10GB Fact Table 
per Solution 
 
Figure 4-11b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in SQL Server for the TPC-H 
10GB Fact Table per Solution 
Figures 4-12a and 4-12b respectively show the results of total loading time 
(in seconds) and percentage of time overhead for loading the Sales DW fact 
table in Oracle, while Figures 4-13a and 4-13b show the same results in SQL 
Server. It can be seen that the standard loading time for the Sales fact table 
without using any encryption solution is 1195 seconds in Oracle and 1247 
seconds in SQL Server. 
As seen in both figures, MOBAT continues to produce much smaller 
loading time overheads than the remaining solutions, similarly to the 
occurred with TPC-H. MOBAT AddCol shows 15% and 16% overhead in 
Oracle and SQL Server, respectively corresponding to an extra 178 and 200 
seconds in loading time. MOBAT CreateCol shows 9% and 10% in Oracle 
and SQL Server, corresponding to adding 113 seconds in Oracle and 120 
seconds in SQL Server, and when using MOBAT ColKey the loading time 
overhead was 5% in Oracle and 6% in SQL Server, corresponding to 65 
seconds of extra loading time in Oracle and 71 seconds of extra loading 
time in SQL Server. 
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Oracle Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
    
 
          
 
Figure 4-12a. Loading Time in 
Oracle for the Sales DW Fact Table 
per Solution 
 
Figure 4-12b. Loading Time 
Overhead (%) in Oracle for the Sales 
DW Fact Table per Solution 
 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
    
 
          
 
Figure 4-13a. Loading Time in SQL 
Server for the Sales DW Fact Table per 
Solution 
 
Figure 4-13b. Loading Time 
Overhead (%) in SQL Server for the 
Sales DW Fact Table per Solution 
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OPES comes after MOBAT in loading time performance, showing a 61% 
overhead in Oracle and 57% in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to 
an extra 734 seconds and 716 seconds of loading time, and Salsa20 presents 
102% and 97% overhead for respectively in Oracle and SQL Server, 
corresponding to 1213 and 1212 seconds of extra loading time. 
The standard encryption solutions continue to produce the highest 
overhead, where AES with 128 bit security produced 199% in Oracle and 
159% in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to adding 2379 and 1985 
seconds to the standard loading time. AES with 256 bit security shows an 
overhead of 210% in Oracle and 171% in SQL Server, respectively 
corresponding to 2504 and 2134 seconds of extra loading time. 3DES168 
introduces 209% loading time overhead in Oracle, corresponding to 
adding 2500 seconds, and 168% in SQL Server, which adds 2092 seconds of 
extra loading time. 
Tables 4-6, 4-7 and 4-8 summarize the fact table loading time results (in 
hh:mm:ss format) respectively for the TPC-H 1GB, TPC-H 10GB and Sales 
DW, for each DBMS, highlighting the best solutions in each case. 
Table 4-6. TPC-H 1GB Lineitem Fact Table Loading Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:05:10 00:03:32 
AES128 00:14:59 (00:09:49 / 190%)  00:07:52 (00:04:20 / 123%) 
AES256 00:15:58 (00:10:48 / 209%)  00:08:27 (00:04:55 / 139%) 
3DES168 00:15:06 (00:09:56 / 192%)  00:08:05 (00:04:33 / 129%) 
OPES 00:07:41 (00:02:31 / 49%)  00:05:05 (00:01:33 / 44%) 
Salsa20 00:08:57 (00:03:47 / 73%)  00:06:01 (00:02:29 / 70%) 
MOBAT AddCol 00:05:35 (00:00:25 / 8%)  00:03:47 (00:00:15 / 7%) 
MOBAT CreateCol 00:05:23 (00:00:13 / 4%)  00:03:41 (00:00:09 / 4%) 
MOBAT ColKey 00:05:18 (00:00:08 / 3%)  00:03:38 (00:00:06 / 3%) 
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Table 4-7. TPC-H 10GB Lineitem Fact Table Loading Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:53:31 00:37:52 
AES128 02:49:45 (01:56:14 / 217%) 01:31:24 (00:53:32 / 141%) 
AES256  03:05:14 (02:11:43 / 246%)  01:43:49 (01:05:57 / 174%) 
3DES168  02:53:44 (02:00:13 / 225%)  01:33:55 (00:56:03 / 148%) 
OPES  01:22:23 (00:28:52 / 54%)  00:55:25 (00:17:33 / 46%) 
Salsa20  01:38:01 (00:44:30 / 83%)  01:08:08 (00:30:16 / 80%) 
MOBAT AddCol  00:59:57 (00:06:26 / 12%)  00:42:30 (00:04:38 / 12%) 
MOBAT CreateCol  00:57:29 (00:03:58 / 7%)  00:40:34 (00:02:42 / 7%) 
MOBAT ColKey  00:56:02 (00:02:31 / 5%)  00:39:41 (00:01:49 / 5%) 
 
Table 4-8. Sales DW 2GB Fact Table Loading Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time  00:19:55 00:20:47 
AES128 00:59:34 (00:39:39 / 199%)  00:53:52 (00:33:05 / 159%) 
AES256  01:01:39 (00:41:44 / 210%)  00:56:21 (00:35:34 / 171%) 
3DES168 01:01:35 (00:41:40 / 209%)  00:55:39 (00:34:52 / 168%) 
OPES  00:32:09 (00:12:14 / 61%)  00:32:43 (00:11:56 / 57%) 
Salsa20  00:40:08 (00:20:13 / 102%)  00:40:59 (00:20:12 / 97%) 
MOBAT AddCol  00:22:53 (00:02:58 / 15%)  00:24:07 (00:03:20 / 16%) 
MOBAT CreateCol  00:21:48 (00:01:53 / 9%)  00:22:47 (00:02:00 / 10%) 
MOBAT ColKey  00:21:00 (00:01:05 / 5%)  00:21:58 (00:01:11 / 6%) 
 
4.4.3. Analyzing Query Performance 
To analyze the query performance of the masking technique and the 
selected encryption algorithms, we defined a query workload for each 
database. The TPC-H workload included the benchmark queries 1, 3, 6, 7, 
8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19 and 20 (which correspond to all queries in TPC-H 
that access the LineItem fact table). For the Sales DW, the workload was a 
set of 29 queries, all processing the Sales fact table, as a set of usual decision 
support reports, gathering daily (9 queries), monthly (9 queries) and 
annual (11 queries) values, including actions such as row selection, joining, 
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aggregates, and ordering. These queries represent typical reporting 
workloads against the fact table for each database. For fairness, databases 
were optimized in a best practice manner (including primary keys, foreign 
keys, and referential integrity constraints and join indexes).  
As previously mentioned, all response time results are an average obtained 
from six executions in each scenario on each DBMS. The standard 
execution time (average of the execution times of the workload against a 
non-encrypted database) for each scenario is 625, 6155, and 2233 seconds 
in Oracle 11g, and 580, 5301, and 2211 seconds in SQL Server 2008, for the 
1GB, 10GB TPC-H and Sales DW, respectively. 
Figures 4-14a and 4-14b respectively show the total workload execution 
time and its overhead in Oracle and Figures 4-15a and 4-15b show the total 
workload execution time and overhead in SQL Server, for the TPC-H 1GB 
database.  
It can be seen that MOBAT executes much faster than the remaining 
solutions, introducing overheads between 22% and 35% of query workload 
execution time in Oracle, respectively corresponding to adding between 
138 and 221 seconds to total execution time, and overheads between 23% 
and 40% in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to adding between 132 
and 233 seconds to total execution time.  
All the remaining encryption solutions are approximately leveled and 
present overheads between 176% and 203% in Oracle, corresponding to 
adding an extra 1102 to 1270 seconds to total execution time, and overheads 
between 163% and 195% in SQL Server, corresponding to adding an extra 
943 to 1132 seconds to total execution time. Regarding these solutions, 
Salsa20 was the fastest with AES128 coming afterwards, followed by OPES 
and AES256, with 3DES168 as the slowest solution. This means that 
MOBAT produces overheads that are roughly one sixth of the encryption 
solutions, on average, in the chosen experimental setups. 
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Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
                 
 
Figure 4-14a. Query Workload 
Execution Time per Solution in 
Oracle for TPC-H 1GB 
 
Figure 4-14b. Query Workload 
Execution Time Overhead (%) per 
Solution in Oracle for TPC-H 1GB 
 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
Query Workload Exec.Time Overhead (%) 
                 
 
Figure 4-15a. Query Workload 
Execution Time per Solution in SQL 
Server for TPC-H 1GB 
 
Figure 4-15b. Query Workload 
Execution Time Overhead (%) per 
Solution in SQLServer for TPC-H 1GB 
Figures 4-16a and 4-16b respectively show the total workload execution 
time and its overhead in Oracle and Figures 4-17a and 4-17b show the total 
workload execution time and overhead in SQL Server, for the TPC-H 10GB 
database. As can be observed, the results lead to similar results as those 
seen in the TPC-H 1GB database, in what concerns the ranking of the tested 
solutions. MOBAT remains the solution having the best execution time, 
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with lower overhead for all scenarios in both DBMS. When compared with 
the results for the TPC-H 1GB database, it can be seen that the differences 
between the solutions are slightly enforced with the higher amount of data 
that need to be processed in the 10GB scale size. 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
 
     
 
          
 
Figure 4-16a. Query Workload 
Execution Time per Solution in 
Oracle for TPC-H 10GB 
 
Figure 4-16b. Query Workload 
Execution Time Overhead (%) per 
Solution in Oracle for TPC-H 10GB 
 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
Query Workload Exec.Time Overhead (%) 
                 
 
Figure 4-17a. Query Workload 
Execution Time per Solution in SQL 
Server for TPC-H 10GB 
 
Figure 4-17b. Query Workload Exec. 
Time Overhead (%) per Solution in 
SQLServer for TPC-H 10GB 
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Furthermore, MOBAT executes much faster than the remaining solutions, 
introducing overheads between 17% and 22% of query workload execution 
time in Oracle, respectively corresponding to adding between 1063 and 
1372 seconds to total execution time, and overheads between 13% and 21% 
in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to adding between 680 and 1119 
seconds to total execution time.  
All the remaining encryption solutions are approximately leveled and 
present overheads between 155% and 192% in Oracle, corresponding to 
adding an extra 9549 to 11818 seconds to total execution time, and 
overheads between 139% and 184% in SQL Server, corresponding to 
adding an extra 7390 to 9757 seconds to total execution time.  Regarding 
these solutions, Salsa20 continues being the fastest, followed by OPES, 
AES128 and AES256, with 3DES168 as the slowest solution. This means 
that MOBAT continues to produce overheads that are roughly one eighth 
to one tenth of the encryption solutions, on average, in the chosen 
experimental setups, similar to what occurred in the TPC-H 1GB. 
Figures 4-18a and 4-18b respectively show the total workload execution 
time and its overhead in Oracle and Figures 4-19a and 4-19b show the total 
workload execution time and overhead in SQL Server, for the Sales DW 
database. 
As shown, MOBAT also executes much faster than the remaining solutions 
in the Sales DW, introducing overheads between 78% and 128% of query 
workload execution time in Oracle, respectively corresponding to adding 
between 1733 and 2851 seconds to total execution time, and overheads 
between 64% and 124% in SQL Server, which respectively correspond to 
adding between 1426 and 2735 seconds to total execution time.  
 
 
 
 
 
MOBAT: A Data Masking Solution for Data Warehouses 
 
119 
Oracle Sales DW 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
Oracle Sales DW 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
                 
 
Figure 4-18a. Query Workload 
Execution Time per Solution in 
Oracle for the Sales DW 
 
Figure 4-18b. Query Workload 
Execution Time Overhead (%) per 
Solution in Oracle for the Sales DW 
 
SQL Server Sales DW 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
SQL Server Sales DW 
Query Workload Exec.Time Overhead (%) 
                 
 
Figure 4-19a. Query Workload 
Execution Time per Solution in SQL 
Server for the Sales DW 
 
Figure 4-19b. Query Workload Exec. 
Time Overhead (%) per Solution in 
SQLServer for the Sales DW 
All the remaining encryption solutions continue approximately leveled 
and present overheads between 598% and 815% in Oracle, corresponding 
to adding an extra 13349 to 18192 seconds to total execution time, and 
overheads between 588% and 759% in SQL Server, corresponding to 
adding 13001 to 16773 seconds to total execution time.  Regarding these 
solutions, Salsa20 continues to be the fastest with OPES and AES128 
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coming afterwards, followed by AES256 and 3DES168 as the slowest 
solution. This means that MOBAT produces overheads that are roughly 
one sixth to one eighth of the encryption solutions, on average, in the 
chosen experimental setups. 
Tables 4-9, 4-10 and 4-11 summarize the query workload execution time 
results respectively for the TPC-H 1GB, TPC-H 10GB and Sales DW, for 
each DBMS, highlighting the best solutions in each case. 
Table 4-9. TPC-H 1GB Query Workload Execution Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:10:25 00:09:40 
AES128 00:29:58 (00:19:33 / 188%) 00:26:31 (00:16:51 / 174%) 
AES256 00:30:37 (00:20:12 / 194%) 00:27:26 (00:17:46 / 184%) 
3DES168 00:31:35 (00:21:10 / 203%) 00:28:32 (00:18:52 / 195%) 
OPES 00:30:13 (00:19:48 / 190%) 00:27:09 (00:17:29 / 181%) 
Salsa20 00:28:47 (00:18:22 / 176%) 00:25:23 (00:15:43 / 163%) 
MOBAT AddCol 00:14:06 (00:03:41 / 35%) 00:13:33 (00:03:53 / 40%) 
MOBAT CreateCol 00:13:29 (00:03:04 / 29%) 00:12:55 (00:03:15 / 34%) 
MOBAT ColKey 00:12:43 (00:02:18 / 22%) 00:11:52 (00:02:12 / 23%) 
 
Table 4-10. TPC-H 10GB Query Workload Execution Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 01:42:35 01:28:21 
AES128 04:42:07 (02:59:32 / 175%) 03:42:24 (02:14:03 / 152%) 
AES256 04:48:03 (03:05:28 / 181%) 03:50:46 (02:22:25 / 161%) 
3DES168 04:59:33 (03:16:58 / 192%) 04:10:58 (02:42:37 / 184%) 
OPES 04:41:29 (02:58:54 / 174%) 03:40:15 (02:11:54 / 149%) 
Salsa20 04:21:44 (02:39:09 / 155%) 03:31:31 (02:03:10 / 139%) 
MOBAT AddCol 02:05:27 (00:22:52 / 22%) 01:47:00 (00:18:39 / 21%) 
MOBAT CreateCol 02:01:54 (00:19:19 / 19%) 01:42:42 (00:14:21 / 16%) 
MOBAT ColKey 02:00:18 (00:17:43 / 17%) 01:39:41 (00:11:20 / 13%) 
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Table 4-11. Sales DW 2GB Query Workload Execution Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:37:13 00:36:51 
AES128 04:53:24 (04:16:11 / 688%) 04:42:03 (04:05:12 / 665%) 
AES256 05:08:04 (04:30:51 / 728%) 04:57:07 (04:20:16 / 706%) 
3DES168 05:40:25 (05:03:12 / 815%) 05:16:24 (04:39:33 / 759%) 
OPES 04:51:05 (04:13:52 / 682%) 04:40:45 (04:03:54 / 662%) 
Salsa20 04:19:42 (03:42:29 / 598%) 04:13:32 (03:36:41 / 588%) 
MOBAT AddCol 01:24:44 (00:47:31 / 128%) 01:22:26 (00:45:35 / 124%) 
MOBAT CreateCol 01:13:55 (00:36:42 / 99%) 01:11:53 (00:35:02 / 95%) 
MOBAT ColKey 01:06:06 (00:28:53 / 78%) 01:00:37 (00:23:46 / 64%) 
 
To demonstrate the effects of using masking and encryption on each 
individual query, Figure 4-20 shows the results for individual query 
execution time in Oracle for the TPC-H 10GB scenarios, with a logarithmic 
scale. These results show that all queries have similar proportional 
overhead to those of the complete workload. This is also true for all the 
other scenarios, making it redundant to include all of them. Query Q1 
presents the most significant results because it processes more than 90% of 
the fact table data, while the other process less than 10%. It can be seen that 
mostly all queries processed using the encryption solutions have 
introduced overheads of several orders of magnitude higher than MOBAT, 
individually matching what has been shown in the total query workload 
results through Figures 4-14 to 4-19. 
The individual query execution times for the Sales DW are not included, 
given that this set of queries can produce a certain amount of insight as a 
whole (and shown in the total query workload execution graphs in Figures 
4-18a to 4-19b), but should mainly not be considered as appropriate for 
individual analysis, since this DW is a specific real-world database and it 
is not a standard nor a benchmark. 
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Figure 4-20. TPC-H 10GB Individual Query Execution Time Overhead per Query 
per Solution in Oracle 11g 
4.5 Discussion on MOBAT 
Contrarily to typical commercial data masking tools which provide data 
masking routines that, once applied, do not allow reversing the operations 
to retrieve the original data, the technique proposed in this chapter 
manages full masking and unmasking processes. MOBAT accomplishes 
continuous data protection similarly to commercial masking tools, since it 
maintains data-at-rest masked at all times, and adds the advantage of 
enabling its usage in live databases. 
Basing the masking and unmasking processes simply on SQL rewriting 
enables executing direct queries against masked/unmasked data without 
having that data transferred between the database and the 
masking/unmasking mechanisms, thus avoiding the I/O and network 
bandwidth congestion that other solutions introduce due to those data 
roundtrips.  
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High-level SQL rewriting also makes MOBAT a straightforward portable 
technique to be universally used in any DBMS regardless of the CPU and 
operating system, contrarily to what occurs with most standard encryption 
packages supplied by DBMS. Most of these packages are CPU optimized, 
i.e., designed and programmed for specific processor models and therefore 
depending on those CPUs, meaning that they may fail to execute on other 
machines. MOBAT is completely processor-independent, since all CPUs 
support basic modular and arithmetic operations. 
As we discussed before, while DW data is mainly composed by numerical 
values, standard encryption algorithms are designed to output generic 
textual values. In the encryption packages supplied by commercial DBMS, 
the output they produce is textual or varbinary type values (char, varchar, 
varbinary, etc). Given that most sensitive columns in DW fact tables store 
numerical values, using these packages to encrypt data requires converting 
those values to a textual or varbinary format. Once decrypted for 
processing, these values also must be transformed back into numerical 
format in order to apply arithmetical operations such as sums, averages, 
etc. This is a significant drawback, introducing extra computational 
overheads with evident impact in performance. MOBAT is specifically 
designed for masking numerical values, and in this sense, it is much more 
performance efficient for protecting DW facts. The data loading and query 
execution response time results shown in the experimental evaluations 
demonstrate this, and show that using encryption does in fact introduce 
extremely high storage space, loading time and query response time 
overhead. 
In what concerns storage space, OPES and MOBAT introduce much 
smaller storage space overheads than the remaining solutions (less than 
25% of extra storage space), followed by Salsa20 at a considerable 
difference (adding approximately 30% of storage space in TPC-H and 
almost 100% in the Sales DW), while the standard encryption solutions 
produce the highest storage space overheads by far. The standard 
encryption solutions introduce the highest overheads, roughly requiring 
duplicating the original database storage space for the TPC-H scenarios 
tested and between 308% and 591% of extra storage space in the Sales DW 
scenarios.  
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Note that in the best case scenarios for the standard encryption algorithms 
in TPC-H 10GB, an overhead of 104% in Oracle implies using more 8GB of 
storage space, and for an overhead of 308% in the Sales DW implies using 
more 5GB of storage space. OPES only requires a storage space overhead 
of 2% for TPC-H, which means that the worst case scenarios would imply 
using more 208MB of storage space in TPC-H 10GB and 62MB in the Sales 
DW. MOBAT would require almost 1GB of extra storage space for the TPC-
H 10GB worst case scenario, and 73MB of extra storage space for the Sales 
DW. Salsa20 requires approximately three times more storage space 
overhead than MOBAT, and ten to twenty times more than OPES. These 
results show that Salsa20 and the standard encryption solutions effectively 
introduce a much higher increase of extra storage space than OPES and 
MOBAT. 
In what concerns loading time, MOBAT is much faster than all the 
remaining solutions, introducing 3% to 16% of extra loading time in the 
tested scenarios. OPES has the second best performance, introducing 46% 
to 71% of extra loading time, more than four times worse than MOBAT on 
average. Salsa20 presents loading time overheads from 72% to 114%, on 
average roughly nine or ten times worse than MOBAT, while the standard 
encryption solutions introduce overheads of more than 100%, reaching 
more than 200% in several scenarios. In practice, while MOBAT introduces 
an extra 6 minutes of loading time in the worst case scenario, the standard 
algorithms introduce at least almost one hour of extra loading time. 
Considering the results obtained in the query workload executions, 
MOBAT is also much faster than the remaining solutions. By observing the 
results, it can be seen that the relative differences between the solutions are 
approximately proportional throughout the different scenarios, with 
MOBAT always as the fastest solution and therefore introducing the 
smallest execution time overheads by several orders of magnitude, roughly 
one sixth, on average, of the remaining solutions. In practice, MOBAT adds 
less than 12 minutes of extra execution time in all TPC-H 10GB and Sales 
DW scenarios, and the remaining solutions introduce at least 30 more 
minutes up to more than 2 hours.  
All the results in all scenarios and databases for both DBMS also show that 
the performance of CreateCol Masking is better than AddCol Masking, which 
was expected. The performance results of ColKey Masking are the best, 
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given the absence of changes in the original fact table data structure and 
size. 
Given that decision support environments typically execute long running 
queries (i.e., queries that can run for many minutes up to hours), the 
response time overheads introduced due to the use of encryption solutions 
represent high absolute values that can easily make query responses 
overdue and jeopardize the usefulness of the DW itself. Considering the 
magnitude of the results shown in the experimental evaluations, even a 
minimum gain in response/CPU time can be considered as an important 
achievement.  
Although not nearly as secure as standard or state-of-the-art encryption 
algorithms, the proposed data masking technique is able to provide at least 
acceptable security while requiring a small amount of computational 
resources, introducing small response time and storage space overhead. 
Moreover, it keeps the data-at-rest always masked. Assuming that 
implementing a minimum amount of security strength concerning data 
confidentiality is better than not implementing any security at all, this 
makes the proposed masking technique a feasible and valid alternative for 
data warehousing contexts in which minimizing response time is so critical 
that using encryption to protect the DW is not acceptable. 
Given that the proposed masking technique is straightforward and nearly 
effortless to implement, the masking keys may be periodically refreshed 
by rebuilding the masked table values, frequently switching the values of 
all or any one of the K1, K2, and K3 keys before refreshing masked data in 
order to ensure that data is properly protected. Although it is not possible 
to absolutely prove that a particular algorithm is absolutely secure 
[Elminaam et al., 2010; Ge and Zdonik, 2007; Kim et al., 2010; Mattson, 2004; 
Nadeem and Javed, 2005; Natan, 2005], we believe that our technique is 
secure enough to be acceptable for use and that the small overheads 
introduced in both data loading and query execution performance are also 
acceptable, allowing us to state that it may be considered as a valid 
alternative for enhancing data confidentiality in DWs. 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter we proposed a data masking solution specifically designed 
for enhancing data confidentiality in DWs. The proposed data masking 
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formula is composed by a set of two consecutive modulus (division 
remainder) operations and two simple arithmetic operations. It requires 
small computational efforts and can be easily implemented in any DBMS. 
The proposed solution is transparently used and to query the database the 
user interfaces only need to send their queries to a middleware instead of 
to the DBMS. Data at rest is always masked and only the processed results 
are returned to the authorized user interfaces that requested them. All SQL 
commands and actions are encrypted and stored in a log by the 
middleware security broker, which can be audited by security staff. If an 
attacker bypasses the broker and gains direct access to stored data, s/he just 
views masked “realistic-looking” but not real values. 
Since it basically works by transparently rewriting user queries, the 
approach minimizes the required changes to user applications, and does 
not jeopardize network bandwidth. The masked database can be directly 
used for production purposes, while applications under development may 
directly query the database without passing through the MOBAT 
application (e.g. for software testing purposes), therefore retrieving 
realistic data, but never the real data. This also avoids disclosure of the real 
original data if any attacker bypasses database access control and is able to 
retrieve data directly from the database. 
Although it was not conceived as a direct alternative to standard 
encryption solutions, we have compared it with the AES and 3DES 
encryption algorithms provided by leading commercial DBMS, as well as 
two state-of-the-art encryption proposals. The experimental results show 
that the storage space increase and the degradation of database 
performance in response time introduced by these standard and research 
solutions is very significant from the DW perspective. This enforces stating 
that those techniques are in fact too complex to be used in DW scenarios.  
Given that most DW data consists on numerical values, our masking 
technique is tailored for this kind of data, thus showing better database 
performance than the remaining encryption solutions, while managing to 
maintain a significant level of security strength. Thus, it is an efficient 
overall solution and a valid alternative for balancing performance and 
security issues from the DW perspective. In the next chapter, we propose 
an encryption solution based on the masking solution that enhances its 
security while maintaining low performance overhead. 
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Chapter 5  
SES-DW: A Specific Encryption 
Solution for Data Warehouses 
As we discussed in Chapter 2 and demonstrated in Chapter 4, database 
storage size and response time overheads introduced by using encryption 
in very large databases such as DWs may jeopardize their feasibility. 
However, given the value of DW data, it is not advisable to avoid using 
encryption to secure that data just because of those overheads. This arises 
the need for encryption solutions that are capable of maintaining database 
performance as high as possible while providing significant security 
strength. Although the data masking solution proposed in the previous 
chapter provides some security strength, it is far from being a full-poof 
solution. Therefore, in this chapter we propose an encryption algorithm 
that computes a series of data transformations based on the data masking 
solution proposed in the previous chapter, which improves its security 
strength while maintaining low performance overhead. 
The proposed Specific Encryption Solution tailored for Data Warehouses 
(SES-DW) consists on a lightweight encryption cipher for numerical 
values, which uses only mixes of standard SQL operators such as eXclusive 
OR (XOR) and modulus (MOD, that return the remainder of a division 
expression), together with additions and subtractions, similarly to the data 
masking solution proposed in the previous chapter. Storage space 
overhead is also avoided by preserving each encrypted column’s datatype, 
while using only standard SQL operators enables the transparent use of 
SQL rewriting in order to avoid I/O and network bandwidth bottlenecks 
by discarding data roundtrips between the database and the encryption 
and decryption mechanisms (similarly to the masking solution presented 
in Chapter 4). 
Also similarly to what we mentioned in the previous chapter it is important 
to note that it is not our aim to propose an encryption solution as strong in 
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security as any state-of-the-art encryption algorithm, but rather a 
technique that provides a considerable level of overall security strength 
while introducing small performance overhead, i.e., that presents better 
security-performance balancing. Nevertheless, we include a thorough 
security analysis of the proposed cipher. As the data masking technique 
proposed in the previous chapter, this encryption technique fits into the 
middleware layer of the security framework described in Chapter 3, 
working transparently between user interfaces and the DBMS. 
Experiments are included in order to compare the proposed solution with 
the standard encryption algorithms available in current DBMS, namely 
AES and 3DES, and also with state-of-the-art proposals such as Order-
Preserving Encryption (OPES) and Salsa20 (alias Snuffle), using the TPC-
H decision support benchmark and a real-world DW running on top of the 
Oracle 11g and Microsoft SQL Server 2008 DBMS. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents 
the encryption cipher and Section 5.2 describes its functional architecture. 
Section 5.3 presents a security analysis on the proposed cipher. Section 5.4 
presents the experimental evaluation. Section 5.5 includes a discussion on 
the proposed encryption solution and on the results obtained in the 
experiments. Section 5.6 presents our conclusions. 
5.1 SES-DW Encryption Cipher 
Given x as the plaintext value to cipher and y as the encrypted ciphertext, 
the external view for encrypting x using the SES-DW cipher is shown in 
Figure 5-1, and considers the following assumptions: 
 NR is the number of rounds executed by the cipher; 
 RowK is a 2128 bit random encryption key (in a database table T, each 
row j has its own RowK, meaning each encrypted table T has a vector 
RowK[j] where j = [1…number of rows in T); 
 Operation[t] is a random binary vector with NR elements (i.e., each 
element is randomly 1 or 0), where t represents each encryption 
round’s number (i.e., t = 1...NR); 
 XorK[t] and ModK[t] are vectors where each element is a random 
value encryption subkey with the same bit length as the plaintext x, 
(where t = 1...NR);  
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 F(t) is a MOD/XOR mix function (explained further), where t 
represents each encryption round’s number (i.e., t = 1...NR). 
F(1)Operation[1]
x
ModK[1]
RowK
output
input
XorK[1]
F(2)Operation[2] ModK[2]
output
input
XorK[2]
F(NR)Operation[NR] ModK[NR]
output
input
XorK[NR]
y  
Figure 5-1. The SES-DW Data cipher for encryption 
The MOD/XOR mix function F(t) for encryption, considering input as the 
function’s input and output as its output, is defined as: 
IF Operation[t] = 1 THEN  
   output = input+(RowK MOD ModK[t])–ModK[t] 
ELSE  
   output = input 
END_IF 
Given this, the SES-DW cipher encryption function for encrypting x by 
executing NR rounds is as shown: 
FUNCTION Encrypt(x, NR)  
   EncrOutput = x 
   FOR t = 1 TO NR 
      IF Operation[t] = 1 THEN 
         EncrOutput = EncrOutput+(RowK MOD ModK[t])–ModK[t] 
      END_IF 
      EncrOutput=EncrOutput XOR XorK[t] 
   END_FOR 
RETURN EncrOutput 
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As illustrated, SES-DW randomly mixes MOD with XOR throughout the 
encryption rounds, given a random distribution of 1 and 0 values of the 
vector Operation. In the rounds where Operation[t] = 0, only XOR is used 
with the respective XorK[t]; in rounds where Operation[t] = 1, SES-DW first 
performs MOD with addition and subtraction using the respective ModK[t] 
and RowK[j], and afterwards XOR with the respective XorK[t]. To avoid 
generating a ciphertext that may overflow the bit length of x it must be 
assured that the bit length of the term using MOD (EncrOutput + (RowK[j] 
MOD ModK[t]) - ModK[t]) is smaller or equal to the bit length of x. 
As a practical example of encrypting with SES-DW, consider the 
encryption of an 8 bit numerical value (x = 126) executing 4 rounds (NR= 
4), for a row that has RowK = 15467801, given the following assumptions 
for Operation, XorK and ModK: 
Operation = [0, 1, 0, 1]  
XorK = [31, 2, 28, 112]  
ModK = [87, 36, 123, 19] 
Then for t = 1 (round 1), EncrOutput = 126 XOR 31 = 97 
For t = 2 (round 2), EncrOutput = (97+(15467801 MOD 36)-36) XOR 2 
                           = 64 
For t=3 (round 3), EncrOutput = 64 XOR 28 = 92 
For t=4 (round 4), EncrOutput = (92+(15467801 MOD 19)-19) XOR 112 
                          = 40 
Thus, Encrypt(126, 4) = 40. To decrypt, SES-DW inverts the cipher. Figure 
5-2 shows the external view of the SES-DW decryption cipher steps, in 
which F-1(x) also represents the reverse MOD/XOR mix function for 
decryption. Given this, the SES-DW cipher decryption function for 
decrypting y with NR rounds is: 
FUNCTION Decrypt(y, NR)  
   DecrOutput = y 
   FOR t = NR DOWNTO 1 
      DecrOutput = DecrOutput XOR XorK[t] 
      IF Operation[t] = 1 THEN 
         DecrOutput = DecrOutput-(RowK MOD ModK[t])+ModK[t] 
      END_IF 
   END_FOR 
RETURN DecrOutput 
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Operation[NR-1]
F-1(NR)Operation[NR]
y
ModK[NR]
RowK
output
input
XorK[NR-1]
F-1(NR-1) ModK[NR-1]
output
input
XorK[1]
F-1(1)Operation[1] ModK[1]
output
input
XorK[NR]
x  
Figure 5-2. The SES-DW Data cipher for decryption 
Considering the encryption example previously shown, we now 
demonstrate the decryption process for y = 40, given the same Operation, 
RowK, XorK and ModK: 
For t=4 (round 1), DecrOutput=(40 XOR 112)-(15467801 MOD 19)+19  
                          =92 
For t=3 (round 2), DecrOutput=92 XOR 28=64 
For t=2 (round 3), DecrOutput=(64 XOR 2)-(15467801 MOD 36)+36  
                          =97 
For t=1 (round 4), DecrOutput=97 XOR 31=126 
Thus, Decrypt(40, 4) = 126, which is the original x plaintext value. Although 
the SES-DW cipher aims to work only with numerical values, we maintain 
the designation of plaintext and ciphertext respectively for the true original 
input value and ciphered output value. 
5.2 Functional Architecture 
The functional architecture for using SES-DW in practice is shown in 
Figure 5-3, which is similar to what was presented for MOBAT in the 
previous chapter. The architecture is made up by three entities:  
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 The encrypted database and its DBMS;  
 The SES-DW security middleware interface;  
 User/client interfaces to query the encrypted database.  
The SES-DW middleware interface acts as a broker between the DBMS and 
the user interfaces, using the SES-DW encryption and decryption methods 
and ensuring the queried data is securely processed and the proper results 
are returned to those interfaces. All communications are executed through 
SSL/TLS secure connections, to protect SQL instructions and returned 
results between the system’s entities. 
User 
Interface
SES-DW
Middleware
Interface
DBMS Encrypted 
DW Database
Black Box
(Encryption Keys, 
User Access Definitions, 
SQL Command Log)
User 
Queries
Query 
Results
Query 
Results
Rewritten 
User Queries  
Figure 5-3. The SES-DW Data Security Functional Architecture 
The Black Box is stored in the Security Framework Database database server, 
and there is one Black Box created for each encrypted DW database. Only 
the SES-DW middleware itself can access the Black Box, where all 
encryption keys and predefined data access policies for the database are 
stored.  
As in MOBAT, the SES-DW middleware also creates a history command 
log that can also be used for intrusion detection purposes, when integrated 
with the DIDS proposed in the following chapter. All Black Box contents 
are encrypted using AES with a 256 bit key, and there is no way to restore 
its true data, except by cracking the encryption keys. These keys are 
generated by the SES-DW middleware and are never shown or known by 
the DBA or any other user. 
To obtain true results, all user queries or actions must pass through the 
SES-DW middleware, which will store a copy of those instructions in the 
Black Box command history log. Each time a user requests any action, the 
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middleware will receive and parse the instructions, fetch the encryption 
keys, rewrite the command, send it to be processed by the DBMS and 
retrieve the results, and finally send those results back to the user interface 
that issued the request. Thus, SES-DW is transparently used, since SQL 
command rewriting is transparently managed by the middleware. 
Obviously, user applications should send the commands to the 
middleware, instead of querying the DBMS directly. 
To encrypt a database, a DBA requires it through the SES-DW middleware. 
After entering login and database connection information, the middleware 
connects to the database and creates the corresponding Black Box, as 
explained earlier. Afterwards, the middleware allows the DBA to define 
which tables and columns to encrypt. All the required encryption keys 
(RowK, XorK, ModK) for each table and column are generated, encrypted 
by an AES256 algorithm and stored in the Black Box. Finally, the 
middleware encrypts all values in each column that were marked for 
encryption. Subsequent updates on the database data must always be done 
through the middleware, which will apply the cipher to the values and 
store them directly in the database. 
In order to implement SES-DW encryption in a given table T, consider the 
following: suppose table T with a set of N numerical columns Ci = {C1, C2, 
…, CN} to be encrypted and a total set of M rows Rj = {R1, R2, …, RM}. Each 
value to encrypt in the table is identified as a pair (Rj, Ci), where Rj and Ci 
respectively represent the row and column to which the value refers (j = 
{1..M} and i = {1..N}). To use the SES-DW cipher, we generate the following 
encryption keys and requirements: 
 An encryption key TabK, a 128 bit random generated value, 
constant for table T; 
 Vector RowK[j], with j = {1..M}, for each row j in table T. Each 
element holds a random 128 bit value; 
 Define NRi with i = {1..N}, which gives the number of encryption 
rounds to execute for each column Ci. We define NRi = 
SBLi/BitLength(Ci), where SBLi is the desired security bit strength 
for the XorK and ModK encryption keys of column Ci and 
BitLength(Ci) is the datatype bit length of column Ci (e.g. if we want 
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to secure a 16 bit column Ci with a security strength of 256 bits, then 
the number of encryption rounds would be 256/16 = 16); 
 Vectors XorKi[t] and ModKi[t], with t = {1..NRi}, for each Ci, filled 
with randomly generated unique values. The bit length of each key 
is equal to the bit length of each Ci’s datatype; 
 A vector Operationi[t], with t = {1..NRi}, for each column Ci, filled 
randomly with 1 and 0 values, so that the count of elements equal 
to 1 is the same as the count of elements equal to 0 (e.g. Operationi = 
[0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1], with NRi = 8). This makes Prob(Operation[t]=0) 
 Prob(Operation[t]=1), i.e., the probability of executing or not 
MOD operations in each cipher round is uniformly distributed, in 
order to avoid information leakage in attempting to break security. 
Since the number of rows in a DW fact table is often very big, the need to 
store a RowK[j] encryption key for each row j poses a challenge. If these 
values were stored in a lookup table separate from table T, a heavy join 
operation between those tables would be required to decrypt data. Given 
the typically huge number of rows in fact tables, this must be avoided. For 
the same reasons, storing RowK[j] in RAM is also impracticable. To avoid 
table joins, as well as oversized memory consumption, the values of 
RowK[j] must be stored along with each row j in table T, as an extra column 
CN+1. This is the only change needed in the DW data structure in order to 
use SES-DW. To secure the value of RowK[j], it should be XORed with key 
TabK before being stored. To retrieve the true value of RowK[j] in order to 
use the SES-DW algorithms, we need to simply calculate (Rj, CN+1) XOR 
TabK. 
5.3 Security Issues 
Most security issues and assumptions concerning the threat model, 
datatype preservation, having data-at-rest masked or encrypted at all 
times, and the use of MOD and XOR operations for SES-DW are similar to 
those described in the previous chapter for MOBAT. In this section we 
present the security proof specifically concerning the SES-DW algorithm, 
as well as the entropy produced by SES-DW. 
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5.3.1 Using Variable Key Lengths and MOD-XOR Mixes 
The bit length of the encryption subkeys XorK and ModK are the same as 
the bit length of each encrypted column, meaning that an 8 bit sized 
column datatype will have 8 bit sized encryption subkeys. It is obvious that 
using 8 bit subkeys on their own is not secure at all. However, since all keys 
are distinct in each round, executing 16 rounds would be roughly 
equivalent to having a 16*8 = 128 bit key in the encryption process. As 
discussed in [Elminaam et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2010; Mattson, 2004; Nadeem 
and Javed, 2005], there is no easy way of obtaining impartial and widely 
accepted values for defining the minimum number of secure rounds for 
each algorithm. It is up to the DW security administrator to decide how 
strongly secure each column should be, which defines how many rounds 
should be executed, considering the bit length of the column’s datatype. 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the MOD operator is used in the 
cipher because it is non-injective and consequently makes our cipher not 
directly invertible. It is also true that the same ciphered output values are 
most likely to come from different original input values and have 
approximately the same probability for any output value within the full 
range of possible output values. This is formally demonstrated in 
Subsection 5.3.3, where the cipher’s entropy is computed, showing a nearly 
uniform probability distribution. 
Randomly using the XOR and MOD operators as the two possible 
operators for each round also increases the number of possibilities an 
attacker needs to test in exhaustive searches for the output values of each 
encryption round, since the attacker does not know the rounds in which 
MOD is used with XOR and needs to test both hypothesis (XOR and MOD-
XOR). Furthermore, if the attacker does not know the security strength 
chosen for encrypting each column, s/he does not know how many 
encryption rounds were executed for each ciphered value. 
By making the values of XorKi and ModKi distinct between columns, we 
also make encrypted values independent from each other between 
columns. Even if the attacker breaks the security of one column in one table 
row, the information obtained from discovering the remaining encryption 
keys is limited. Thus, the attacker cannot infer information enough to break 
overall security; in order to succeed, s/he must perform recover all the keys 
for all columns. 
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5.3.2 Attack Costs on SES-DW 
To break security by key search in a given column Ci, the attacker needs to 
have at least one pair (plaintext, ciphertext) for a row j of Ci, as well as the 
security bit strength involved, as explained in Section 5.2, because it will 
indicate the number of rounds that were executed. In this case, taking that 
known plaintext, its respective ciphertext, and the CN+1 value (storing RowKj 
XOR TabK, as explained in Section 5.2), s/he may then execute an 
exhaustive key search. 
The number of cipher rounds for a column Ci is given by NRi, and β is the 
bit-length of Ci’s datatype. Since half the values of vector Operation are 
zeros and the other half are ones, the probability of occurrences of 1 and 0 
is equal, i.e., Prob(Operation[t]=0) = ½ = Prob(Operation[t]=1), where the 
number of possible values for Operation[t] is 2NRi.  
Considering β, each XorK and ModK subkey also has a length of β bits and 
thus, each XorK and ModK subkeys have a search space with 2β possible 
values. TabK is a 128 bit value, thus with a search space of 2128 possible 
values. Considering the cipher’s algorithm and given the probability of {0, 
1} values in Operation, a XOR is executed in all rounds (NRi), while a MOD 
is executed before the XOR in half the rounds (NRi/2). Given this, the key 
search space dimension considering the combination of XOR and 
MOD/XOR rounds is given by G(x): 
𝐺(𝑥) = ∑ 𝐹(𝑥)
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Considering Y as the number of attempts to discover the keys, Y is a 
discrete random variable with support S = {1…N }, where N represents the 
search space’s dimension. For one attempt, considering a random variable 
B, it has only two possibilities: 
𝐵 = {
 0, 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙
1, 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙
 
Therefore, B follows a Bernoulli distribution with probability p = Prob(B=1) 
= 1/N. Since the number of attempts is limited, given the search space is 
finite, variable Y also has a finite support S = {1…N}. The probability of 
being successful after k attempts is given by: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 𝑘) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(?̅? ∩ ?̅? ∩ … ∩ ?̅? ∩ 𝐴) = (1 −
1
𝑁
)
𝑘−1
.
1
𝑁
  , k=1… N 
Note that the probability of needing more than m attempts is given by: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 > 𝑚) =  ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 𝑘)
𝑁
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𝑁
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.
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𝑁
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𝑁
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𝑁−𝑚
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The probability of needing n more attempts, given m initial unsuccessful 
attempts (for m > 1 and n > 1) is defined by Prob(Y >m+n | Y >m) = 
Prob(Y>m+n) / Prob(Y>m), since the event {Y > m+n} is contained in {Y > m}, 
which means that after having m unsuccessful attempts, being successful 
after n more attempts only depends on those n additional attempts and not 
on the initial m attempts, i.e., it does not depend on the past. For the 
complete search space, the average number of attempts is then given by: 
∑ 𝑘. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 𝑘) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑘 (1 −
1
𝑁
)
𝑘−1
= (∗)
𝑁
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑘=1
 
From the series theory it is known that 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑘 =
1
1−𝑥
+∞
𝑘=0  , if |𝑥|<1 
Which is the case in 
(∗) for (1 −
1
𝑁
).  
Thus, 
(∑ 𝑥𝑘+∞𝑘=1 )
′ = (
1
1−𝑥
)
′
 ∑ 𝑘. 𝑥𝑘−1+∞𝑘=1 =
1
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 , |𝑥| < 1 
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Thus, the average number of attempts for finding the keys is 
(∗) =
1
𝑁
.
1
(1 − (1 −
1
𝑁))
2 = 𝑁 
which is equal to the dimension of the key search space (N). Note however, 
that this is the worst case complexity. It is possible for the attacker to reduce 
the key search space by chosen plaintext attacks. Since the same TabK key 
is used for encrypting all RowK, as explained in section 5.2 (CN+1(row j) = 
RowK[j]  TabK), the information leakage is given by 
y1  y2 = (x1   TabK)  (x2   TabK)   
 y1  y2 = (x1   x2)  (TabK  TabK)  
 y1  y2 = x1   x2  
This implies that CN+1(row j)  CN+1(row j+1) = RowK[j]  RowK[j+1], 
reducing the possible search space for RowK to 264 instead of 2128 in each 
row. If the attacker manages to use very low RowK values, which are most 
probably smaller than the value of the ModK encryption keys (i.e. 
RowK<ModK[t]), then the (RowK MOD ModK[t]) – ModK[t] operation in the 
cipher will be reduced to RowK – ModK[t], thus further reducing 
complexity. In this case, for example, taking more than one (plaintext, 
ciphertext) pair y1 = Encrypt(x1,2) and y2 = Encrypt(x2,2) for 2 encryption 
rounds on the same row, where Operation=[0,1]: 
𝑦1 𝑦2 = (𝑥1 𝑋𝑜𝑟𝐾[1] + 𝑅𝑜𝑤𝐾 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝐾[2])  (𝑥2 𝑋𝑜𝑟𝐾[1] + 𝑅𝑜𝑤𝐾 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝐾[2]) 
Considering that each xi has a length of  bits, given the encryption key 
RowK has a reduced search space of 264 (as previously mentioned) and each 
XorK and ModK have a search space of 2, the key search space in this 
example is given by 22+64. Since XorK[1] and ModK[2] are just half the keys 
for the 2 round SES-DW, to obtain the remaining XorK[2] and ModK[1] 
keys, the search space is incremented by 22.  
As the number of XorK and ModK encryption keys is the same as the 
number of rounds, the generic expression for the reduced key search space 
in this type of attack is given by G(x) = 2NRi*+64 + 2NRi*. Note that for an 8 bit 
value ( = 8) encrypted by 16 rounds (NRi = 16), using 16 XorK and ModK 
subkeys with 8 bits each (each total key length for XorK and ModK is 16*8 
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= 128 bits), the key search space complexity is 2192 + 2128 ≅ 6.3x1057, which 
remains a considerable measure of security strength. 
5.3.3 SES-DW Entropy 
In information theory, entropy is a measure of randomness or uncertainty 
[Vaudenay, 2006]. In this context, the term usually refers to Shannon’s 
entropy, which quantifies the randomness of a variable based upon the 
knowledge of the information contained in its message. The entropy of a 
discrete variable X with n bits in length is given by the following 
expression, where Prob(xi) is the probability of occurrence of each xi within 
the probability distribution of all possible integer values [1…2n]: 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦(𝑋) = − ∑ (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋 = 𝑥𝑖). 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋 = 𝑥𝑖))
2𝑛
𝑖=1    
Since numeric datatype storage sizes are typically 8, 16, 32, 64 or 128 bits, 
each of our cipher’s input/output values (as well as the encryption keys) 
respectively have a number of 28, 216, 232, 264, or 2128 possible combinations. 
While it is computationally fast to obtain the probability distribution in the 
first case by combining all possible input and encryption key values (with 
all 8 bit values = [1...28]) using two cipher rounds (the minimum number of 
rounds), for the remaining (216, 232, 264 and 2128) the task gets exponentially 
time-expensive.  
Therefore, after a series of statistical regression experiments using the 
calculated 8 bit probability distribution for SES-DW, we found that the 
logarithmic regression ( 𝑦 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝑙𝑛(𝑥) ) generated the most adjusted 
statistical model for representing the cipher’s probability distribution (with 
correlation R2 >= 0.98 and a standard error of 0.001). Knowing that the 
accumulated probability for n bits must be equal to 1, using the logarithmic 
regression function we must ensure that: 
∫ 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝑙𝑛(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
2𝑛
1
= 1 
This expression leads to 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥𝑖) = ?̂? + ?̂?. 𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑖), which represents the 
estimated probability distribution function for n bits SES-DW, where: 
?̂? =
1−𝑛.𝑏.2𝑛.𝑙𝑛(2)
2𝑛−1
+ 𝑏          ?̂? =
?̅?−(2𝑛−1+
1
2
)
22𝑛−2 − 
1
4
 – 𝑛 . 2𝑛−1 .  ln (2)
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Given 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥), the entropy of SES-DW for n = 8, 16, 32, 64 and 128 bits is 
shown in Table 5-1. As can be seen, the entropy produced for n bits is 
nearly n, thus meaning the generated ciphertexts are very close to a 
uniformly random n bit value and therefore, have very little information 
leakage because very little can be inferred from the output generated by 
the cipher. 
Table 5-1. Estimated SES-DW entropy values 
Number of bits (n) SES-DW Entropy 
8 7.967144 
16 15.972308 
32 31.979863 
64 63.986246 
128 127.989741 
5.4 Experimental Evaluation 
In these experiments we used the TPC-H benchmark [TPC-H] 
implemented in its 1GB and 10GB scale sizes, and a real-world sales DW 
storing one year of commercial data taking up 2GB of storage space (as we 
previously mentioned, full description of the sales DW can be seen in 
Appendix A). We tested all scenarios using the Oracle 11g and Microsoft 
SQL Server 2008 DBMS with default settings, on a Pentium Core2Duo 
3GHz CPU with a 1.5TB SATA hard disk and 2GB RAM (512MB of devoted 
to database memory cache), running Windows 2003 Server.  
As in the experiments involving the data masking solution, the columns 
chosen for testing the masking solution were those referring to numerical 
datatype columns belonging to the fact tables. The TPC-H schema has one 
fact table (LineItem), and seven dimension tables. In TPC-H setups, four 
numerical columns of LineItem were encrypted (L_Quantity, 
L_ExtendedPrice, L_Tax and L_Discount). The Sales DW database schema 
has one fact table (Sales) and four dimension tables. In the Sales DW, five 
numerical columns were encrypted (S_ShipToCost, S_Tax, S_Quantity, 
S_Profit, and S_SalesAmount).  
In these experiments, we compare the storage size overhead and query 
response time of SES-DW with the column-based AES (with 128 bit and 
256 bit security) and 3DES168 algorithms available as built-in options of 
SES-DW: A Specific Encryption Solution for Data Warehouses 
 
141 
each DBMS, and OPES [Agrawal et al., 2004] and Salsa20/20 [Bernstein, 
2005; Bernstein, 2008]. OPES and Salsa20 were implemented using C#. We 
use the column-based solutions for the same reasons as explained in the 
previous chapter in Section 4.4 (see Table 4-2). 
All loading time and query response time results shown in this section 
were obtained from an average of six executions in each described 
setup/scenario, given the relatively small standard deviation values, as in 
Chapter 4. The complete set of results and respective statistical measures 
can be seen in Appendix B. Note that the experiments included in this 
chapter cannot be directly compared with those of the data masking 
chapter, since different CPUs were used. 
5.4.1. Analyzing Storage Space 
The storage space results measured in these experimental evaluations are 
exactly the same as those presented for the data masking experimental 
evaluation in Subsection 4.4.1, making it redundant and unnecessary to 
repeat the analysis here. This happens because the implementation of SES-
DW requires exactly the same changes to the DW data schemas as MOBAT, 
and the remaining encryption algorithms that we tested against are also 
the same as in the previous experiments. Therefore, in this subsection we 
just remind the main storage space results and conclusions.  
For TPC-H 1GB: 
 OPES and SES-DW produce much smaller storage space overheads 
than the remaining solutions; 
 OPES adds a 2% overhead for both DBMS, corresponding to 18MB 
of extra storage space in Oracle and 21MB in SQL Server; 
 SES-DW adds 8% and 12% overhead respectively in Oracle and SQL 
Server, corresponding to an extra 96MB and 102MB of storage space;  
 Salsa20 introduces 38% overhead in Oracle, corresponding to adding 
292MB, and 26% in SQL Server, which adds 316MB of extra storage 
space; 
 The standard encryption solutions produce the highest overhead, 
with AES being the worst by requiring 154% in Oracle and 95% in 
SQL Server of storage space overhead, corresponding to respectively 
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adding 1188MB and 1173MB and 154% in each DBMS, while 
3DES168 produced a storage space overhead of 104% in Oracle and 
76% in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to 800MB and 944MB 
of extra storage space. 
In what concerns the TPC-H 10GB DW, the extra storage space added to 
the 10GB database by each encryption solution is approximately 
proportional to those of the 1GB database, which means ten times bigger. 
Thus, the analysis of the results for the 10GB sized TPC-H database is 
similar to that of the 1GB. 
For the Sales DW: 
 OPES and SES-DW continue to produce much smaller storage space 
overheads than the remaining solutions, similarly to the occurred 
with TPC-H; 
 OPES shows a 4% overhead for both DBMS, corresponding to an 
extra 62MB of storage space in Oracle and 73MB in SQL Server 
 SES-DW presents 25% and 33% overhead for SES-DW respectively in 
Oracle and SQL Server, corresponding to an extra 415MB and 636MB 
of storage space;  
 Salsa20 also introduces more storage space overhead than OPES and 
SES-DW, namely 88% in Oracle, corresponding to adding 1464MB, 
and 94% in SQL Server, which adds 1818MB of extra storage space; 
 The standard encryption solutions continue to produce the highest 
overhead, with AES also being the worst by requiring 462% in Oracle 
and 591% in SQL Server of storage space overhead, corresponding to 
respectively adding 7688MB and 11424MB of storage space, while 
3DES168 produced a storage space overhead of 308% in Oracle and 
390% in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to 5125MB and 
7532MB of extra storage space. 
5.4.2. Analyzing Loading Time 
Figures 5-4a and 5-4b respectively show the results for the total loading 
time (in seconds) and percentage of time overhead for loading the TPC-H 
1GB LineItem fact table in Oracle, while Figures 5-5a and 5-5b show the 
same results in SQL Server. It can be observed that the standard loading 
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time for the TPC-H LineItem fact table without using any sort of encryption 
solution is 253 seconds in Oracle and 171 seconds in SQL Server. 
As shown, SES-DW produces much smaller loading time overheads than 
the remaining solutions with the same bit security. SES-DW with 128 bit 
security shows 10% and 12% overhead in Oracle and SQL Server, 
respectively corresponding to an extra 26 and 20 seconds in loading time. 
SES-DW with 256 bit security shows 16% and 18% in Oracle and SQL 
Server, respectively corresponding to adding 41 and 30 seconds, and when 
using 1024 bit security (at least four times higher than the remaining 
solutions) the loading time overhead was 78% in Oracle and 66% in SQL 
Server, respectively corresponding to an extra 198 and 113 seconds of 
loading time. 
 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
   
 
            
 
Figure 5-4a. Loading Time in Oracle 
for the TPC-H 1GB Fact Table per 
Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-4b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in Oracle for the TPC-H 1GB Fact 
Table per Encryption Solution 
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SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
LineItem Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
   
 
            
 
Figure 5-5a. Loading Time in SQL 
Server for the TPC-H 1GB Fact Table 
per Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-5b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in SQL Server for the TPC-H 1GB 
Fact Table per Encryption Solution 
OPES comes after SES-DW 128 and 256 bit security in loading time 
performance, showing an overhead of 40% in Oracle and 34% in SQL 
Server, which respectively correspond to adding 100 and 110 seconds. 
Salsa20 introduces more loading time overhead than OPES and the 
referred bit security versions of SES-DW, namely 66% in Oracle, 
corresponding to adding 166 seconds, and 64% in SQL Server, which adds 
110 seconds of extra loading time. 
Note that, although SES-DW 1024 does introduce higher overhead than 
OPES and Salsa20, it does use a much higher security bit strength, which 
consequently has impact on its performance.  
Similarly to what occurred with storage space, the standard encryption 
solutions produced the highest loading time overheads. AES with 128 bit 
security produced 140% in Oracle and 123% in SQL Server, respectively 
corresponding to adding 355 and 211 seconds to the standard loading time. 
AES with 256 bit security shows an overhead of 151% in Oracle and 138% 
in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to 383 and 236 seconds of extra 
loading time. 3DES168 introduces 144% loading time overhead in Oracle, 
corresponding to adding 364 seconds, and 127% in SQL Server, which adds 
218 seconds of extra loading time. 
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Figures 5-6a and 5-6b respectively show the results of total loading time (in 
seconds) and percentage of loading time overhead for loading the TPC-H 
10GB LineItem fact table in Oracle, while Figures 5-7a and 5-7b show the 
same results in SQL Server. 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
     
 
            
 
Figure 5-6a. Loading Time in Oracle 
for the TPC-H 10GB Fact Table 
 
Figure 5-6b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in Oracle for the TPC-H 10GB 
 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
LineItem Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
     
 
          
 
Figure 5-7a. Loading Time in SQL 
Server for the TPC-H 10GB  
 
Figure 5-7b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in SQL Server for the TPC-H 10GB 
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From observing the results in Figures 5-6a to 5-7b, it can be seen that the 
extra loading time added to the 10GB database by each encryption solution 
is approximately proportional to those of the 1GB database, as occurred 
with the storage space, which means ten times bigger. Thus, the analysis of 
the results for the 10GB sized TPC-H database is also similar to that of the 
1GB sized TPC-H database. 
Figures 5-8a and 5-8b respectively show the results of total loading time (in 
seconds) and percentage of time overhead for loading the Sales DW fact 
table in Oracle, while Figures 5-9a and 5-9b show the same results in SQL 
Server. It can be seen that the standard loading time for the Sales fact table 
without using any encryption solution is 994 seconds in Oracle and 1013 
seconds in SQL Server. As seen in both Figures, SES-DW continues to 
produce much smaller loading time overheads than the remaining 
solutions, similarly to the occurred with TPC-H. SES-DW with 128 bit 
security shows 13% and 15% overhead in Oracle and SQL Server, 
respectively corresponding to an extra 130 and 148 seconds in loading time. 
SES-DW with 256 bit security shows 22% in both DBMS, corresponding to 
adding 217 seconds in Oracle and 224 seconds in SQL Server, and when 
using 1024 bit security the loading time overhead was 82% in Oracle and 
86% in SQL Server, corresponding to an extra 814 and 868 seconds of 
loading time. 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
     
 
         
 
Figure 5-8a. Loading Time in Oracle 
for the Sales DW Fact Table 
 
Figure 5-8b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in Oracle for the Sales DW 
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SQL Server Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Fact Table Loading Time (sec) 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB 
Sales Loading Time Overhead (%) 
 
     
 
         
 
Figure 5-9a. Loading Time in SQL 
Server for the Sales DW Fact Table per 
Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-9b. Loading Time Overhead 
(%) in SQL Server for the Sales DW 
Fact Table per Encryption Solution 
OPES comes after SES-DW in loading time performance, showing a 56% 
overhead in Oracle and 53% in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to 
an extra 561 seconds and 541 seconds of loading time, and Salsa20 presents 
91% and 86% overhead for respectively in Oracle and SQL Server, 
corresponding to an extra 908 and 866 seconds of loading time in each 
DBMS. 
The standard encryption solutions continue to produce the highest 
overhead, where AES with 128 bit security produced 169% in Oracle and 
139% in SQL Server, respectively corresponding to adding 1682 and 1403 
seconds to the standard loading time. AES with 256 bit security shows an 
overhead of 191% in Oracle and 154% in SQL Server, respectively 
corresponding to 1895 and 1560 seconds of extra loading time. 3DES168 
introduces 197% loading time overhead in Oracle, corresponding to 
adding 1955 seconds, and 158% in SQL Server, which adds 1598 seconds of 
extra loading time. 
Overall, the loading time results presented in this section mostly confirm 
those shown in the previous chapter, although different CPUs were used 
between them. Tables 5-2, 5-3 and 5-4 summarize the fact table loading 
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time results respectively for the TPC-H 1GB, TPC-H 10GB and Sales DW, 
for each DBMS, highlighting the best solutions in each case. 
Table 5-2. TPC-H 1GB Lineitem Fact Table Loading Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:04:13 00:02:51 
AES128 00:10:08 (00:05:55 / 140%) 00:06:22 (00:03:31 / 123%) 
AES256 00:10:36 (00:06:23 / 151%) 00:06:47 (00:03:56 / 138%) 
3DES168 00:10:17 (00:06:04 / 144%) 00:06:29 (00:03:38 / 127%) 
OPES 00:05:53 (00:01:40 / 40%) 00:03:49 (00:00:58 / 34%) 
Salsa20 00:06:59 (00:02:46 / 66%) 00:04:41 (00:01:50 / 64%) 
SES-DW128 00:04:39 (00:00:26 / 10%) 00:03:11 (00:00:20 / 12%) 
SES-DW256 00:04:54 (00:00:41 / 16%) 00:03:21 (00:00:30 / 18%) 
SES-DW1024 00:07:31 (00:03:18 / 78%) 00:04:44 (00:01:53 / 66%) 
 
Table 5-3. TPC-H 10GB Lineitem Fact Table Loading Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:42:56 00:29:56 
AES128 01:46:15 (01:03:19 / 147%) 01:09:04 (00:39:08 / 131%) 
AES256 01:52:22 (01:09:26 / 162%) 01:15:32 (00:45:36 / 152%) 
3DES168 01:48:47 (01:05:51 / 153%) 01:11:30 (00:41:34 / 139%) 
OPES 01:02:46 (00:19:50 / 46%) 00:42:22 (00:12:26 / 42%) 
Salsa20 01:14:41 (00:31:45 / 74%) 00:51:46 (00:21:50 / 73%) 
SES-DW128 00:50:24 (00:07:28 / 17%) 00:35:37 (00:05:41 / 19%) 
SES-DW256 00:53:36 (00:10:40 / 25%) 00:38:40 (00:08:44 / 29%) 
SES-DW1024 01:20:44 (00:37:48 / 88%) 00:58:36 (00:28:40 / 96%) 
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Table 5-4. Sales DW 2GB Fact Table Loading Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB  
Loading Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:16:34 00:16:53 
AES128 00:44:36 (00:28:02 / 169%) 00:40:16 (00:23:23 / 139%) 
AES256 00:48:09 (00:31:35 / 191%) 00:42:53 (00:26:00 / 154%) 
3DES168 00:49:09 (00:32:35 / 197%) 00:43:31 (00:26:38 / 158%) 
OPES 00:25:55 (00:09:21 / 56%) 00:25:54 (00:09:01 / 53%) 
Salsa20 00:31:42 (00:15:08 / 91%) 00:31:19 (00:14:26 / 86%) 
SES-DW128 00:18:44 (00:02:10 / 13%) 00:19:21 (00:02:28 / 15%) 
SES-DW256 00:20:11 (00:03:37 / 22%) 00:20:37 (00:03:44 / 22%) 
SES-DW1024 00:30:08 (00:13:34 / 82%) 00:31:21 (00:14:28 / 86%) 
 
5.4.3. Analyzing Query Performance 
To analyze the query performance of the encryption algorithms, we 
defined a decision support query workload for each database similar to 
what was described in the data masking technique’s experimental 
evaluation in the previous chapter. The TPC-H workload included the 
benchmark queries were the same as those used in the data masking 
experiments in the previous chapter (i.e., TPC-H queries number 1, 3, 6, 7, 
8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19 and 20, which correspond to all that access the 
LineItem fact table). For the Sales DW, the workload was also the same set 
of 29 queries all processing the Sales fact table. For fairness, databases were 
also optimized in a best practice manner (including primary keys, foreign 
keys, and referential integrity constraints and join indexes).  
As we previously mentioned, all response time results are an average 
obtained from six executions in each scenario on each DBMS. The standard 
execution time (average of execution time of the workload against a non-
encrypted database) for each scenario is 492, 5037, and 1766 seconds in 
Oracle 11g, and 452, 4694, and 1690 seconds in SQL Server 2008, for the 
1GB, 10GB TPC-H and Sales DW, respectively. 
Figures 5-10a to 5-11b show the total workload execution time and its 
overhead in Oracle and SQL Server for the TPC-H 1GB database, while 
Figure 5-12 shows the CPU execution time overhead in Oracle and SQL 
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Server for the same database. SES-DW with 128-bit and 256-bit security has 
the best response and CPU time overheads for all scenarios, respectively 
106% and 154% of execution time overhead in Oracle, corresponding to 523 
and 759 seconds of added response time, and 105% and 152% in SQL 
Server, corresponding to 475 and 688 seconds of added response time. The 
results are followed by Salsa20 and further by AES, while OPES has results 
leveled between AES and 3DES, while SES-DW with 1024 bit security 
presents values approximately similar to AES. 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
  
 
Figure 5-10a. Query Workload 
Execution Time in Oracle for the 
TPC-H 1GB per Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-10b. Query Workload Exec. 
Time Overhead (%) in Oracle for the 
TPC-H 1GB per Encryption Solution 
 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
  
 
Figure 5-11a. Query Workload 
Execution Time in SQL Server for the 
TPC-H 1GB per Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-11b. Query Workload Exec. 
Time Overhead (%) in SQL Server for 
the TPC-H 1GB p/ Encryption Solution 
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Query Workload CPU Time Overhead (%) 
 Oracle TPC-H 1GB SQL Server TPC-H 1GB 
 
 
Figure 5-12. Query Workload CPU Time Overhead (%) for the TPC-H 1GB per 
Encryption Solution in each DBMS 
 
It can be seen that in what concerns the processing efforts of the encryption 
algorithms themselves, which can be observed through analyzing the CPU 
execution time overhead, the results shown in Figure 5-12 show that SES-
DW introduces an overhead of approximately 200% to 270% respectively 
with 128 and 256 bit security. Salsa20, which is the best of the remaining 
solutions, introduces approximately 300%, while all other solutions add 
nearly 400% of CPU execution time overhead. 
Figures 5-13a to 5-14b show the total workload execution time and its 
overhead in Oracle and SQL Server for the TPC-H 10GB database, while 
Figure 5-15 shows the CPU execution time overhead in Oracle and SQL 
Server for the same database. As can be observed, the results lead to similar 
conclusions as those seen in the TPC-H 1GB database, in what respects the 
ranking performance of the tested solutions. SES-DW remains the solution 
having the best response and CPU time overheads for all scenarios, with 
128-bit and 256-bit security in both DBMS. When compared with the 
results for the TPC-H 1GB database, it can be seen that the differences 
between the solutions are slightly enforced with the higher amount of data 
which needs to be processed in the 10GB scale size.  
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Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
  
 
Figure 5-13a. Query Workload 
Execution Time in Oracle for the 
TPC-H 1GB per Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-13b. Query Workload Exec. 
Time Overhead (%) in Oracle for the 
TPC-H 1GB per Encryption Solution 
 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
 
 
 
Figure 5-14a. Query Workload 
Execution Time in SQL Server for the 
TPC-H 10GB per Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-14b. Query Workload Exec. 
Time Overhead (%) in SQL Server for 
the TPC-H 10GB p/ Encryption Solution 
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Query Workload CPU Time Overhead (%) 
 Oracle TPC-H 10GB SQL Server TPC-H 10GB 
 
 
Figure 5-15. Query Workload CPU Time Overhead (%) for the TPC-H 10GB per 
Encryption Solution in each DBMS 
 
Figures 5-16a to 5-17b show the results of total workload execution time 
and respective overhead for the Sales DW fact table in both DBMS. It can 
be seen that SES-DW continues to produce much smaller execution time 
overheads than the remaining solutions, similarly to the occurred with 
TPC-H. SES-DW with 128 bit security shows 262% and 236% overhead in 
Oracle and SQL Server, respectively corresponding to an extra 4627 and 
3988 seconds in response time. SES-DW with 256 bit security shows 409% 
and 361% in Oracle and SQL Server, corresponding to adding 7223 seconds 
in Oracle and 6101 seconds in SQL Server, and when using 1024 bit security 
the loading time overhead was 610% in Oracle and 493% in SQL Server, 
respectively corresponding to an extra 10773 and 8332 seconds of loading 
time. 
Salsa20 comes after SES-DW 128 bit and 256 bit in execution time 
performance, showing a 539% overhead in Oracle and 492% in SQL Server, 
and OPES presents more than 700% and 600% overhead respectively in 
Oracle and SQL Server. The standard encryption solutions continue to 
produce the highest overhead, roughly between 700% and 800% of extra 
loading time in both DBMS. 
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Oracle Sales DW 
Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
Oracle Sales DW 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
  
 
Figure 5-16a. Query Workload 
Execution Time in Oracle for the 
Sales DW per Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-16b. Query Workload Exec. 
Time Overhead (%) in Oracle for the 
Sales DW per Encryption Solution 
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Query Workload Execution Time (sec) 
SQL Server Sales DW 
Query Workload Exec. Time Overhead (%) 
  
 
Figure 5-17a. Query Workload 
Execution Time in SQL Server for the 
Sales DW per Encryption Solution 
 
Figure 5-17b. Query Workload Exec. 
Time Overhead (%) in SQL Server for 
Sales DW p/ Encryption Solution 
Figure 5-18 shows the CPU time overhead per solution for the Sales DW in 
each DBMS. In what concerns CPU time overhead, by observing Figure 5-
18 and comparing it with the results from the TPC-H 1GB in Figure 5-12 
and TPC-H 10GB in Figure 5-15, it can be seen that the CPU execution time 
overhead obtained in the Sales DW are very leveled and similar to those 
obtained in the TPC-H databases. This reveals a similar difference and 
impact in CPU processing efforts between the different solutions. 
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Query Workload CPU Time Overhead (%) 
 Oracle Sales DW 2GB SQL Server Sales DW 2GB 
 
 
Figure 5-18. Query Workload CPU Time Overhead (%) for the Sales DW 2GB per 
Encryption Solution in each DBMS 
Tables 5-5, 5-6 and 5-7 summarize the query workload execution time 
results respectively for the TPC-H 1GB, TPC-H 10GB and Sales DW, for 
each DBMS. We highlight SES-128 as the solution that achieves the best 
results. 
Table 5-5. TPC-H 1GB Query Workload Execution Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 1GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 1GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:08:12 00:07:32 
AES128 00:22:37 (00:14:25 / 176%) 00:20:31 (00:12:59 / 172%) 
AES256 00:24:56 (00:16:44 / 204%) 00:22:10 (00:14:38 / 194%) 
3DES168 00:28:22 (00:20:10 / 246%) 00:22:42 (00:15:10 / 201%) 
OPES 00:25:35 (00:17:23 / 212%) 00:22:06 (00:14:34 / 193%) 
Salsa20 00:21:08 (00:12:56 / 158%) 00:18:51 (00:11:19 / 150%) 
SES-DW128 00:16:55 (00:08:43 / 106%) 00:15:27 (00:07:55 / 105%) 
SES-DW256 00:20:51 (00:12:39 / 154%) 00:19:00 (00:11:28 / 152%) 
SES-DW1024 00:24:13 (00:16:01 / 195%) 00:22:05 (00:14:33 / 193%) 
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Table 5-6. TPC-H 10GB Query Workload Execution Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle TPC-H 10GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server TPC-H 10GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 01:23:57 01:18:14 
AES128 04:13:11 (02:49:14 / 202%) 03:54:23 (02:36:09 / 200%) 
AES256 05:17:53 (03:53:56 / 279%) 04:37:30 (03:19:16 / 255%) 
3DES168 06:07:33 (04:43:36 / 338%) 05:13:41 (03:55:27 / 301%) 
OPES 04:46:45 (03:22:48 / 242%) 03:55:55 (02:37:41 / 202%) 
Salsa20 04:03:43 (02:39:46 / 190%) 03:45:40 (02:27:26 / 188%) 
SES-DW128 02:44:53 (01:20:56 / 96%) 02:37:26 (01:19:12 / 101%) 
SES-DW256 03:20:56 (01:56:59 / 139%) 02:51:29 (01:33:15 / 119%) 
SES-DW1024 04:09:36 (02:45:39 / 197%) 03:48:33 (02:30:19 / 192%) 
 
Table 5-7. Sales DW 2GB Query Workload Execution Time Overhead 
 
 
Oracle Sales DW 2GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
SQL Server Sales DW 2GB  
Execution Time (Overhead) 
Standard Loading Time 00:29:26 00:28:10 
AES128 03:55:01 (03:25:35 / 698%) 03:43:49 (03:15:39 / 695%) 
AES256 04:18:10 (03:48:44 / 777%) 03:56:20 (03:28:10 / 739%) 
3DES168 04:24:20 (03:54:54 / 798%) 04:08:18 (03:40:08 / 782%) 
OPES 03:56:29 (03:27:03 / 703%) 03:26:21 (02:58:11 / 633%) 
Salsa20 03:08:14 (02:38:48 / 540%) 02:46:59 (02:18:49 / 493%) 
SES-DW128 01:46:36 (01:17:10 / 262%) 01:34:42 (01:06:32 / 236%) 
SES-DW256 02:29:58 (02:00:32 / 410%) 02:10:06 (01:41:56 / 362%) 
SES-DW1024 03:29:06 (02:59:40 / 610%) 02:47:12 (02:19:02 / 494%) 
 
To demonstrate the effects of using encryption on each individual query, 
the results for individual query execution time in Oracle for the TPC-H 
10GB scenarios are shown in Figure 5-19, with a logarithmic scale. These 
results show that all queries have similar proportional overhead to those 
of the complete workload. This is also true for all the other scenarios, 
making it redundant to include all. It can be seen that most queries 
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processed by AES and 3DES have overheads of several orders of 
magnitude higher than SES-DW. 
 
 
Figure 5-19. TPC-H 10GB Individual Query Execution Time Overhead per 
Encryption Algorithm in Oracle 11g 
For the same reasons as in the experimental evaluation subchapter of the 
proposed data masking solution, the individual query execution time 
results for the Sales DW are not included, given this set of queries can 
produce a certain amount of insight as a whole, but should mainly not be 
considered as appropriate for individual analysis, since this DW is a 
specific real-world database and it is not a standard nor a benchmark. 
5.5 Discussion on SES-DW 
Contrarily to typical encryption packages such as those supplied by the 
leading commercial DBMS, SES-DW preserves the encrypted columns’ 
datatype and bit length. This avoids introducing storage space overhead 
and type conversions in decryption, consequently decreasing the amount 
of data that needs to be accessed in order to process queries, as well as 
computation efforts, when compared with typical encryption. As the data 
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masking technique proposed in the previous chapter, SES-DW 
accomplishes continuous data protection similarly to commercial 
encryption packages, since it maintains data-at-rest encrypted at all times, 
while adding the mentioned benefits of datatype preservation. 
SES-DW also has similar advantages to MOBAT, such as executing direct 
queries against encrypted/decrypted data without having that data 
transferred between the database and the encryption/decryption 
mechanisms. This also avoids I/O and network bandwidth congestion that 
other solutions introduce due to those data roundtrips, enabled by the fact 
that the encrypting and decrypting processes simply rely on SQL 
rewriting. As MOBAT, SES-DW is a straightforward and portable 
technique to be universally used in any DBMS regardless of the CPU and 
operating system, contrarily to what occurs with most standard encryption 
packages supplied by DBMS. 
Another advantage in SES-DW that is similar to MOBAT is that SES-DW is 
specifically designed for masking numerical values, and in this sense, is 
therefore much more performance efficient for protecting DW facts, when 
compared with standard encryption techniques that require executing data 
type conversions. The data loading and query execution response time 
results shown in the experimental evaluations demonstrate this, as it also 
proves that using encryption does in fact introduce extremely high storage 
space, loading time and query response time overheads. 
In what concerns storage space, SES-DW presents similar overhead as 
MOBAT, concerning the addition of an extra column in the fact table. OPES 
and SES-DW introduce much smaller storage space overheads than the 
remaining solutions (less than 25% of extra storage space), followed by 
Salsa20 at a considerable difference (adding approximately 30% of storage 
space in TPC-H and almost 100% in the Sales DW), while the standard 
encryption solutions produce the highest storage space overheads by far.  
In what concerns loading time, SES-DW with 128 bit and 256 bit security 
(those similar to the key lengths of the other solutions) is much faster than 
all the remaining solutions, introducing 10% to 29% of extra loading time 
in the tested scenarios. OPES has the second best performance, introducing 
34% to 61% of extra loading time, more than two times worse than SES-
DW on average. Salsa20 presents loading time overheads from 64% to 
102%, on average roughly four times worse than SES-DW, while the 
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standard encryption solutions introduce overheads of more than 100%, 
reaching more than 200% in several scenarios. On the other hand, while 
SES with 1024 bit security does present greater overhead than OPES and 
Salsa20, it does have a superior bit security strength than these solutions. 
Considering the results obtained in the query workload executions, SES-
DW with security strengths similar to the remaining solutions is also much 
faster. By observing the results, it can be seen that the relative differences 
between the solutions are approximately proportional throughout the 
different scenarios, with SES-DW being always the fastest solution (using 
the same bit security strength as the key length of the remaining solutions) 
and therefore introducing the smallest execution time overheads by several 
orders of magnitude, roughly half to a quarter, on average, of the 
remaining solutions.  
SES-DW can be considered as a much more efficient overall solution, 
introducing small overheads when compared to the remaining solutions, 
for similar key sizes. Note that the worst result for SES-DW is that with 
1024 bit security, which is similar to Salsa20. However, it does refer to using 
1024 bit encryption, far higher than the remaining tested solutions. 
As we previously mentioned, given that decision support environments 
typically execute long running queries (i.e., queries that can run for many 
minutes up to hours), the response time overheads introduced due to the 
use of encryption solutions represent high absolute values that can easily 
make query responses overdue and jeopardize the usefulness of the DW 
itself. Considering the magnitude of the results shown in the experimental 
evaluations, even a minimum gain in response/CPU time can be 
considered as an important achievement.  
The proposed encryption technique is straightforward and nearly 
effortless to implement in a similar fashion as the data masking technique, 
and the encryption keys may also be periodically refreshed and used to 
refresh the encrypted table values without much effort, by frequently 
switching the values of all or any one of the set of encryption keys for each 
encrypted column before refreshing encrypted data in order to ensure that 
data is properly protected. Therefore, given all of its security and 
performance features discussed and demonstrated in this chapter, we 
believe our technique is secure enough to be acceptable for use and that it 
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may be considered as a valid alternative for enhancing data confidentiality 
in DWs. 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter we propose an encryption solution specifically designed for 
enhancing data confidentiality in DWs. The proposed encryption 
algorithm requires only operations that can be executed using standard 
SQL, such as modulus, exclusive or and arithmetic operators. As the 
masking technique, it requires small computational efforts and is 
straightforward and easily implemented in any DBMS. The proposed 
solution is transparently used and to query the database the user interfaces 
only need to send their queries to a middleware broker instead of the 
DBMS. Data-at-rest is always encrypted and only the final processed 
results are returned to the authorized user interfaces that requested them. 
All SQL commands and actions are encrypted and stored in a log by the 
middleware security broker, which can be audited by any security staff.  
We have compared SES-DW with the AES and 3DES encryption 
algorithms provided by leading commercial DBMS, as well as two state-of-
the-art encryption proposals. The experimental results confirm the same 
kind of storage space and database performance results as in the previous 
chapter. Given that most DW data consists on numerical values, our 
encryption technique is tailored for this kind of data. Given both security 
proof and performance results, our technique shows better security 
strength versus database performance tradeoffs than the remaining 
encryption solutions. Thus, it is an efficient overall solution and a valid 
alternative for balancing performance and security issues from the DW 
perspective. 
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Chapter 6  
DW-DIDS: An Intrusion Detection 
Mechanism for Data Warehouses 
In a defense in depth scenario, an intruder needs to overcome a series of 
security mechanisms against invasive or unauthorized actions, such as 
routers, firewalls, network-based intrusion detectors, OS-based intrusion 
detectors, and finally, Database Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDS). The 
DIDS represents the last bastion of defense before any intruder gains access 
to the data itself. In this chapter, we propose a Data Warehouse Database 
Intrusion Detection System (DW-DIDS) based on the analysis of user 
actions at the SQL command level, including measures concerning what 
data was processed as well as the resulting datasets from the command’s 
execution. The proposed DIDS complies with the principles defined by the 
framework presented in Chapter 3. 
To accomplish this, we define what an intruder is and what types of attack 
can occur against data warehouses, proposing a classification of each 
intruder action according to those intents. Given this classification and the 
characteristics of typical end user workloads, we propose a set of features 
analyzed by the DIDS which we consider relevant to analyze and monitor 
their behavior.  
We then define how to construct each user’s behavior profile using the 
chosen Intrusion Detection (ID) features in a defined learning phase for the 
DIDS, and how to perform ID in the detection phase for generating alerts.  
For performing alert and response management, we propose a risk 
exposure method that assesses the risk inherent to each generated alert, 
given its probability and impact, which indicates the alerts that potentially 
present greater risk to the enterprise. This allows security staff to quickly 
check the alerts showing the highest risk and deal with the potentially most 
Chapter 6 
162 
dangerous intrusions first. The approach includes a SQL-like set of rules 
that allow determining the probability that each alert refers to a true 
intrusion given the feature that generated that alert, as well as the impact 
that the user action can produce on the enterprise. These rules also enable 
to deal with intrusions automatically, given the alert’s risk exposure 
measure. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1 we describe the basics of 
intrusion behavior in data warehousing environments, classifying the 
types of intrusion actions and proposing the relevant features for 
monitoring user behavior and performing intrusion detection. In Section 
6.2 we present the overall architecture of the proposed DIDS, describing 
each of its components and how they operate together during the 
workflow of the user command’s execution. Section 6.3 describes how to 
build user profiles, while Section 6.4 describes how to perform ID given 
each user action. Section 6.5 presents the risk exposure method for alert 
and response management. Section 6.6 includes an experimental 
evaluation of the proposed DIDS against two other ID techniques 
proposed by recent state-of-the-art research. In Section 6.7 we discuss open 
issues regarding the proposed DIDS and finally, Section 6.8 summarizes 
and concludes the chapter. 
6.1. Selecting Intrusion Detection Features in Data Warehouses 
Selecting the appropriate features for performing intrusion detection 
requires understanding what an intruder is and which are the distinct type 
of intentions that can drive an attack, i.e., what the intruder aims to achieve 
with the attack.  
From a database perspective, an intruder in a data warehousing 
environment can be one of the following [Treinen and Thurimella, 2006]: 
 An authorized user, which is someone that has regular access to 
authorized database interfaces and acts with malicious intent; 
 A masqueraded user, which is someone that obtains the credentials 
of an authorized user and impersonating that user takes control of an 
authorized interface connecting to the database; 
 An insider attacker, which is someone that holds valid credentials to 
access the database as a regular activity; 
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 An external attacker, which is someone that does not have valid 
credentials to access the database, but is able to bypass database 
security mechanisms and gain direct database access using SQL 
injection or other exploiting techniques; 
 Any combination of the above. 
Considering the possible intruders’ intentions, there are mainly three types 
of attacks mobilized against DWs [Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004]: 
 Attacks aiming at corrupting data (integrity attacks). In this type of 
attack, the intruder seeks access to the database for executing actions 
that compromise its integrity, such as corrupting or deleting the data 
in a given database object (e.g. such as a table or view); 
 Attacks aiming at stealing information (confidentiality attacks). In 
these attacks, the intruder focuses on confidentiality issues, such as 
stealing business information, rather than damaging data; 
 Attacks aiming at making the DW unavailable (availability 
attacks). These attacks aim on making database services unavailable, 
i.e., they are mainly Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (e.g. flooding 
database services and bandwidth with a large number of requests, 
and halting or crashing database server instances). 
Given these intruder intents and types of attacks, we define ten classes of 
intrusion action types (A...J) as shown in Table 6-1. This classification 
distinguishes the intruder’s intentions apart from each other (shown in the 
“Attack Profile/Intent/Focus” column), defining a taxonomy for each 
action accordingly to what s/he might be aiming to achieve with the attack.  
Considering that integrity attacks focus on compromising the consistency 
and accurateness of the data content itself, we consider as integrity attacks 
all intruder actions that attempt to insert new false data values (class H), 
change the existing data values in order to make them incorrect or 
inaccurate (class I) and deleting existing data (class J). Any one of these 
attacks will cause inaccurate query responses against the affected data and 
they can also compromise referential integrity constraints if dimensional 
data is affected. 
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Table 6-1. SQL Intrusion Action Type Classification 
SQL 
Action 
Class 
Security dimension affected 
by the intrusion Intruder Command 
Action Description 
Attack Profile/Intent/Focus 
Confid Integrity Availab 
A X   
Attempts to discover 
valid database 
credentials/logins 
Brute force attack or dictionary-based 
attacks for attempting to obtain valid 
application/database logins 
B X   
Query retrieving 
information on 
database objects or 
data structures 
Retrieving information on database 
tables, views, triggers, etc. as well as 
index column names and types, in order 
to compose further attack instructions 
C   X 
Malicious 
modification of 
auxiliary data 
structures 
Erasing or renaming performance 
optimization data structures (e.g. 
erasure of indexes or materialized 
views), database objects (e.g. tables or 
physical datafiles) 
D X  X 
Query retrieving all 
data from a table 
(integral table copy) 
Retrieving all possible information of 
fact tables (in order to steal business 
secrets or strangle network bandwidth) 
or dimension tables (e.g. customer 
information) 
E X   
Query retrieving a 
significant portion of 
data from a table 
Stealing of selected sensitive factual 
(e.g. fact rows about sales concerning a 
given product or time period, or the 
rows with a small well-chosen set of 
sensitive table columns) or dimensional 
data (e.g. a list of customer credit cards 
or addresses) 
F X   
Query retrieving a 
specific and relatively 
small portion of data 
Stealing a small amount of specifically 
targeted data (e.g. total year sales value 
of a given product) 
G   X Query flooding 
Execution of an overwhelming amount 
of concurrent queries that access large 
volumes of data (creating database 
server processing bottlenecks) or that 
return large volumes of data (causing 
network bandwidth strangulation) 
H  X  Insertion of false data 
Insertion of rows with false data in fact 
tables and/or dimension tables to 
compromise user query results 
I  X  
Malicious 
modification of data 
Modification of stored data values in 
fact tables and/or dimension tables to 
compromise user query results 
J  X  Deletion of data 
Deletion of fact and/or dimensional 
table rows to produce false user query 
results and erase sensitive data 
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We consider as confidentiality attacks all those that attempt to disclose 
information that should not be disclosed. In these intruder actions, there 
can be distinct intentions such as: attempting to retrieve valid credentials 
to access the database with certain privileges (class A, which will allow the 
intruder to gain access to certain parts of the database), retrieving 
information on the database structures, such as table names and column 
names, for example (class B, which will allow identifying how the data is 
stored in the database and how the business is analyzed); and retrieving 
all or certain amounts of data from the database (classes D, E and F, which 
discloses business information to the intruder that s/he may use in her/his 
benefit or dismay the enterprise). 
Data availability attacks aim at keeping the database services from 
providing the responses back to the users or to simply keep them from 
operating. We consider as availability attacks user actions that: attempt to 
rename or delete database objects that hold data, such as tables or 
materialized views, or which are required to process regular user 
commands, such as table views (class C); request the database server to 
process a huge amount of data in a single command (e.g. retrieving all data 
from a fact table, defined in class D); and overwhelming the database 
server with commands, alias known as query flooding (class G). 
As can be seen, the classes defined in Table 6-1 cover a broad scope of 
intentions posed by intrusions. This classification is generic and can be 
easily modified in order to widen its scope by including other classes of 
different types of attack. 
As previously discussed, a DIDS at the database command level should be 
able to analyze all the aspects triggered by the execution of the user’s 
action: the commands themselves, processed data, and resulting datasets. 
Given the described issues, the features required for monitoring database 
user actions are those focusing on the following usability dimensions: 
 Action-type: what type of actions are being requested; 
 Traceability: from who/where does the requested action come; 
 Selectivity: what data will be affected by that action and what data 
composes the resulting dataset; 
 Time: when are the actions requested to execute and their duration. 
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In order to analyze the referred dimensions given each user action, we need 
to capture observable measures of user behavior from each of the following 
inputs:  
 The user’s ID and his/her session ID. Identifying the user and 
session allows building individual behavior profiles, as well as trace 
back each requested database command;  
 The SQL commands issued by the user. The SQL command allows 
using features that identify the type of command (insert, update, 
select, delete, etc.) and accessed data structures (columns, tables, 
materialized views, etc.), selection attributes and values, grouping 
attributes, union queries, etc.;  
 A timestamp of the issued execution request. This allows defining 
the temporal behavior of each user, identifying sequences of 
measures as well as frequencies of occurrences, how long does it take 
to process each command (elapsed time), etc.; 
 The data processed by each SQL command. The measures from the 
processed data allow using features concerning the data that is 
processed by each command that is not intrinsic to the command (e.g. 
how many rows were processed in the command’s execution); 
 The dataset resulting from each SQL command’s execution. The 
measures from the dataset resulting from the command’s execution 
allow using features that enable analyzing what sort of data is 
returned to the user (the size of the resulting dataset, how many rows 
and columns, data values, etc.). 
Considering these inputs and the characterization of data warehousing 
environments and intrusion actions previously described, the intrusion 
detection features considered interesting to capture the relevant measures 
for the proposed DIDS are shown in Table 6-2. Note that although these 
features may seem general-purpose and well fit for intrusion detection in 
most types of databases, they are in fact the most relevant features for 
collecting the required information for monitoring data warehouse user 
actions and analyze their behavior, given the characteristics inherent to 
data warehouse user activity, as described in [Bockermann et al. 2009; 
Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004; Kimball and Ross, 2013; TPC-H; TPC-DS; 
Treinen and Thurimella, 2006]. 
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Table 6-2. SQL Intrusion Detection Features 
F# FeatureName Description 
User-based features 
F1 #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts The number of consecutive failed database login attempts 
by a UserID or from an IPAddress (accumulated or in a 
given timespan) 
F2 #SimultaneousSQLSessions The number of active simultaneous database connections on 
behalf of a UserID or IPAddress 
F3 #UnauthorizedAccessAttempts The number of consecutive requests to execute 
unauthorized actions (e.g. requesting to modify read-only 
data, or query data that he does not have access privileges) 
from a UserID or IPAddress 
SQL Command-based features 
F4 CPUTime CPU time spent by the DBMS to process each command 
F5 ResponseSize Size (in bytes) of the result of the command’s execution 
F6 #ResponseLines Number of lines and columns in the result of the 
command’s execution 
F7 #ResponseColumns Number of columns in the result of the command’s 
execution 
F8  #ProcessedRows Number of accessed rows for processing the command’s 
execution 
F9 #ProcessedColumns Number of accessed columns for processing the command’s 
execution 
F10 CommandLength Number of characters in the command 
F11 #GroupBy Number of GROUP BY columns in the command 
F12 #Union Number of UNION clauses in the command 
F13…F17 #Sum, #Max, #Min, #Avg, 
#Count 
Number of appearances of SUM, MAX, MIN, AVG and 
COUNT functions in the command 
F18, F19 #And , #Or Number of appearances of AND and OR operators in the 
command’s WHERE clause(s) 
F20 #LiteralValues Number of appearances of literal values in the command’s 
WHERE clause(s) 
Session-based features 
F21…F27 #Select, #Insert, #Delete, 
#Update, #Create, #Alter, 
#Drop 
Number of executed SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, 
UPDATE, CREATE, ALTER, and DROP commands per 
session 
F28 #Insert-Select Number of executed INSERT commands that used 
SELECT commands for inserting or building datasets, per 
session 
F29 #Create-Select Number of executed CREATE commands that used 
SELECT commands for inserting or building datasets, per 
session 
F30 TimeBetwCommands Time period (in seconds) between execution of commands, 
per session 
F31 #SimultaneousCommands Number of commands simultaneously executing, per 
session 
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Table 6-2. SQL Intrusion Detection Features (continued) 
F# FeatureName Description 
Table-based features 
F32 #ProcessedRows Number of accessed rows per table 
F33 #ProcessedColumns Number of accessed columns per table 
F34...F38 #Sum, #Max, #Min, #Avg, 
#Count 
Nr. of appearances of SUM, MAX, MIN, AVG and 
COUNT functions executed per table 
F39…F42 #Select, #Insert, #Delete, 
#Update 
Number of executed SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, and 
UPDATE commands per table 
Column-based features 
F43 #GroupBy Number of issued GROUP BY clauses per column 
F44…F48 #Sum, #Max, #Min, #Avg, 
#Count 
Nr. of SUM, MAX, MIN, AVG and COUNT functions 
executed per column 
F49, F50 #Select, #Update Number of executed SELECT, and UPDATE commands 
per column 
As can be observed in Table 6-2, the features are divided into five main 
groupings: user-based, command-based, session-based, table-based and 
column-based. This allows testing features by applying different levels of 
grouping (per user / per user session / per SQL command / per table / per 
column) as roll-up and drill-down techniques, widening the detection 
scope and coverage of user behavior variability. 
Table 6-3 shows the coverage of the intrusion detection features defined in 
Table 6-2 against the intrusion action classes described in Table 6-1. Given 
the diverse types of intrusion detection techniques discussed in Chapter 2, 
the set of proposed features presented in our approach manages to cover 
an extremely broad scope of possible forms of intrusion detection. For 
example, features F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F30, F31 are commonly used in intrusion 
detection systems that inspect network traffic; F6, F8…F29, F34…F50 are 
widely used for SQL command analysis; F4, F5, F6, F13…F17, F34…F38, F44…F48 
are used in statistical intrusion detection systems; F4, F21…F27, F30, F31, 
F39…F42, F49, F50 are used for sequence analysis;  F6…F9, F11, F12, F21…F29, F32, 
F33, F39…F43, F49, F50 focus on the accessed data and are used in intrusion 
detection systems for data access pattern analysis; and features F4…F7, 
F30…F33 are used in intrusion detection systems that analyze the action’s 
resulting dataset.  
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Table 6-3. SQL Intrusion Detection Features Coverage per Intrusion Action Class 
SQL Action 
Class 
Intrusion Detection Features 
A F1, F2, F3, F8, F9, F10, F12, F18, F19, F20, F30, F31, F32, F33, F49 
B F2, F3, F8, F9, F18, F19, F20, F30, F31, F32, F33, F49 
C 
F3, F8, F9, F10, F18, F19, F20, F22, F23, F24, F25, F26, F27, F28, F30, F31, F32, F33, F40, F41, F42, 
F50 
D 
F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F12, F18, F19, F20, F21, F22, F25, F26, F28, F29, F30, F31, F32, 
F33, F39, F49 
E 
F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15, F16, F17, F18, F19, F20, F21, F22, F25, 
F26, F28, F29, F30, F31, F32, F33, F34, F35, F36, F37, F38, F39, F43, F44, F45, F46, F47, F48, F49 
F 
F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15, F16, F17, F18, F19, F20, F21, F22, F25, 
F26, F28, F29, F30, F31, F32, F33, F34, F35, F36, F37, F38, F39, F43, F44, F45, F46, F47, F48, F49 
G 
F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F18, F19, F20, F21, F22, F28, F29, F30, F31, F32, F33, 
F39, F40, F43, F49 
H F2, F3, F4, F8, F9, F10, F18, F19, F20, F22, F28, F29, F30, F31, F32, F33, F39, F40, F49 
I F2, F3, F4, F8, F9, F10, F18, F19, F20, F24, F26, F30, F31, F32, F33, F42, F50 
J F2, F3, F4, F8, F10, F18, F19, F20, F23, F27, F30, F31, F32, F41 
 
6.2. DW-DIDS Architecture 
The Data Warehouse Database Intrusion Detection System’s (DW-DIDS) 
architecture is shown in Figure 6-1. The DataBase Administrator (DBA) is the 
person in charge of managing the DW Database(s), namely managing all 
database objects such as datafiles, tablespaces, tables, indexes, views, etc. 
The Authorized End User is a regular authorized DW end user that is 
interested in querying data for decision support purposes or an ETL tool. 
The Intruder represents the attackers as defined in the previous section. 
The DW Security Administrator is responsible for handling the DW-DIDS 
through the Security Manager Interface by managing the contents of the DW-
DIDS Database (which is a part of the Security Framework Database, as 
explained in Chapter 3). This database contains: 
 A historical SQL command log for storing all commands requested 
to be executed by the DBMS; 
 The individual user feature profiles and respective statistical models; 
 A historical alert log for storing and monitoring all generated alerts; 
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 A rule-base dataset containing the rules for computing risk exposure 
and indicating how to deal with intrusions according to each 
generated alert (the syntax of the risk exposure rules will be 
explained further in Section 6.5). 
The generated alerts stored in the alert log are also manually confirmed as 
true or false positive outcomes by the DW Security Administrator, after their 
veracity have been checked out. The true and false positive outcomes are 
used to fine-tune each feature’s contribution in the overall intrusion 
detection process, as explained further in Subsection 6.5.4. 
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Figure 6-1. DW-DIDS Architecture 
In our approach, intrusion detection is handled at the SQL command level 
in two moments:  
1) when the DBMS receives a command to execute, that command is 
analyzed before it is executed (step 2);  
2)  after its execution is completed (if the command is not considered an 
intrusion in step 2), its response and the data that was processed is 
also analyzed before being returned to the user which requested the 
execution (step 10).  
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The sequence of steps is labeled in Figure 6-1. In practice, before executing 
any command, the Command Parser retrieves the command text and 
starting date/time, as well as user identification (User type, UserID, 
IPAddress, SessionID), parses the command according to the intrusion 
detection features and passes all the information to the Command Analyzer 
(step 3). The Command Analyzer stores this information in the SQL Command 
Log and retrieves the respective user features’ statistical models (step 4), 
and applies the intrusion detection algorithms (explained in the next 
subsections) to determine if an alert should be generated concerning the 
analyzed command. The information referring the parsed user command 
and its outcome results from the intrusion detection tests is then passed on 
to the Intrusion Response Manager (IRM) (step 5). 
When the IRM receives indication that an alarm should be generated, it 
retrieves the probability, impact and risk exposure rule set from the DW-
DIDS Database (step 6), evaluates the intrusion’s risk exposure and stores 
the data concerning the alert and the features which generated it in the 
database (for future reference), and notifies the DW Security Administrator 
through the Security Manager Interface (step 7). Moreover, it also takes the 
suitable actions for dealing with the possible intrusion through the DBMS, 
accordingly to what is defined by the risk exposure rules. The IRM takes 
action against intrusions by suspending or killing its execution, or killing 
the user session, either automatically or on request of the DW Security 
Administrator after s/he has seen the alert information and decided what 
action should be taken. 
If the command is not considered an intrusion a priori to its execution, i.e., 
if no alarm is generated after analyzing the command, DW-DIDS will 
simply update each feature’s statistical model for the corresponding user 
in the DW-DIDS Database and notify the DBMS to execute the command. 
In this case, after its execution, the resulting dataset and the data that was 
processed is parsed by the Response Parser and analyzed by the Response 
Analyzer (in a similar way as the applied by the Command Parser to the user 
command) (steps 10 to 13).  
If the Response Analyzer does not request to generate an alarm against the 
command’s resulting dataset, i.e., if it is not considered an intrusion, then 
each feature’s statistical models for the concerning user is updated once 
more in the DW-DIDS Database and the command’s results are disclosed 
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back to the user that requested them. On the other hand, if the IRM receives 
indication that an intrusion alert should be generated, then it takes action 
similarly to what was previously described for steps 6 and 7. 
6.3. Learning Phase: Building User Behavior Profiles 
Our user profiling approach is based on adjusting a probabilistic 
distribution for each ID feature { F1, …, F50 } (as shown in Table 6-2) per 
user, except F1 and F3 (which use absolute values), from observations 
(feature values) extracted in an initial training (alias learning) stage. To 
obtain those observations, we assume the existence of a previous 
“intrusion-free” database command log or a set of queries supplied by the 
DW administrator, which also identify the user that issued each command.  
To build the user profiles, each SQL user command in that log or set of 
queries is parsed and executed against the DW to extract the required 
information, i.e., the observations from the command itself, those referring 
to the data processed by the command, and the resulting dataset, for 
building each feature’s statistical distribution per user. The workflow of 
this training stage is shown in Figure 6-2, where the continuous lines show 
the flow a priori to the user command’s execution and the dashed lines 
indicate the flow a posteriori.  
Statistical adjustment tests are performed in order to obtain each 
population’s distribution model at a level of 5% significance using Qui-
square (which is valid for any distribution), Kolmogorov-Smirnov (which 
is valid for a continuous distribution) or Shapiro-Wilks (valid for normal 
distributions) to verify if each set of observations comes from a population 
with a given distribution function F0, specified on the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 6-2. DW-DIDS Learning Stage Workflow for each SQL User Command 
6.4. Detection Phase: Intrusion Detection against User Commands 
The testing phase workflow for performing intrusion detection is shown in 
Figure 6-3, where continuous lines show the flow a priori to the user 
command’s execution and the dashed lines indicate the flow a posteriori. To 
detect an intrusion, each user command is analyzed before it is executed 
by the DBMS. A statistical test is performed for each feature given its 
original statistical model for the respective user and a new sample set built 
by gathering the existent observations with the current respective user 
session sample set for that feature. New statistical tests are performed to 
adjust a new probability distribution to the former data collection. 
Afterwards, we test if the new distribution matches the original 
distribution of the feature (Ho).  
The Chi-square, Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Shapiro-Wilk statistical tests, 
mentioned in the previous subsection, are always used as the testing 
methods in all cases, all performed at a level of 5% significance. These 
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methods test whether one distribution (e.g. one data set) is significantly 
different from another (e.g. a normal distribution) and produce a binary 
answer, corresponding to yes or no. We use the Shapiro-Wilk test if the 
sample size is small (between 3 and 2000) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test if the sample size is big (greater than 2000). The Chi-square test is used 
to verify if a data sample came from a population with a specific 
distribution.  
If no test in this first phase (i.e., a priori to the user command’s execution by 
the DBMS) rejects H0, then the DBMS is notified to run the command. After 
the command has been processed, feature value extraction is performed on 
the resulting dataset and the processed data and the corresponding 
statistical tests are executed in a similar fashion as described in the 
previous paragraph. In any testing phase, for each feature’s test result that 
rejects the distribution’s equality (Ho) in any moment, the respective user 
action is considered an intrusion and an alarm is generated. 
For features F1 and F3 a different approach is chosen, considering the 
following: in systems such as ATM, banking, e-governance, and most web 
applications, for instance, the number of allowed consecutive unsuccessful 
login attempts is typically three (which is the most used option) to five 
(usually the maximum number of allowed consecutive unsuccessful 
attempts). It is considered common to accept two consecutive unsuccessful 
attempts followed by a successful attempt as a non-intrusion, while more 
consecutive unsuccessful attempts indicate a possible intrusion tentative 
or a true user that has forgotten his/her login information. Thus, DW-DIDS 
considers an intrusion more than two consecutive failed login attempts 
(F1>2) on behalf of a given user/IP address and generates the correspondent 
alert. 
In a similar fashion, a situation where a user that manages to login and tries 
to view or process data to which s/he does not have or is not supposed to 
access may also match an intrusion action. Therefore, two consecutive 
attempts from a given user/IP address for accessing unauthorized data or 
for executing an unauthorized command (e.g. an INSERT, UPDATE, 
DROP, etc., by a DW End User, which has only SELECT statement 
privileges) (F3>=2) is also considered an intrusion by DW-DIDS, generating 
the correspondent alert. 
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Figure 6-3. DW-DIDS Intrusion Test/Detection Stage Workflow for each SQL User Command 
6.5. Alert and Response Management 
For each user action that flags an alert, the Intrusion Response Manager (IRM) 
evaluates the potential damage the action may cause to the enterprise, 
assessing the action’s risk exposure according to the feature(s) that 
generated the alert. After computing that risk exposure measure, it notifies 
the DW Security Administrator about the alert and adequately responds to 
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the intrusion accordingly with the defined risk exposure rule. In this 
section we define risk exposure and explain how this measure is computed 
in order to rank the alerts and take action against the attack. We also show 
how to calibrate the contribution of each intrusion detection feature in the 
overall intrusion detection process. 
6.5.1. Defining the Risk Exposure  
Many DIDS evaluate what data is accessed, while others focus on how data 
is accessed. Both assess the probability of a given user action being 
suspicious to classify that particular action or set of actions to which it 
belongs as an intrusion; when that probability exceeds a predefined 
threshold, an alert is generated. As we have previously mentioned, any 
thresholds used to filter out intrusion alerts given their probability should 
be defined with low values that minimize the risk of false negatives, i.e., to 
minimize the number of true intrusions that pass undetected. Given the 
sensitivity of DW data, it is preferable to have low thresholds, as the 
potential cost of undetection is often considered too high or unacceptable.  
However, this exponentially increases the number of generated alerts in 
most scenarios, making alert management one of the most critical issues in 
intrusion detection scenarios. 
To improve the efficiency of intrusion detection systems when the number 
of generated alerts is extremely high, alert correlation techniques such as 
[Debar and Wespi, 2001; Ning et al., 2002; Pietraszek, 2004; Pietraszek and 
Tanner, 2005; Valdes and Skinner, 2001; Yu et al., 2007] have been 
proposed. These techniques typically filter sets of alerts to distinguish 
which are worthy of being checked from those that are more probably false 
alarms. However, we argue that alert correlation on itself is not the best 
way to determine which alerts should be checked and in which order of 
priority. 
Since the value of DWs resides on the fact that they store the secrets of the 
business, the impact resulting from an intrusion on the enterprise is 
intimately linked with what data was exposed or corrupted. When using 
alert correlation techniques, there can be an alert that has been positively 
correlated for checking but has a low potential impact on the enterprise 
(e.g. the exposed or damaged data is not very sensitive), while an alert 
referring a true intrusion with high impact can be filtered out if it has a low 
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correlation value. Moreover, not evaluating the potential impact of the 
intrusion means that security staff do not know which alerts are more 
important, implying that resources may be wasted in checking intrusion 
alerts referring to actions that would cause minimal damage to the 
enterprise, while a highly prejudicial intrusion occurs and is left to be dealt 
with later on. 
To avoid this, we propose considering all alerts admissible and apply a 
method for ranking them, given a measure of risk exposure. Given a user 
action, risk exposure is a function of both the probability that the action has 
of referring an intrusion and the impact that it may produce, i.e., the 
potential magnitude of the cost to the enterprise related with the damage 
or disclosure of the data targeted by the action. The computation of the risk 
exposure of each alert is done according to the matrix shown in Figure 6-4, 
given its measured probability and impact.  
 
Figure 6-4. The risk exposure matrix 
The risk exposure method assures that all generated alerts will be ranked 
and automatically inform security staff to check out and deal with the most 
significant intrusions (given alerts with higher risk exposure) prior to 
possible intrusions that might potentially produce less damage, thus 
performing alert management more efficiently.  
To determine which actions are taken as a response for each alert given its 
risk exposure assessment, the DW Security Administrator should define 
rules with the following syntax (where the values enclosed in {} represent 
sets of values to choose from and those in [] are optional clauses): 
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    GIVEN RISK EXPOSURE AS {VeryLow, Low, High, VeryHigh,   
                            Critical} 
       ON FEATURE {FeatureName1, FeatureName2, ...},  
                  [AllFeatures] 
   [WHERE {List of filtering conditions}] 
    [WHEN {List of time-based conditions}] 
     TAKE ACTION {DoNothing, PauseUserCommand,  
                  TerminateUserCommand, KillUserSession} 
      FOR USERS {User1, User2, ...} [, [AllUsers,] 
          USERS WITH ROLE {Role1, Role2, ...} 
This SQL-like rule covers all user action classes and dimensions mentioned 
in Section 6.1. The FOR USERS, WHEN and WHERE clauses allow 
conditioning the application of the intrusion response actions defined in 
the TAKE ACTION clause, according to the specified features included in 
the ON FEATURE clause to which the generated alert refers. The FOR 
USERS clause allows the rule to be applied only to a limited subset of users, 
the WHEN clause allows the rule to be valid only during a given time 
schedule, and the WHERE clause allows the rule to be valid only given 
certain conditions using feature weight values – feature weighting is 
explained in the next subsection. 
As an example of defining risk exposure rules, consider feature 
#ConsecFailedLoginAttempts from Table 6-2. Supposing the DW Security 
Administrator wants to be alerted each time an alert is risen by this feature 
and defines that High and Very High risk exposure assessments for this 
feature should terminate the respective user commands, while a Low 
assessment should suspend the user command until the administrator 
checks if everything is alright, for all users. This is accomplished by: 
GIVEN RISK EXPOSURE AS Low 
   ON FEATURE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts 
 TAKE ACTION PauseUserCommand 
  FOR USERS AllUsers 
GIVEN RISK EXPOSURE AS VeryHigh, High 
   ON FEATURE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts  
 TAKE ACTION TerminateUserCommand 
  FOR USERS AllUsers 
As another example, if all users requesting to execute any command that 
generates critical alerts – regardless of the feature that generated them – 
should immediately be banned, the following rule can be defined: 
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GIVEN RISK EXPOSURE AS Critical 
   ON FEATURE AllFeatures 
 TAKE ACTION TerminateUserCommand, KillUserSession 
  FOR USERS AllUsers 
On the other hand, considering that all the command that generate alerts 
which present a Very Low risk exposure measure can be executed normally, 
although the Security Manager Interface still displays the alert to the DW 
Security Administrator so they can be checked out, the following rule can be 
defined: 
GIVEN RISK EXPOSURE AS VeryLow 
   ON FEATURE AllFeatures 
 TAKE ACTION DoNothing 
  FOR USERS AllUsers 
6.5.2. Defining the Probability 
DW-DIDS defines the probability of each intrusion alert with rules, given 
the feature that generated the alert. In a similar manner to the risk exposure 
rules, these rules have the following syntax: 
DEFINE PROBABILITY AS {VeryLow, Low, High, VeryHigh} 
    ON FEATURE {FeatureName1, FeatureName2, ...}, 
               [AllFeatures] 
[WHERE {List of filtering conditions}] 
 [WHEN {List of time-based conditions}] 
   FOR USERS {User1, User2, ...}, [AllUsers,] 
       USERS WITH ROLE {Role1, Role2, ...} 
It is quite obvious that, depending on each DW’s context, each feature has 
its own importance in the overall intrusion detection process, which is 
directly related to its risk probability, i.e., its efficiency in producing high 
true positive rates (detection of a high amount of true intrusions) and low 
false positive rates (small amounts of false alarms). To define this 
importance, each feature has a weight attributed to it, which is a real value 
within the range [0…1]. Using the probability rule syntax, we propose that 
the risk probability of each feature Fi should have a significance directly 
linked to its weight, as: 
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DEFINE PROBABILITY AS VeryLow  
    ON FEATURE Fi WHERE Weight(Fi)<0.25 
   FOR AllUsers 
DEFINE PROBABILITY AS Low  
    ON FEATURE Fi WHERE Weight(Fi)>=0.25 AND Weight(Fi)<0.50 
   FOR AllUsers 
DEFINE PROBABILITY AS High  
    ON FEATURE Fi WHERE Weight(Fi)>=0.50 AND Weight(Fi)<0.75 
   FOR AllUsers 
DEFINE PROBABILITY AS VeryHigh  
    ON FEATURE Fi WHERE Weight(Fi)>=0.75 
   FOR AllUsers 
After the learning phase in which all user profiles are built and DW-DIDS 
runs for the first time to detect and respond to intrusions, we suggest 
giving an equal weight of 0.5 to all features (Weight(Fi)=0.5), since it is 
not possible to know a priori which features will reveal to be more 
significant in the intrusion detection process. However, after the DW 
security staff checks each generated intrusion alert, the value of each 
feature’s weight is calibrated by its revealed efficiency. This weight 
calibration technique is explained in Subsection 6.5.4. 
For the fixed value features F1 and F3 we use predefined constants for 
defining the probability rule. For example, in banking and e-governance 
applications the number of consecutive unsuccessful login attempts that 
are allowed typically ranges from three to five. As mentioned before, it is 
common to accept that two consecutive unsuccessful login attempts 
followed by a successful attempt as a non-intrusion, while more 
consecutive unsuccessful tries indicate a possible intrusion attempt. Given 
this, the probability of an intrusion given the number of consecutive failed 
login attempts can be defined as: 
DEFINE PROBABILITY AS VeryLow  
    ON FEATURE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts  
 WHERE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts<=2 
   FOR AllUsers 
DEFINE PROBABILITY AS Low  
    ON FEATURE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts  
 WHERE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts=3 
   FOR AllUsers 
DEFINE PROBABILITY AS High  
    ON FEATURE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts  
 WHERE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts=4 
   FOR AllUsers 
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DEFINE PROBABILITY AS VeryHigh  
    ON FEATURE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts  
 WHERE #ConsecFailedLoginAttempts>=5 
   FOR AllUsers 
Note that this is only an example and that although the statistical features 
have a proposed predefined set of rules given their computed 
importance/weight in the overall intrusion detection process, the DW 
Security Administrator can define new rules to widen the probability scope 
(in the same way s/he can add new features). To give an example on using 
temporal conditioning on any feature, consider a context in which no user 
is expected to access the DW between 8p.m. and 7a.m. on the server time 
clock. This may be defined in a rule as: 
DEFINE PROBABILITY AS VeryHigh  
    ON FEATURE #ProcessedRows, CommandLength  
 WHERE (Server.Time>20:00 OR Server.Time<7:00) AND 
       (#ProcessedRows>0 OR CommandLength>0) 
      FOR AllUsers 
Given the wide scope allowed by the defined rules, there may be more than 
one type of probability assessed when checking the rules that concern a 
generated intrusion alert. For instance, the same feature might have a High 
probability given from one of the rules and a VeryHigh probability 
attributed by another rule. In this case, the Intrusion Response Manager 
always chooses to assign the highest value (in this case, VeryHigh). 
6.5.3. Defining the Impact 
The assessment of the impact caused by a user action is also defined by 
rules in a similar fashion as those previously described. This assessment is 
based on which, how much, and when sensitive data can be exposed or 
damaged by the user command, as well as who is the user. The impact for 
the actions ranged by each user’s command is managed by the following 
rules, valid for the list of nominal-based, value-based and/or temporal-
based conditions is defined through rules with the following syntax: 
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DEFINE IMPACT AS VeryLow, Low, High, VeryHigh 
    ON FEATURE {FeatureName1, FeatureName2, ...}, 
       [AllFeatures] 
   [ON COMMAND Insert, Update, Delete, Select, 
               CreateAll, DropAll, AlterAll,  
               CreateTable, DropTable, AlterTable, 
               CreateIndex, DropIndex, AlterIndex, 
               CreateProcedure, DropProcedure,  
               AlterProcedure, CreateFunction,  
               DropFunction, AlterFunction, 
               CreateView, DropView, AlterView, 
               CreateTrigger, DropTrigger,  
               AlterTrigger, AllCommands, DML, DDL] 
 [WITH COLUMNS {Column1, Column2, ...}, [AllColumns]] 
[WHERE {List of filtering conditions}] 
 [WHEN {List of time-based conditions}] 
[JOINED WITH {Column1, Column2, ...}, [AllColumns]] 
   FOR USERS {User1, User2, ...}, [AllUsers,] 
       USERS WITH ROLE {Role1, Role2, ...} 
This impact assessment is left entirely to the DW Security Administrator, as 
it depends on the nature and structure of each DW itself and is mostly 
unique in each real-world context. The clauses are used in a similar manner 
to those in the probability rules, plus the clause that allows distinguishing 
which is the user command (ON COMMAND), which columns are 
processed (WITH COLUMNS), and the clause defining the impact of two 
or more columns being processed or shown together by the same 
command (JOINED WITH COLUMNS).  
As an example, suppose that a credit sales DW has a Sales fact table with 
column SalesAmount, storing the total amount value of each sale. It is 
probable that a command that retrieves a single row or two of SalesAmount 
values from the fact table probably represents low exposure risk for the 
enterprise in case of an intrusion, while that risk may probably be very 
high if the number of retrieved rows is higher (e.g. greater than 20). This 
can be defined by the following rules: 
DEFINE IMPACT AS Low  
    ON FEATURE #ProcessedRows 
    ON COMMAND Select  
  WITH COLUMNS Sales.SalesAmount 
 WHERE COUNT(*)<=2 FOR USERS AllUsers 
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DEFINE IMPACT AS VeryHigh  
    ON FEATURE #ProcessedRows 
    ON COMMAND Select  
  WITH COLUMNS Sales.SalesAmount 
    WHERE COUNT(*)>=20 FOR USERS AllUsers 
6.5.4. Calibrating Feature Weight 
The efficiency of intrusion detection mechanisms is typically analyzed 
recurring to several measures [Kamra et al., 2008; Kamra, 2010]: 
 True Positive (TP): an alert referring to a true intrusion; 
 False Positive (FP): an alert which reveals a false alarm; 
 True Negative (TN): a user action that is correctly classified as a non-
intrusion by the ID process; 
 False Negative (FN): an intrusion action that is misclassified by the ID 
process as a non-intrusion (i.e., resulting in a missed intrusion). 
The importance of each feature in DW-DIDS is computed by a self-
calibrating technique, using its individual ∑TP and ∑FP values. For each 
feature Fi, its weight is given by: 
Weight (Fi) = 0.5 + 
(
∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 − ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖
∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖+ ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖
)
2
 , ∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 > 0 ∨  ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖 > 0 
where ∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 and ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖 respectively represent the total number of true 
positives and false positives achieved by all the alerts generated by feature 
Fi. In our approach we assume a priori that each statistical feature initially 
has the same relevance. When DW-DIDS runs for the first time (and until 
the first alert generated by Fi, which allows computing TPi and FPi), each 
feature’s weight is set to an initial value of 0.50, as previously explained in 
Subsection 6.5.2. This value represents a neutral value in the formula, 
where the number of alerts generated by the feature refers to a true 
intrusion are the same as the number of alerts referring to false alarms: 
∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 =  ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖      (
∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 − ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖
∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖+ ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖
) = 0      Weight (Fi) = 0.5 + 
0
2
  = 0.5         
Every time an intrusion alert is generated, it needs to be checked a posteriori 
by the DW Security Administrator and then its status (true positive or false 
positive) is stored in the DW-DIDS Database. Each feature’s weight linked 
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to that alert is then updated accordingly to the calibration weight formula. 
In case ∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 >  ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖 , the second term of the sum is positive, which makes 
the feature’s weight higher than 0.5. Contrarily, when ∑ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 <  ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝑖 the 
second term of the sum is negative, which makes the feature’s weight 
lower than 0.5, implying it erroneously alerts intrusions more than it 
accurately does. As the values of TPi or FPi grow, the computed weight will 
also respectively get higher or lower, meaning that as the values of TPi and 
FPi vary through time the computed weight will faithfully reflect the 
feature’s intrusion detection probability. 
6.6. Experimental Evaluation 
Given the inexistence of an intrusion detection benchmark at the SQL 
command level, we used the well-known TPC-H decision support 
benchmark [TPC-H] to build the “true” non-intrusion workloads and a set 
of diverse artificially created “intrusion” workloads in the experiments.  
For the “true” DW users, the respective workloads were taken from the 
TPC-H benchmark due to its representativeness of typical DW workloads, 
and defined according to the following assumptions: 
 A number of randomly chosen TPC-H benchmark queries were 
selected for each user’s workload, i.e., each user has different queries 
to execute, as well as a different number of queries to execute; 
 Within the queries for each workload, several were randomly picked 
for modifying the benchmark’s fixed parameters (namely in their 
WHERE clause) by randomly changing their values to obtain a larger 
scope of diverse user actions from the benchmark queries; 
 A number of randomly built queries (by randomly picking a set of 
tables, columns, functions to execute, grouping and sorting, and 
literal restrictions for columns in the WHERE clauses) were also 
generated for each workload, representing the ad hoc user queries in 
DW environments; 
 The proportion of TPC-H and randomly built queries used in each 
workload is respectively 80% and 20% (on average), representing the 
typical reporting behavior in DW’s as the majority of the running 
tasks, while ad hoc queries are simulated by the random queries, in 
smaller number. 
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Given that TPC-H has 23 predefined queries, the composed workload for 
each “true” user is shown in Table 6-4 for a setup consisting of 10 users, 
where O means that we are using the original TPC-H query, and M stands 
for a TPC-H query with modified parameters, as explained previously. 
 
Table 6-4. “Non-Intrusion” True User Workloads (TUW) 
 Users 
Queries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
TPC-H Q1 O O   M   M O  
TPC-H Q2  M O   O    O 
TPC-H Q3 M    O  O M O  
TPC-H Q4  O M   M   M O 
TPC-H Q5    M O  M    
TPC-H Q6 O M      O  M 
TPC-H Q7   M O  O   M  
TPC-H Q8 M O     M   O 
TPC-H Q9   M O  M  O   
TPC-H Q10  O   M  O  O  
TPC-H Q11 O    M     M 
TPC-H Q12 M  O   O M O   
TPC-H Q13  O   M    M  
TPC-H Q14   O M      O 
TPC-H Q15 M M    O O    
TPC-H Q16 O  M     M O  
TPC-H Q17  O   M  O   M 
TPC-H Q18  M   O O M  M  
TPC-H Q19 M    O M  O   
TPC-H Q20  O   M  O  M M 
TPC-H Q21 O    M M  M  O 
TPC-H Q22  M   O      
TPC-H Q23   O M  M  O  O 
Nr. of Random Queries 2 3 1 5 3 2 5 1 2 2 
To build each “intruder” workload, we generated a random number of 
actions for each intrusion action type defined in Section 6.1 and executed 
them in a random order. The types of intrusion actions cover a wide range 
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of attacks against the database, accordingly with the DW attack actions and 
classes formerly described in Section 6.1, as follows: 
 Inserting a random amount of rows; 
 Changing a random amount of rows and columns; 
 Deleting a random amount of rows and columns; 
 Selecting a random amount of columns from a random number of 
tables, without range value restrictions (1); 
 Selecting a random amount of columns with a random amount of 
functions (MAX, SUM, etc.) from a random number of tables, 
without range value restrictions (2); 
 Selecting a random amount of columns from a random number of 
tables with a random amount of grouping columns, without range 
value restrictions (3); 
 Selecting a random amount of columns with a random amount of 
functions (MAX, SUM, etc.) from a random number of tables with a 
random amount of grouping columns, without range value 
restrictions (4); 
 Similar to (1), with range value restrictions; 
 Similar to (2), with range value restrictions; 
 Similar to (3), with range value restrictions; 
 Similar to (4), with range value restrictions; 
 Union queries with a random number of columns and tables; 
 Query flooding; 
 Unauthorized DW end user actions (create, drop, etc). 
For comparison with other DIDS, we repeated the experiments using the 
fine-grained Role-Based access control DIDS (RB-DIDS) solution proposed 
in [Kamra et al., 2008] and the clustered Data-Centered DIDS (DC-DIDS) 
proposed in [Mathew et al., 2010]. Both these solutions are explained in 
Chapter 2. The machine used in these experiments was the same used for 
the experiments presented in Chapter 5, with a Core2Duo 3GHz CPU and 
2GB of RAM, using Oracle 11g as the DBMS. 
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DC-DIDS was implemented accordingly to the referred paper, using K-
means clustering [Mathew et al., 2010]. In their paper [Kamra et al., 2008], 
the authors of RB-DIDS define vectors named quiplets that store 
information on the columns used in the WHERE selection clause as well as 
the accessed tables and columns to be displayed included in the SELECT 
projection clause. They also propose three types of granularity (coarse, 
medium-grain and fine-grained quiplets) for building the user profiles. For 
fairness, we include the results from the implementation using the 
medium-coarse quiplet, which obtained the best results in our tests, using 
K-means clustering with 10 iterations and the statistical Median Absolute 
Deviation (MAD) test for the detection process. 
For our testing scenario, we consider that the most sensitive data relates to 
the most recent data. Since TPC-H has approximately seven years of 
business data, the implementation of DW-DIDS defined the data from the 
most recent year to have very high impact due to intrusion actions, the data 
from the two previous years as high impact, the data from the two years 
before that as low impact and the remaining as having very low impact. Of 
course, this is not a real scenario, but we consider it to be a sufficiently 
realistic setup to test our approach. As we previously explained, the 
definition of impact on the data is directly related to the sensitivity of the 
data values themselves, which varies from case to case. This is why this 
assessment should be done by the DW Security Administrator according to 
the specific business context. 
Four user scenarios were considered for testing, with a total of 10 users in 
each scenario. Scenario 10-0 specifies a setup without any intruder activity, 
i.e., there is no “intruder” workload running, while in scenarios 9-1, 8-2 and 
5-5 there are respectively one, two and five “intruders” amongst the 10 
users.  
6.6.1. Building User Profiles 
Each user profile is comprised by the set of statistical models (one per 
feature) that refer to his/her workloads. To build the statistical models for 
each feature of each “true” user, we used 5, 25, 50 and 100 executions of the 
“True” Users’ Workloads (TUW) previously shown in Table 6-4. The data 
and user workload in the learning phases are considered intrusion-free and 
representative of normal usage because they are built and run “as defined” 
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in the TPC-H benchmark. We shall now analyze the time and resources 
required to build these profiles. 
Table 6-5 shows the required storage space (in kilobytes) for building the 
user profiles. As can be seen, the smallest user profile database was built 
from 305 SQL commands, referring to the 5-5 Scenario with the execution 
of 5 TUW workloads, while the largest user profile database, referring to 
Scenario 10-0 with the execution of 100 TUW workloads, which contains a 
set of 12000 SQL queries. 
As shown in Table 6-5 in the largest setup, RBAC-DIDS, DC-DIDS and 
DW-DIDS respectively needed nearly 234 KB, 1031 KB and 2767 KB of 
storage space, corresponding to an average of 20, 88 and 236 bytes of data 
per SQL command. Given that the storage space typically required by DWs 
ranges through many gigabtyes or terabtyes, we may conclude that the 
measured sizes for the user profiles can be considered insignificant. 
Table 6-5. Required Storage Space for building User Profiles 
Scenario # Executions 
# TUW SQL 
Commands 
Required Storage Space (Kbytes) 
RBAC-DIDS DC-DIDS DW-DIDS 
10-0 
5 600 11.7 51.6 138.3 
25 3000 58.6 257.8 691.7 
50 6000 117.2 515.6 1383.4 
100 12000 234.4 1031.3 2766.8 
9-1 
5 540 10.5 46.4 124.5 
25 2700 52.7 232.0 622.5 
50 5400 105.5 464.1 1245.1 
100 10800 210.9 928.1 2490.1 
8-2 
5 485 9.5 41.7 111.8 
25 2425 47.4 208.4 559.1 
50 4850 94.7 416.8 1118.1 
100 9700 189.5 833.6 2236.3 
5-5 
5 305 6.0 26.2 71.4 
25 1525 29.8 131.1 356.8 
50 3050 59.6 262.1 713.7 
100 6100 119.1 524.2 1427.3 
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In what concerns the time spent in building the user profiles, the measured 
costs can also be deemed insignificant when compared with the typical 
response time of long running queries, intrinsic characteristics of user 
actions in DW environments. For building all the user profiles, RBAC-
DIDS took less than 1 minute, DC-DIDS took approximately 4 minutes and 
DW-DIDS nearly 6 minutes. 
6.6.2. Intrusion Detection Efficiency 
The complete “true” user and intruder workload of the testing (intrusion 
detection) phase for each scenario is shown in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6. Workload Quantification for each User Scenario 
Scenario # “True” Queries # Attack Queries 
10-0 1250 0 
9-1 1130 100 
8-2 1020 200 
5-5 660 500 
Based on the previously mentioned TP, TN, FP and FN measures, derived 
calculations are commonly used to measure the efficiency of intrusion 
detection mechanisms, such as [Kamra et al., 2008; Kamra, 2010]: 
 TP Rate (TPR) =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 
 FP Rate (FPR) =  
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁
 
 Accuracy =  
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑁
 
 Precision =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
 
For the performed experiments, Figures 6-5a to 6-5c respectively show the 
TP Rate (TPR) and FP Rate (FPR) of DW-DIDS, RBAC-DIDS and DC-DIDS 
for each scenario using the user profiles built in the learning stage for each 
TUW training set, and Figures 6-6a to 6-6c show their Accuracy and 
Precision. All results are the average of 10 repeated executions for each 
setup (and there full statistical measures can be seen in Appendix C). 
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Figure 6-5a. DW-DIDS 
TP and FP rates 
Figure 6-5b. RBAC-DIDS 
TP and FP rates 
Figure 6-5c. DC-DIDS 
TP and FP rates 
 
Figure 6-6a. DW-DIDS 
Accuracy (ACC) and 
Precision (PREC) 
Figure 6-6b. RBAC-DIDS 
Accuracy (ACC) and 
Precision (PREC) 
Figure 6-6c. DC-DIDS 
Accuracy (ACC) and 
Precision (PREC) 
As shown in Figures 6-5.a to 6-5.c, the TP rates resulting from the scenarios 
in which the user profiles were built from only 5 TUW executions are 
relatively low for all DIDS (ranging from 52% to 78%), while in those built 
from 25 or more TUW executions the TP rates ranged between 85% and 
94% for DW-DIDS and between 79% and 94% for RB-DIDS, while DC-
DIDS obtains the worst TPR result, ranging between 65% and 72%.  
The observed FP rates are all relatively low for DW-DIDS and RB-DIDS 
(ranging from 1% to 7%) in all scenarios except the 5-5 scenario, where 14% 
to 23% of the alerts result in false alarms for DW-DIDS, 15% to 30% for RB-
DIDS, and 19% to 31% for DC-DIDS. This should be somewhat expected, 
since the 5-5 scenario represents an environment with heavy intrusion 
activity (±50% of the total input workload). This results in a heavy increase 
of alarm generation, and given the high difficulty in distinguishing normal 
from abnormal behavior (as previously described), the probability of 
generating false alarms consequently increases. 
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As seen in Figures 6-6.a to 6-6.c, the accuracy is high in all scenarios except 
5-5, ranging between 90% and 99% for DW-DIDS, between 83% and 99% 
for RB-DIDS, and between 82% and 90% for DC-DIDS. In the 5-5 scenario, 
DW-DIDS maintains the best accuracy results between 72% and 90%, RB-
DIDS between 62% and 89%, and DC-DIDS between 68% and 78%. The 
precision results are considerably high for DW-DIDS in all scenarios, 
ranging from 58% to 83%, variable in RB-DIDS by ranging from 36% to 
83%, and the poorest for DC-DIDS, ranging from 29% to 50%. 
Another commonly used metric to evaluate ID efficiency is the F-score (or 
F-measure) [Kamra et al., 2008; Kamra, 2010]. This measure is preferred by 
many authors to score efficiency, because it scores the balance (as a 
harmonic mean) between Precision and Recall (alias TP rate) in a single 
output: 
 F-score =  
2∗𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛∗𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
Figures 6-7.a to 6-7.c show the F-score results in each scenario for each 
DIDS. It can be seen that DW-DIDS obtains the best results for all scenarios 
and TUW setups, followed by RB-DIDS, while DC-DIDS has the worst 
results in most cases. DW-DIDS and RB-DIDS present very similar results 
for the setups in which the training SQL dataset is fairly significant in size 
(>=25 TUW), although DW-DIDS has always a slight advantage. On the 
other hand, the DC-DIDS presents better results than RB-DIDS when the 
training dataset is small (5 TUW) in the 9-1 and 8-2 scenarios, suggesting 
that in these cases the data-centric analysis produces more efficient results 
than the command-centric analysis. Since DW-DIDS includes analysis on 
both data and command features, this mostly explains why DW-DIDS 
presents better results in all cases. 
 
Figure 6-7a. F-Score for 
the 9-1 Scenario 
Figure 6-7b. F-Score for the 
8-2 Scenario 
Figure 6-7c. F-Score for 
the 5-5 Scenario 
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6.6.3. Analyzing the Generated Alerts per Risk Exposure Measure 
Given that one of the main advantages of ranking the alerts using the risk 
exposure approach is to separate the most urgent alerts that need to be 
checked out from those which represent a lower risk to the enterprise, we 
shall now analyze the generated alerts per risk exposure measure. Tables 
6-7a to 6-7d show the number of generated alerts for each risk exposure 
measure, in each scenario. Recall the previously presented Table 6-6 
referring to the number of “true” SQL instructions versus the number of 
“intrusion” SQL instructions for each scenario (10-0, 9-1, 8-2 and 5-5). 
Table 6-7a. Alerts per Risk Exposure Measure w/ Profiles built from 5 TUW Executions 
 Scenario Very Low Low High Very High Critical 
Total # 
Alerts 
 10-0 11 13 14 12 7 57 
 9-1 27 28 28 30 12 125 
 8-2 41 52 59 42 29 223 
 5-5 88 93 116 111 89 497 
Table 6-7b. Alerts per Risk Exposure Measure w/ Profiles built from 25 TUW Executions 
 Scenario Very Low Low High Very High Critical 
Total # 
Alerts 
 10-0 2 2 3 3 3 13 
 9-1 22 30 31 29 15 127 
 8-2 40 52 57 47 29 225 
 5-5 103 118 139 116 63 539 
Table 6-7c. Alerts per Risk Exposure Measure w/ Profiles built from 50 TUW Executions 
 Scenario Very Low Low High Very High Critical 
Total # 
Alerts 
 10-0 1 2 3 4 2 12 
 9-1 20 30 30 26 17 123 
 8-2 36 50 59 49 31 225 
 5-5 108 123 138 125 69 563 
Table 6-7d. Alerts per Risk Exposure Measure w/ Profiles built from 100 TUW Executions 
 Scenario Very Low Low High Very High Critical 
Total # 
Alerts 
 10-0 1 1 2 4 2 10 
 9-1 22 23 26 35 20 126 
 8-2 34 51 55 54 32 226 
 5-5 109 125 131 136 71 572 
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By observing the previous tables it can be seen that in scenario 10-0, while 
there are no “intrusion” actions, DW-DIDS using profiles built from 25 
TUW raises 19 false alerts (corresponding to 1,5% of user statements), 
while in the remaining setups that amount of false alarms decreases to 1% 
or less, as a result of building more accurate profiles due to having more 
TUW to build it from. 
Figure 6-8 shows the percentage of alerts per risk exposure measure, given 
each scenario and user profile database setup. It can be seen that the most 
relevant alerts (very high and critical) represent approximately one third 
of all alerts, which should be the ones first deserving full attention on 
behalf of the security staff, instead of wasting potentially precious time 
checking the remaining alerts.  
 Scenario 10-0 Scenario 9-1 Scenario 8-2 Scenario 5-5 
5 TUW 
Executions 
 
25 TUW 
Executions 
50 TUW 
Executions 
100 TUW 
Executions 
Figure 6-8. Percentage of Alerts per Risk Exposure Method in each Setup 
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It can be seen that the alerts that are potentially most critical to the 
enterprise (assuming this to be Very High + Critical) are approximately 35-
40% of the total number of alerts in most cases. This gives a measure of 
how many alerts (60-65%) can be left to check subsequently to those that 
are most urgent to check. 
To analyze the efficiency of the risk exposure alert ranking method, we 
recalculated the TPR, FPR, Accuracy, Precision and F-score measures for 
DW-DIDS, considering only the generated alerts referring to attacks that 
fell within the High, Very High and Critical measures, i.e. filtering those 
which present a greater threat to the enterprise. Figures 6-9 to 6-11 show 
these results.  
 
Figure 6-9. DW-DIDS 
TPR and FPR 
considering only High, 
Very High and Critical 
Risk Exposure Alerts 
Figure 6-10. DW-DIDS 
Accuracy and Precision 
considering only High, 
Very High and Critical 
Risk Exposure Alerts 
Figure 6-11. DW-DIDS 
F-Score considering only 
High, Very High and 
Critical Risk Exposure 
Alerts 
Considering Figure 6-9, the TP rate presents nearly the same results as 
when all alerts are considered (Figure 6-5a), but the FP rate is much better 
than the previous, obtaining much fewer false alarms. The measured 
accuracy and precision, shown in Figure 6-10, is very high and also 
significantly better than the previous (Figure 6-6a). In fact, the accuracy for 
the majority of the scenarios in almost 100%, while in many setups the 
precision rises above 90%. Figure 6-11 shows that the overall F-score 
measure translates this, by presenting almost 10% of improvement for each 
scenario considering the previous results shown in Figures 6-7a to 6-7c. 
Conclusively, this allows to state that considering the alerts referring to 
higher risk exposure present higher efficiency results in intrusion 
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detection, thus demonstrating that the risk exposure method is an 
adequate form of defining the priority on which alerts should be checked 
first and consequently reduce intrusion damage.  
6.6.4. Database Response Time Overhead due to Intrusion Detection  
In what concerns the impact on database performance, i.e. the increase of 
query response time, we measured an average overhead for each DIDS in 
each scenario as shown in Figure 6-12.  
 
Figure 6-12. Database Response Time Overhead for each DIDS in each Scenario 
By observing the previous figure, it can be seen that RB-DIDS is the fastest, 
introducing an overhead of equal or lesser than 2% to user query workload 
response time, while DW-DIDS is the slowest, given that it joins data-
centric and command-centric analysis and processes a significantly higher 
amount of data than the remaining DIDS in the intrusion detection process, 
introducing response time overheads ranging from 4% to 11%. However, 
although DW-DIDS does in fact have the worse results, we argue that its 
intrusion detection efficiency shown in the experiments make these 
overheads worthwhile when compared to the remaining solutions. 
6.7. Discussion on DW-DIDS 
In DW-DIDS, all risk exposure, probability and impact rules are stored in 
the DW-DIDS Database and used by the Intrusion Response Manager (IRM) 
as formerly explained. Although probability is initially predefined, each 
rule may be redefined by the DW Security Administrator at any time for fine 
tuning. For instance, the DW Security Administrator may grant a different 
probability to any feature or grant higher or lower weights to specific 
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features that s/he knows are most likely to lead to better or less reliable ID 
rates given the DW’s context. 
The conditional clauses in the DW-DIDS rules (similarly to SQL clauses) 
allow an extremely wide range of definitions that, due to space feasibility 
issues, are not included. We just want to make clear that, besides the 
examples described in the former subsections, the algorithms can be easily 
adapted to cope with a wide range of rule possibilities using standard SQL 
functions with the DW-DIDS features, tables and columns, and the DW’s 
tables and columns, providing a very wide intrusion detection scope 
coverage. 
Using qualitative measures instead of quantitative measures allows 
providing a much more comprehensive rank; it is humanly much more 
intuitive and straightforward to interpret a High or Low measure of 
evaluation than the difference between a value of 0.46 and 0.58, or having 
just a High measure instead of differencing values such as 0.76 and 0.78. 
The qualitative measures smoothen the ranges of the quantitative values, 
providing better understanding to security staff. 
Combining quantitative probability and impact assessments into a unique 
qualitative risk exposure measure also improves the efficiency of alert 
management. For example, if an alert refers to an attack with Low 
probability – probably, a false positive – or refers to an attack with Low 
impact – probably, against non-sensitive data – it can be assessed as having 
Low risk exposure, which means that checking it can be postponed (or the 
intrusion may even be tolerated); if another alert with higher risk exposure 
– and thus, probably capable of causing greater damage – is generated 
simultaneously, it is more significant and quickly dealt with. The 
credibility and assertiveness of these assumptions are demonstrated by the 
experimental results shown in Figures 6-9, 6-10 and 6-11 described in 
Subsection 6.6.3, where the analysis containing the most relevant alerts (i.e. 
High, Very High and Critical risk exposure) shows particularly good 
accuracy, precision and F-score results. 
Figure 6-12 illustrates the alert correlation and risk exposure approaches for 
alert management. Standard alert correlation techniques are a weakness in 
most existing DIDS because they may exclude part of the generated alerts 
and do not consider the impact of the user actions, while our approach 
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considers all the alerts, focusing on their importance rather than solely on 
their probability.  
The alert correlation approach might lead to wasting time dealing with an 
attack on unimportant data while an attack on vital data occurs. With the 
risk exposure alert ranking method proposed in this thesis, it is guaranteed 
that the attacks focusing on the most sensitive data or capable of producing 
more damage to the enterprise can be dealt with first, effectively increasing 
damage containment. Furthermore, while alert correlation may exclude 
some alert that refers to an intrusion potentially capable of producing high 
impact on the enterprise, the risk exposure does not exclude any alert, but 
rather ranks them given their respectively assessed risk measure. 
Intrusion Detector
Alert Correlator
Intrusion Detector
Risk Exposure 
Assessment
Generated
Alerts
Generated
Alerts
Filtered Alerts 
considered 
Relevant
Ranked 
Alerts (All)
Filtered 
Alerts 
considered 
Irrelevant
Trash Security Staff Security Staff
ALERT MANAGEMENT USING 
ALERT CORRELATION APPROACH
ALERT MANAGEMENT USING 
RISK EXPOSURE APPROACH
 
Figure 6-12. Risk Exposure Approach vs Alert Correlation for Alert Management 
Although discussable, we argue that the contribution of each feature to the 
overall intrusion detection efficiency is subjective. The rules that define 
attack probability depend on the intrusion detection features in DW-DIDS 
are initially tuned to 0.5 by default, given the system has no knowledge a 
priori on which feature is more relevant for the intrusion detection process. 
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However, if the DW Security Administrator has know-how or any way of 
defining the relevance of each feature a priori, the rules provide a way to 
accomplish this by adding whichever extra rules s/he wishes to the rule 
base. On the other hand, the rules that define the sensitivity of data (i.e. 
impact rules) must be defined by the DW Security Administrator because it 
depends on the nature and importance of that data to the enterprise, which 
only s/he (and mainly business managers) know, and depends on the DW 
context itself. Therefore, there isn't any automatic setup for these rules 
because, from our point of view, it is not relevant. 
Our proposal is both syntax-centric and data-centric. Although this rises 
its execution time overhead, we argue that this is worthwhile because it 
allows our approach to analyze the complete set of dimensions affecting 
the data due to the user action – the command itself, the processed data 
and the data resulting from the command’s execution – which is left out by 
the IDS used for comparison in the experiments (they only analyze 
command syntax - RBAC - and resulting dataset - Data-Centric). To the 
best of our knowledge, no other DIDS proposes this threefold analysis. 
The main reasons why we chose the role-based and data-centered 
approaches proposed in [Kamra et al., 2008; Mathew, 2010] is that DIDS 
analyzing data access patterns such as [Bertino et al., 2005; Kamra et al., 
2010] and analyzing the targeted data such as [Mathew et al., 2010; Spalka 
and Lehnhardt, 2005] seem more adequate for DW intrusion detection than 
solutions using other techniques such as sequence alignment, 
fingerprinting commands or transactional read-write rules, as we 
previously discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, we chose one of each type of 
these intrusion detection techniques. 
The differences in storage size and time cost are justified by the type of 
dataset required by each DIDS to build the profiles: RBAC-DIDS just parses 
the SQL command and splits it into the relevant features, which basically 
works by accessing the command log and executing string manipulation; 
DC-DIDS considers, on average, a higher number of features than RBAC-
DIDS and executes statistics per feature on each resulting command’s 
dataset, thus requiring data access actions, which are much more time-
expensive than those executed by RBAC-DIDS; and DW-DIDS executes 
both types of actions of RBAC-DIDS and DC-DIDS, plus accessing the data 
rows processed by the command, and has the highest number of features. 
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Although this makes DW-DIDS the slowest solution in building the 
profiles and the one that requires the highest amount of storage space, 
collecting and combining the information regarding the user command 
with the resulting dataset and the rows processed by the command enables 
it to compose the richest feature dataset, which would add value to 
improve its intrusion efficiency, as was demonstrated in the experiments. 
By analyzing all results, it may be concluded that DW-DIDS showed the 
best results, followed closely by RB-DIDS in most scenarios, mainly when 
the training set was significantly large (>=25 TUW), while DC-DIDS 
obtained the worst results. By integrating features that enable both data-
centric and command-centric analysis, DW-DIDS is capable of producing 
the expected added value when compared with the application of those 
distinct analysis in separate. We may also conclude that a training set of 5 
TUW is insufficient in size for producing an efficient user profile database, 
as these scenarios yielded relatively low intrusion detection efficiency. The 
better results were obtained using the highest number of user workloads 
in the training stage. 
The results presented in the experiments suffer from the predefined data 
values and user commands used in the setups. Although both the DW- 
DIDS and RBAC-based approaches obtained good results in our 
experiments, it is extremely difficult to state that these results can be 
generalized to assess the efficiency of both DIDS. Most DIDS use the well-
known KDD99 benchmark [DARPA] to compare results. However, this 
benchmark uses network-based traffic for its purpose, which in our case is 
not applicable. In fact, given the absence of an SQL-based intrusion 
detection benchmark, the results published in this field of research are not 
comparable and thus, they cannot be generalized. We therefore argue that 
research in both the data warehousing and intrusion detection 
communities should make an effort to propose a benchmark for DIDS at 
the SQL level, possibly a compromise between the well-known TPC-DS or 
TPC-H decision support benchmarks and the KDD99 benchmark. 
6.8. Summary 
In this chapter, we proposed a DIDS specifically designed for DWs, which 
can work transparently between the user interfaces and the database server 
as an extension of the DBMS itself. User behavior profiles are built using 
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features that enable analyzing the diverse dimensions of DBMS user 
behavior: SQL commands, processed data and result datasets. Statistical 
tests are used to verify user actions against those profiles and generate 
intrusion alerts.  
The probability of each alert referring to a true intrusion and the impact 
that might be caused by the user action to which the alert refers can be 
managed by a set of SQL-like rules previously defined by the DW Security 
Administrator. This rule-base allows extending DBMS data access policies 
and provides a mean to assess the risk exposure of each intruder action for 
an extremely wide range of possibilities. The risk exposure method is used 
to rank the generated alerts and prioritize response to intrusions, 
presenting clear advantages when compared to standard correlation 
techniques: it does not allow any intrusion alert to be neglected and it 
enables rapidly responding to alerts which may cause greater damage to 
the enterprise. The experimental results show the proposed approach 
achieves high intrusion detection efficiency and accuracy results in the 
tested setups. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions and Future Work 
Protecting business secrets from disclosure is a critical issue for many 
enterprises. This implies that ensuring data confidentiality in extremely 
sensitive data repositories such as DWs, which store many of those secrets, 
is of vital importance. To deal with this, many data security solutions have 
been proposed in the past. Research and best practice guides have stated 
that the best way to promote confidentiality at the database level is 
probably to use a mix of DIDS together with encryption for live user 
databases, and use data masking techniques for protecting sensitive 
published or outsourced data.  
Despite the development of these solutions for protecting data 
confidentiality, internal as well as external attacks against databases in the 
recent past have been rising in both number and complexity. This makes 
the continuous development and improvement of data security solutions 
an imposing business requirement, in which this thesis seeks to make a 
contribution. In this sense, this thesis addressed the feasibility issues 
involving solutions that promote data confidentiality and deal with 
intrusions against DWs at the database level, focusing on data masking, 
encryption and DIDS.  
As discussed, data masking solutions are typically not used to protect live 
databases because they are not considered secure enough, and have been 
mostly applied as an irreversible process as a mean to secure sensitive data 
that has to be outsourced or publicly published. On the other hand, it is 
revealed throughout this thesis that the database performance overheads 
introduced by encryption techniques might effectively lead business 
stakeholders and end users to consider their use infeasible in many data 
warehousing environments. Finally, the reasons why there should be DIDS 
specifically tailored for data warehousing environments have also been 
discussed, as well as the issues relating alert management and dealing with 
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intrusions against DWs according to the potential cost they represent to the 
business. 
Founded on the research and analysis of current commercial and state-of-
the-art data masking and encryption solutions as well as database 
intrusion detection techniques, the overall objective of this thesis was the 
proposal of new feasible, efficient and effective solutions in these fields that 
contribute to enhance data security in data warehousing environments. To 
achieve this overall objective given the importance of securing 
confidentiality in DWs and comparing with the currently available data 
security solutions from the fields covered, our work introduces a series of 
solid key contributions, which are detailed in the following paragraphs: 
 A body of knowledge focusing on the impact on database 
performance caused by the use of encryption in very large 
databases. Most discussions around the development of new 
encryption techniques are focused on their security proof, i.e., on the 
demonstration of how secure they are against attackers. The focus on 
their performance, i.e., how fast they are able to execute, is often 
considered a secondary issue. We have built a body of knowledge 
focusing on the development guidelines of modern encryption 
solutions and their performance concerning implementations to be 
used against very large databases. Experimental evaluations 
included in state-of-the-art standards and published research as well 
as experimental results throughout this thesis effectively show that 
the storage space and response time overheads introduced by 
encryption algorithms dramatically degrade database performance 
to a magnitude that jeopardizes their feasibility in data warehousing 
environments. Since database performance is a critical issue in DWs, 
we conclude that current encryption solutions are not suitable. Data 
warehouses operate in a well-determined specific environment with 
tight security, performance and scalability requirements and, 
therefore, need specific solutions able to cope with these directives. 
Since there is always a tradeoff between security strength and 
performance, developing specific data confidentiality solutions for 
DWs must always balance security requirements with the desire for 
high performance, i.e., ensuring a strong level of security while 
keeping database performance acceptable. This is a critical issue that 
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justifies the development of new solutions in this domain, given the 
lack of specific solutions for data warehousing environments. 
 A body of knowledge on database intrusion detection techniques. 
Although intrusion detection has been well studied in the past 
decades, it has mostly focused on network and operating system 
level intrusions rather than on the data level intrusions. We have 
built a body of knowledge that gathers, describes and classifies the 
most recently proposed intrusion detection techniques that can be 
used at the data level to develop DIDS. We have discussed their 
usage from a data warehousing perspective, given the typical DW 
workloads. We have justified why DWs are database systems with 
unique user and data processing requirements that differ from other 
types of systems and require distinctively tailored intrusion 
detection approaches. To the best of our knowledge, we have 
concluded that up to date there has been no database intrusion 
detection proposal that accounts for: 1) the impact that the intrusion 
might cause to the business; 2) realizing intrusion detection and 
response both a priori and a posteriori to the execution of the user 
action; and 3) performing intrusion detection by analyzing the user 
action, processed data and the outcome of processing the user action, 
together in the same workflow. We have also discussed why alert 
correlation techniques are not the most appropriate solutions for 
performing alert management, given that these techniques exclude 
possible intrusions that could be alerted, by relying solely on 
probability assessments. Given the sensitivity of DW data and its 
critical security requirements, these facts justify the development of 
new DIDS that incorporate these capabilities. 
 An integrated data security framework that enables the use of data 
masking, encryption and intrusion detection in a single workflow. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first framework that 
transversally integrates a diversity of solutions across several distinct 
security domains/purposes such as masking, encryption and 
intrusion detection. The proposed framework describes the 
implementation of an architecture that enables integrating all 
solutions proposed in this thesis together in a unique workflow. The 
framework also proposes the guidelines for improving or developing 
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new data masking, encryption and DIDS from a data warehousing 
perspective, considering the issues pointed out by the discussion 
derived from the bodies of knowledge in each domain presented in 
Chapter 2. This framework provides an overall functional security 
architecture and guides the development of the solutions proposed 
in this thesis for each referred domain. 
 A reversible data masking technique for numeric values on live 
databases using only standard SQL operators. Although data 
masking techniques are not seen as reliable solutions to be used in 
live sensitive databases and are mostly used as an irreversible 
process which is applied to the data that is to be publicly available or 
outsourced, we have shown that they might still be a viable option 
in data warehousing environments in which response time is a 
critical concern. Given the overhead introduced by using encryption, 
using a lightweight data masking solution that provides some 
security strength is better than not having any sort of security at all. 
In this thesis, we have proposed a reversible data masking technique, 
which provides a certain level of security strength while producing 
low database performance overheads. It relies on data type 
preservation and restrains its data transformations to operators 
existing in standard SQL, requiring only SQL rewriting to achieve its 
security purpose. This gives it several advantages: 1) data type 
preservation avoids database storage space overhead and extra 
computational efforts in datatype conversions when compared with 
standard encryption; 2) executing SQL commands directly against 
the masked data; 3) due to the previous advantage, it avoids data 
roundtrips between the database and the masking/unmasking 
mechanisms, thus avoiding critical path I/O and network bandwidth 
consumption bottlenecks, contrarily to other solutions which require 
this; 4) data-at-rest is masked at all times; 5) It executes faster than 
standard and state-of-the-art encryption algorithms; and 6) the 
solution can be transversally and transparently applied and used in 
any DBMS against any database. The experimental results have 
confirmed these advantages and demonstrated that it can effectively 
be a valid way to protect data confidentiality in DWs. 
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 A lightweight encryption algorithm for securing numeric values 
using only standard SQL operators. We have proposed a novel 
encryption algorithm that, although might not be as secure as other 
standard and state-of-the-art encryption algorithms, presents 
significantly better database performance while providing 
considerable security strength, i.e., better performance-security 
tradeoffs. It follows similar guidelines as those on which the data 
masking technique was based, also relying on data type preservation 
and restraining its data transformations to operators existing in 
standard SQL, requiring only SQL rewriting to achieve its security 
purpose. Thus, it also achieves the same advantages, when compared 
with standard and state-of-the-art encryption algorithms. The 
experimental results have also confirmed these advantages and the 
included security proof makes it an acceptable alternative to the 
former, making it a feasible and efficient encryption option to protect 
data confidentiality in DWs.  
 A DIDS focused on typical end user workloads and intrusions in 
DWs, capable of analyzing the user action, processed data and 
resulting outcome from the execution of the user action, performing 
intrusion detection and response both a priori and a posteriori, and a 
risk exposure method for ranking alerts and responding to possible 
intrusions in a much more reliable and efficient way than standard 
alert correlation techniques. Our DIDS specifically accounts for the 
characteristics of DW users, gathering the set of features that allow 
adequately building their behavior profiles and analyze their actions. 
The proposed features handle intrusion detection by analyzing from 
several aspects of user workloads, such as the user command, the 
data processed by the command and the results of its processing. The 
intrusion detection processes may run before the command’s 
execution and after it finishes executing (but before disclosing results 
back to the user). Each generated intrusion alert is never discarded, 
but ranked by a risk exposure method that is able to prioritize 
dealing with the intrusions that potentially present a higher threat to 
the business. The proposed set of risk exposure rules (including 
probability and impact) enables defining a particularly large scope of 
possibilities that provide a wide coverage of intrusions. The 
relevance of each feature in the intrusion detection processes is 
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adjusted according to its efficiency given its TP and FP rates and self-
calibrates through time. Therefore, the proposed solution is 
effectively better than those that perform intrusion detection in only 
one of the mentioned moments or only on one aspect of the user 
action, and particularly better than those that rely on alert correlation 
techniques for alert management purposes. The experimental results 
demonstrate its efficiency against similar state-of-the-art intrusion 
detection solutions, comproving these statements. 
 
Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis represents the initial ground for our 
research in data security for data warehousing. Related to the issues and 
questions addressed in this thesis, we propose the following priority 
developments and improvements: 
 Increase the scope of both data masking and encryption techniques 
to consider protecting the confidentiality of textual attributes, 
besides numerical attributes. Both data masking and encryption 
techniques proposed in this thesis were specifically designed as 
intended to mask and encrypt numeric values, because in most DWs 
the main portion of sensitive data is numerical. Nevertheless, other 
datatypes may also be used to store sensitive data. A natural and 
logical improvement of the proposed solutions is its adaptation to be 
able to accomplish protecting data of all datatypes. Therefore, 
researching the best ways to develop and implement these 
improvements, and verify their feasibility, namely by assessing 
performance impact as well as security strength, is one of the future 
works to be executed. 
 Investigate ways to enhance the security strength of the proposed 
data masking and encryption solutions, without losing focus on 
their feasibility for data warehousing environments. As we have 
discussed in this thesis, the execution performance and security 
strength of both data masking and encryption techniques depend on 
their algorithm, keys and block length. Investigating changes to the 
proposed data masking formula or encryption algorithm in any one 
of these aspects to improve their performance or their security and 
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respective tradeoffs is always an open research possibility for future 
work, as in any other similar solution. Additionally, any of the 
proposed solutions can use the row masking keys to enable a method 
for injecting false rows into the fact tables. This would make it 
increasingly difficult to distinguish true and false data, increasing the 
overall DW security level and misleading attackers that gain direct 
access to the database. To achieve this, instead of generating 
independent random numbers for the values of the masking or 
encryption row keys in each fact table row j, we redefine those keys 
Kj as a multiple of the sum of the true original values of all Ci, j 
columns to be masked, for each true row j: 
Kj = ( Ci, j ) * k,  { i = 1…n } where k is a random integer constant 
that does not overflow for Kj and n is the number of masked 
columns C in row j) 
For false rows, random values for filling each column Ci,j would be 
generated, and the value of Kj would be equal to any value different 
from those possibly generated by Formula (3). Thus, true rows are 
verifiable through testing if Kj is a multiple of the sum of the true 
unmasked values of all masked columns, using the MOD remainder 
operator. The following formula shows how to test if a certain row j 
is true or false: 
Given R = K3,j MOD ( Ci, j ) ,  { i = 1…n }     
IF R=0 THEN row j is True ELSE row j is False 
However, although potentially increasing the fact table’s security 
strength, there is a tradeoff between security and performance that 
needs to be considered when using this false data injection method. 
The more false data is injected, the stronger is the level of security of 
the table. However, the more data is injected, the more data is 
scanned and verified by the queries, decreasing database 
performance. The increased overall security strength for each fact 
table is directly dependent on how many false rows should be 
injected into each table, and how to distribute the false rows 
throughout the existing data. Thus, the injection of false data to 
increase security strength is at least, arguable, since it increases the 
amount of data to be accessed when the queries are being processed, 
consequently introducing overhead in response time. 
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 Investigate ways to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
intrusion detection methods. Our intrusion detection approach 
appears to work best when the number of intrusions is relatively low. 
This happens because its statistical probability provides that a 
greater number of false alarms is likely to be generated given an 
increasing number of attack attempts. However, the statistical 
approach used to detect abnormal commands was our first approach. 
As future work, testing techniques such as the Naive Bayes Classifier, 
Clustering, SVM, etc. for the intrusion detection process should be 
approached and their efficiency should be compared in order to 
choose the most efficient solution(s). 
 Improve the practical application and performance of the risk 
exposure method rules. The execution of the verification tasks 
referring to the impact and probability rules introduce extra response 
time because they need to be processed before the user command is 
executed and before the results are disclosed back to the user. Given 
the expressiveness of the rules’ syntax (similar to SQL), the efforts in 
processing them may be significant. Therefore, the impact produced 
in database performance by the referred verification tasks for the 
generated alerts should be thoroughly evaluated and analyzed, and 
ways of improving and optimizing the execution of these tasks 
should be researched.  
 Develop a database intrusion detection benchmark. Benchmarks 
are an essential instrument used in the development and 
implementation of many systems. They provide a mean to test those 
systems and significantly contribute to supply end users and 
developers with feedback on their performance, allowing to compare 
between different solutions, as well as give the developers insight for 
improving the proposed solutions. In the past, the KDD99 
benchmark [KDD99] has been widely used for testing intrusion 
detection solutions, as we have previously mentioned. However, this 
benchmark focuses on intrusion actions at the network and operating 
system (OS) level, and the datasets and attack loads used in most 
published research are either synthetic or come from real-world 
applications. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
proposal from the research community regarding an intrusion 
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detection benchmark focusing on the data level. In such a sensitive 
matter as data security, we find that the inexistence of a recognized 
standard database intrusion detection benchmark at the data level is 
an important lack in assessing the feasibility, credibility and 
efficiency of DIDS. Therefore, we propose a first draft version of such 
a benchmark, which can be seen in Appendix D of this thesis. 
 Realize and produce a survey with an objective comparison 
between distinct state-of-the-art database intrusion detection 
techniques and mechanisms using the proposed database 
intrusion detection benchmark. Once the benchmark is defined and 
accepted by the database research and security communities, use it 
to test a sample of distinct state-of-the-art intrusion detection 
techniques (e.g. those described in Chapter 2). The obtained results 
can then be used to produce a formal report to disclose them to those 
communities and drive discussion around them as well as around 
the benchmark itself. 
 Demonstrate the feasibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
proposed solutions in real-world data warehousing contexts. 
Perform implementations and tools using the proposed solutions in 
real-world DWs and gather feedback to measure and analyze their 
accomplishments in order to assess their feasibility, efficiency and 
effectiveness in real-world data warehousing contexts. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has focused on proposing feasible, efficient and 
effective techniques that can enhance data security in data warehousing 
environments. Overall, the main objective for the future is to investigate 
ways of enhancing these proposals and go from research prototypes and 
laboratory environments to real-world scenarios as much as possible. We 
will aim verifying our experimental results and expectations and to 
provide both the research community as well as the industrial community 
with knowledge and tools that can truly enhance data security in data 
warehousing environments. We also wish that our work can make way for 
innovative solutions in this domain, not only data masking, encryption and 
intrusion detection techniques specifically designed for DWs, but also for 
the conception of a novel standard database intrusion detection benchmark 
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at the database level. Ultimately, we hope our work is considered as an 
effective concrete valid contribution to keep the secrets of the business safe. 
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Appendix A 
Sales Data Warehouse 
In this appendix we describe the purpose and data schemas of the Sales 
DW as well as its scale and query workloads used in the experimental 
evaluations included in this thesis. 
A.1. Purpose 
The Sales DW is withdrawn from a real-world enterprise data mart of an 
online retail business, which aims on analyzing sales revenue, given 
customers, products and promotions. 
A.2. Data Schema 
The Sales DW data schema is shown in Figure A-1. It is a star schema with 
a central fact table named Sales, which stores the relevant measures 
regarding sales and promotions, and four dimension tables that describe 
the business, respectively containing the descriptive information 
concerning Customers, Products and Promotions, as well as a temporal 
dimension named as Time. 
A.3. Table Scale Size 
The number of rows and approximate storage space size for the Sales DW 
used in the experimental evaluations is shown in Table A-1, corresponding 
to one year of business activity. 
Table A-1. Scale-size features of the Sales Data Warehouse 
 Number of Rows Storage Size 
Time 8 760 0,12 MB 
Customers 250 000 90 MB 
Products 50 000 7 MB 
Promotions 89 812 10 MB 
Sales 31 536 000 1 927 MB 
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Figure A-1. Sales Data Warehouse Star Schema 
 
A.4. Query Workloads 
Following is the list of 29 queries against the Sales DW data schema that 
were used in the experiments. 
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Q1. YEAR SALES PROFITS QUOTA PER DEPARTMENT, ORDERED BY QUOTA 
SELECT  
   P_Department, 
   Profit/TotalProfit*100 AS ProfitQuota  
FROM  
   (SELECT      
       P_Department, 
       SUM(S_profit) AS Profit  
    FROM  
       Products, Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       P_Department) A, 
   (SELECT  
       SUM(S_profit) AS TotalProfit  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')) B  
ORDER BY  
   ProfitQuota DESC 
 
Q2. MONTH SALES PROFITS QUOTA PER DEPARTMENT, ORDERED BY QUOTA 
SELECT  
   P_Department, 
   Profit/TotalProfit*100 AS ProfitQuota  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       P_Department, SUM(S_profit) AS Profit  
    FROM  
       Products, Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       P_Department) A, 
   (SELECT  
       SUM(S_profit) AS TotalProfit  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')) B  
ORDER BY  
   ProfitQuota DESC 
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Q3. DAY SALES PROFITS QUOTA PER DEPARTMENT, ORDERED BY QUOTA 
SELECT  
   P_Department, 
   Profit/TotalProfit*100 AS ProfitQuota  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       P_Department, 
       SUM(S_profit) AS Profit  
    FROM  
       Products, Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       P_Department) A, 
   (SELECT  
       SUM(S_profit) AS TotalProfit  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')) B  
ORDER BY  
   ProfitQuota DESC 
 
Q4. YEAR TOTAL SALES, PROFIT AND SHIPCOST VALUES 
SELECT  
   SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount, 
   SUM(S_profit) AS TotalSalesProfit, 
   SUM(S_shiptocost) AS TotalShipToCost  
FROM  
   Sales, Times  
WHERE  
   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND   
   T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') 
 
Q5. MONTH TOTAL SALES, PROFIT AND SHIPCOST VALUES 
SELECT  
   SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount, 
   SUM(S_profit) AS TotalSalesProfit, 
   SUM(S_shiptocost) AS TotalShipToCost  
FROM  
   Sales, Times  
WHERE  
   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
   T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') 
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Q6. DAY TOTAL SALES, PROFIT AND SHIPCOST VALUES  
SELECT  
   SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount, 
   SUM(S_profit) AS TotalSalesProfit, 
   SUM(S_shiptocost) AS TotalShipToCost  
FROM  
   Sales, Times  
WHERE  
   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') 
 
Q7. TOP 100 CUSTOMERS OF A YEAR WITH HIGHEST TOTAL SALES VALUE, 
ORDERED BY VALUE 
SELECT  
   TOP 100 
   S_CustomerID, C_Name, C_City, TotalSalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       S_CustomerID,  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       S_CustomerID) A, Customers  
WHERE  
   C_CustomerID=S_CustomerID  
ORDER BY  
   TotalSalesAmount DESC 
 
Q8. TOP 100 CUSTOMERS OF A MONTH WITH HIGHEST TOTAL SALES VALUE, 
ORDERED BY VALUE 
SELECT 
   TOP 100  
   S_CustomerID, C_Name, C_City, TotalSalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       S_CustomerID,  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       S_CustomerID) A, Customers  
WHERE  
   C_CustomerID=S_CustomerID  
ORDER BY  
   TotalSalesAmount DESC 
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Q9. TOP 100 CUSTOMERS OF A DAY WITH HIGHEST TOTAL SALES VALUE, 
ORDERED BY VALUE 
SELECT  
   TOP 100 
   S_CustomerID, C_Name, C_City, TotalSalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       S_CustomerID,  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       S_CustomerID) A, Customers  
WHERE  
   C_CustomerID=S_CustomerID  
ORDER BY  
   TotalSalesAmount DESC 
 
Q10. YEAR TOTAL SALES QUANTITY AND VALUE PER PROMOTION/PRODUCT OF 
BRAND #1, ORDERED BY PROMOTION/PRODUCT 
SELECT  
   S_PromotionID, PR_Description, S_ProductID, P_Name,  
   Qty, SalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID,  
       SUM(S_quantity) AS Qty,  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS SalesAmount # 
    FROM  
       Sales, Times, Products  
    WHERE  
       S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
       P_Brand='BRAND #1' AND  
       S_PromotionID>0 AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID  
    ORDER BY  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID), Products, Promotions  
WHERE  
   S_PromotionID=PR_PromotionID AND  
   S_ProductID=P_ProductID 
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Q11. MONTH TOTAL SALES QUANTITY AND VALUE PER PROMOTION/PRODUCT 
OF BRAND #1, ORDERED BY PROMOTION/PRODUCT 
SELECT  
   S_PromotionID, PR_Description, S_ProductID, P_Name,  
   Qty, SalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID,  
       SUM(S_quantity) AS Qty,  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS SalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times, Products  
    WHERE  
       S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
       P_Brand='BRAND #1' AND  
       S_PromotionID>0 AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID  
    ORDER BY  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID), Products, Promotions  
    WHERE  
       S_PromotionID=PR_PromotionID AND  
       S_ProductID=P_ProductID 
 
Q12. DAY TOTAL SALES QUANTITY AND VALUE PER PROMOTION/PRODUCT OF 
BRAND #1, ORDERED BY PROMOTION/PRODUCT 
SELECT  
   S_PromotionID, PR_Description, S_ProductID, P_Name,  
   Qty, SalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID,  
       SUM(S_quantity) AS Qty,  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS SalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times, Products  
    WHERE  
       S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
       P_Brand='BRAND #1' AND  
       S_PromotionID>0 AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID  
    ORDER BY  
       S_PromotionID, S_ProductID), Products, Promotions  
WHERE  
   S_PromotionID=PR_PromotionID AND  
   S_ProductID=P_ProductID 
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Q13. YEAR TOTAL SALES VALUE PER COUNTRY/ZONE, ORDERED BY 
COUNTRY/ZONE 
SELECT  
   C_Country, ZipCode,  
   SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       DISTINCT(SUBSTR(c_zipcode,1,3)) AS ZipCode  
    FROM  
       Customers), Sales, Customers, Times  
WHERE  
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
   T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
   SUBSTR(C_ZipCode,1,3)=ZipCode  
GROUP BY  
   C_Country, ZipCode  
ORDER BY  
   C_Country, TotalSalesAmount DESC, ZipCode 
 
Q14. MONTH TOTAL SALES VALUE PER COUNTRY/ZONE, ORDERED BY 
COUNTRY/ZONE 
SELECT  
   C_Country, ZipCode,  
   SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       DISTINCT(SUBSTR(c_zipcode,1,3)) AS ZipCode  
    FROM  
       Customers), Sales, Customers, Times  
WHERE  
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
   T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
   SUBSTR(C_ZipCode,1,3)=ZipCode  
GROUP BY  
   C_Country, ZipCode  
ORDER BY  
   C_Country, TotalSalesAmount DESC, ZipCode 
 
Q15. DAY TOTAL SALES VALUE PER COUNTRY/ZONE, ORDERED BY 
COUNTRY/ZONE 
SELECT  
   C_Country, ZipCode,     
   SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       DISTINCT(SUBSTR(c_zipcode,1,3)) AS ZipCode  
    FROM  
       Customers), Sales, Customers, Times  
WHERE  
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
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   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') 
   SUBSTR(C_ZipCode,1,3)=ZipCode  
GROUP BY  
   C_Country, ZipCode  
ORDER BY  
   C_Country, TotalSalesAmount DESC, ZipCode 
 
Q16. YEAR TOTAL SALES VALUE PER CUSTOMER AGE CLASS, PER PRODUCT, 
ORDERED BY SALES VALUE 
SELECT  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, C_Gender, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income<600 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS MinimumIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=600 AND C_Income<1000 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS ReasonableIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=1000 AND C_Income<1500 THEN S_salesamount 
            ELSE 0 END) AS MediumIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=1500 AND C_Income<2500 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS HighIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=2500 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS VeryHighIncome  
FROM  
   Sales, Products, Customers, Times  
WHERE  
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
   S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
   T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
GROUP BY  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, C_Gender  
ORDER BY  
   MinimumIncome+ReasonableIncome+MediumIncome+     
   HighIncome+VeryHighIncome DESC 
 
Q17. MONTH TOTAL SALES VALUE PER CUSTOMER AGE CLASS, PER PRODUCT, 
ORDERED BY SALES VALUE 
SELECT  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, C_Gender, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income<600 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS MinimumIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=600 AND C_Income<1000 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS ReasonableIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=1000 AND C_Income<1500 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS MediumIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=1500 AND C_Income<2500 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS HighIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=2500 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS VeryHighIncome  
FROM  
   Sales, Products, Customers, Times  
WHERE  
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
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   S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
   T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
GROUP BY  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, C_Gender  
ORDER BY  
   MinimumIncome+ReasonableIncome+MediumIncome+  
   HighIncome+VeryHighIncome DESC 
 
Q18. DAY TOTAL SALES VALUE PER CUSTOMER AGE CLASS, PER PRODUCT, 
ORDERED BY SALES VALUE 
SELECT  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, C_Gender, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income<600 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS MinimumIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=600 AND C_Income<1000 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS ReasonableIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=1000 AND C_Income<1500 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS MediumIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=1500 AND C_Income<2500 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS HighIncome, 
   SUM(CASE WHEN C_Income>=2500 THEN S_salesamount  
            ELSE 0 END) AS VeryHighIncome  
FROM  
   Sales, Products, Customers, Times  
WHERE  
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
   S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
   S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
   T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
GROUP BY  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, C_Gender  
ORDER BY  
   MinimumIncome+ReasonableIncome+MediumIncome+ 
   HighIncome+VeryHighIncome DESC 
 
Q19. YEAR TOTAL SALES VALUE AND RESPECTIVE QUOTA PER COUNTRY, 
ORDERED BY VALUE 
SELECT  
   C_Country, SalesAmount,  
   SalesAmount/TotalSalesAmount*100 AS SalesQuota  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')), 
   (SELECT  
       C_Country, 
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS SalesAmount  
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    FROM  
       Sales, Customers, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY 
       C_Country)  
ORDER BY 
   SalesAmount DESC 
 
Q20. MONTH TOTAL SALES VALUE AND RESPECTIVE QUOTA PER COUNTRY, 
ORDERED BY VALUE 
SELECT  
   C_Country, SalesAmount,  
   SalesAmount/TotalSalesAmount*100 AS SalesQuota  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')), 
   (SELECT  
       C_Country, 
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS SalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Customers, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY 
       C_Country)  
ORDER BY 
   SalesAmount DESC 
 
Q21. DAY TOTAL SALES VALUE AND RESPECTIVE QUOTA PER COUNTRY, 
ORDERED BY VALUE 
SELECT  
   C_Country, SalesAmount,  
   SalesAmount/TotalSalesAmount*100 AS SalesQuota  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')), 
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   (SELECT  
       C_Country, 
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS SalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Customers, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') 
    GROUP BY 
       C_Country)  
ORDER BY 
   SalesAmount DESC 
 
Q22. LIST OF PRODUCTS NEVER SOLD DURING THE YEAR, ORDERED BY 
PRODUCT 
SELECT  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, P_Brand, P_Category, P_Department  
FROM  
   Sales, Products  
WHERE  
   S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
   S_ProductID NOT IN  
      (SELECT  
          DISTINCT(S_ProductID)  
          FROM  
             Sales, Times  
          WHERE  
             S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
             T_Date=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY'))  
ORDER BY  
   S_ProductID 
 
Q23. LIST OF PRODUCTS NEVER SOLD DURING THE MONTH, ORDERED BY 
PRODUCT 
SELECT  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, P_Brand, P_Category, P_Department  
FROM  
   Sales, Products  
WHERE  
   S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
   S_ProductID NOT IN  
      (SELECT 
          DISTINCT(S_ProductID)  
       FROM  
          Sales, Times  
       WHERE  
          S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
          T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
          T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY'))  
ORDER BY  
   S_ProductID 
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Q24. LIST OF PRODUCTS NEVER SOLD DURING THE DAY, ORDERED BY 
PRODUCT 
SELECT  
   S_ProductID, P_Name, P_Brand, P_Category, P_Department  
FROM  
   Sales, Products  
WHERE  
   S_ProductID=P_ProductID AND  
   S_ProductID NOT IN 
      (SELECT  
          DISTINCT(S_ProductID)  
       FROM  
          Sales, Times 
       WHERE 
          S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
          T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY'))  
ORDER BY  
   S_ProductID 
 
Q25. NUMBER OF PURCHASES MADE PER CUSTOMER DURING THE YEAR, 
ORDERED BY COUNTRY, CITY, ZONE, NUMBER OF PURCHASES 
SELECT  
   S_CustomerID, C_Name, C_City, C_ZipCode, C_Country  
FROM 
   (SELECT  
       S_CustomerID,  
       COUNT(*) AS Conta  
    FROM 
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       S_CustomerID), Customers  
WHERE 
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
   Conta>0  
ORDER BY  
   C_Country, C_City, C_ZipCode, Conta DESC 
 
Q26. NUMBER OF PURCHASES MADE PER CUSTOMER DURING THE MONTH, 
ORDERED BY COUNTRY, CITY, ZONE, NUMBER OF PURCHASES 
SELECT  
   S_CustomerID, C_Name, C_City, C_ZipCode, C_Country  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       S_CustomerID,  
       COUNT(*) AS Conta  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
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       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       S_CustomerID), Customers  
WHERE  
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
   Conta>0  
ORDER BY  
   C_Country, C_City, C_ZipCode, Conta DESC 
 
Q27. NUMBER OF PURCHASES MADE PER CUSTOMER DURING THE DAY, 
ORDERED BY COUNTRY, CITY, ZONE, NUMBER OF PURCHASES 
SELECT  
   S_CustomerID, C_Name, C_City, C_ZipCode, C_Country  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       S_CustomerID,  
       COUNT(*) AS Conta  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date=to_date('01-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') 
    GROUP BY  
       S_CustomerID), Customers  
WHERE  
   S_CustomerID=C_CustomerID AND  
   Conta>0  
ORDER BY  
   C_Country, C_City, C_ZipCode, Conta DESC 
 
Q28. MONTHLY TOTAL SALES VALUE AND RESPECTIVE QUOTA FOR THE YEAR, 
ORDERED BY MONTH 
SELECT  
   SalesMonth, MonthTotalSalesAmount,  
   MonthTotalSalesAmount/TotalSalesAmount AS MonthQuota  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
    FROM 
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')) a, 
   (SELECT SalesMonth, 
       SUM(TotSalesAmount) AS MonthTotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       (SELECT  
           to_char(T_Date,'Month') AS SalesMonth, 
           S_salesamount AS TotSalesAmount  
        FROM  
           Sales, Times  
        WHERE  
           S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
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           T_Date>=to_date('01-01-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
           T_Date<=to_date('31-12-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')) b  
    GROUP BY  
       SalesMonth) c  
ORDER BY  
   SalesMonth 
 
Q29. DAILY TOTAL SALES VALUE AND RESPECTIVE QUOTA FOR A MONTH, 
ORDERED BY DAY 
SELECT  
   T_Date, DayTotalSalesAmount,  
   DayTotalSalesAmount/TotalSalesAmount AS DayQuota  
FROM  
   (SELECT  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS TotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND   
       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')) a,  
   (SELECT  
       T_Date,  
       SUM(S_salesamount) AS DayTotalSalesAmount  
    FROM  
       Sales, Times  
    WHERE  
       S_TimeID=T_TimeID AND  
       T_Date>=to_date('01-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY') AND  
       T_Date<=to_date('30-11-2008','DD-MM-YYYY')  
    GROUP BY  
       T_Date) b  
ORDER BY  
   T_Date 
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Appendix B 
Data Masking and Encryption 
Experimental Results 
In this appendix we present the averages and standard deviations for the 
data masking and encryption experimental results described in the thesis. 
As mentioned in the respective chapters, each result is obtained from the 
execution of six rounds of experiments, referring to the following legend 
labels: 
Reference/Label Description 
Standard Standard data without masking/encryption 
AES128 Col Data encrypted with TDE AES 128 bit key column encryption 
3DES168 Col Data encrypted with TDE 3DES168 column encryption 
OPES Data encrypted with OPES 
Salsa20 Data encrypted with Salsa20/20 
MOBAT AddCol 
Data masked by MOBAT, where a column for masking keys has 
been added to the existing fact table 
MOBAT CreateCol 
Data masked by MOBAT, where a column for masking keys was 
added to the fact table, which has been completely recreated 
MOBAT ColKey 
Data masked by MOBAT, using a numerical column from the 
original fact table data structure as key K3, j 
SES-DW128 Data encrypted using SES-DW with 128 bit security 
SES-DW256 Data encrypted using SES-DW with 256 bit security 
SES-DW1024 Data encrypted using SES-DW with 1024 bit security 
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B.1. Data Masking Chapter Loading Time Results 
Tables B-1 to B-3 show the results in seconds for the average (µ) and 
standard deviation (σ) of the data masking loading experiments, obtained 
using a Pentium IV 2.8 GHz CPU with 2GB RAM. 
Table B-1. TPC-H 1GB Loading Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 310 9,86777 212 8,99475 
AES128 899 46,94247 472 36,75193 
AES256 958 44,63968 507 31,48409 
3DES168 906 33,61551 485 21,38157 
OPES 461 20,87444 305 22,10521 
Salsa20 537 26,42794 361 26,65626 
MOBAT AddCol 335 14,81949 227 12,39097 
MOBAT CreateCol 323 14,70876 221 11,69447 
MOBAT ColKey 318 12,81143 218 11,93016 
 
Table B-2. TPC-H 10 GB Loading Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 3211 121,9969 2272 96,2474 
AES128 10185 387,1303 5484 233,5230 
AES256 11114 434,7008 6229 254,6556 
3DES168 10424 508,4449 5635 257,1251 
OPES 4943 222,8019 3325 160,8512 
Salsa20 5881 185,4172 4088 180,0211 
MOBAT AddCol 3597 181,0830 2550 155,7417 
MOBAT CreateCol 3449 151,5198 2434 154,1759 
MOBAT ColKey 3362 144,0208 2381 131,4362 
 
Table B-3. Sales DW Loading Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 1195 74,2938 1247 70,9444 
AES128 3574 155,6558 3232 111,3055 
AES256 3699 162,8546 3381 117,3645 
3DES168 3695 140,0080 3339 146,1417 
OPES 1929 117,5107 1963 71,6937 
Salsa20 2408 84,0577 2459 97,3811 
MOBAT AddCol 1373 83,7072 1447 76,2599 
MOBAT CreateCol 1308 79,9533 1367 80,6815 
MOBAT ColKey 1260 80,7588 1318 78,5291 
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B.2. Data Masking Chapter Query Workloads Execution Time Results 
Tables B-4 to B-6 show the results in seconds for the average (µ) and 
standard deviation (σ) of the data masking query workload execution 
experiments, obtained using a Pentium IV 2.8 GHz CPU with 2GB RAM. 
Table B-4. TPC-H 1GB Query Workload Execution Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 625 50,6069 580 54,4009 
AES128 1798 223,0013 1591 199,6768 
AES256 1837 212,8436 1646 172,8946 
3DES168 1895 175,8836 1712 186,4174 
OPES 1813 158,0126 1629 137,4651 
Salsa20 1727 163,8821 1523 154,9399 
MOBAT AddCol 846 76,7923 813 82,0243 
MOBAT CreateCol 809 79,0004 775 69,8340 
MOBAT ColKey 763 86,0046 712 76,4791 
 
Table B-5. TPC-H 10 GB Query Workload Execution Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 6155 481,3438 5301 406,6876 
AES128 16927 1701,2962 13334 949,9173 
AES256 17283 1767,3377 13846 1213,7299 
3DES168 17973 1741,0874 15058 1266,3514 
OPES 16889 1575,5657 13215 1172,8934 
Salsa20 15704 1118,5171 12691 1054,1071 
MOBAT AddCol 7527 762,7053 6420 715,2876 
MOBAT CreateCol 7314 819,1865 6162 480,4649 
MOBAT ColKey 7218 702,9792 5981 447,6100 
 
Table B-6. Sales DW Query Workload Execution Time 
 Oracle SQL Server 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 2233 172,8706 2211 200,3533 
AES128 17604 1399,6442 16923 1974,8563 
AES256 18484 1619,3473 17827 1578,0671 
3DES168 20425 1777,9447 18984 1827,5253 
OPES 17465 1376,6070 16845 1497,5728 
Salsa20 15582 845,2452 15212 1435,1688 
MOBAT AddCol 5084 390,5519 4946 279,9171 
MOBAT CreateCol 4435 462,5449 4313 240,3703 
MOBAT ColKey 3966 283,0312 3637 264,4148 
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B.3. Encryption Chapter Loading Time Results 
Tables B-7 to B-9 show the results in seconds for the average (µ) and 
standard deviation (σ) of the encryption loading experiments, obtained 
using a Core2Duo 3 GHz CPU with 2GB RAM. 
Table B-7. TPC-H 1GB Loading Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 253 12,2420 171 9,6231 
AES128 608 28,4159 382 14,3341 
AES256 636 29,6265 407 19,2423 
3DES168 617 31,9687 389 20,1096 
OPES 353 17,3743 229 21,5238 
Salsa20 419 24,6833 281 21,5931 
SES-DW128 279 15,9888 191 15,8537 
SES-DW256 294 20,3858 201 18,3346 
SES-DW1024 451 21,4445 284 19,7159 
 
Table B-8. TPC-H 10 GB Loading Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 2576 132,6468 1796 99,7148 
AES128 6375 302,7141 4144 214,7684 
AES256 6742 342,2266 4532 193,2705 
3DES168 6527 384,4802 4290 245,6537 
OPES 3766 153,7396 2542 102,1442 
Salsa20 4481 190,5514 3106 129,0725 
SES-DW128 3024 140,4549 2137 103,1846 
SES-DW256 3216 153,7929 2320 109,6005 
SES-DW1024 4844 200,5901 3516 133,9737 
 
Table B-9. Sales DW Loading Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 994 38,4313 1013 47,0286 
AES128 2676 125,6391 2416 97,7693 
AES256 2889 89,9725 2573 111,7741 
3DES168 2949 78,9573 2611 123,8752 
OPES 1555 77,0835 1554 57,2072 
Salsa20 1902 84,6333 1879 78,4652 
SES-DW128 1124 46,8944 1161 54,5001 
SES-DW256 1211 57,4479 1237 64,4903 
SES-DW1024 1808 71,6928 1881 89,6482 
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B.4. Encryption Query Workloads Execution Time Results 
Tables B-10 to B-12 show the results in seconds for the average (µ) and 
standard deviation (σ) of the encryption query workload execution 
experiments, obtained using a Core2Duo 3 GHz CPU with 2GB RAM. 
Table B-10. TPC-H 1GB Query Workload Execution Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 492 48,4052 452 39,2937 
AES128 1357 124,1525 1231 124,3141 
AES256 1496 130,1163 1330 153,0616 
3DES168 1702 167,9543 1362 159,4373 
OPES 1535 136,5459 1326 99,6848 
Salsa20 1268 95,7280 1131 98,4518 
MOBAT AddCol 1015 93,4154 927 89,7789 
MOBAT CreateCol 1251 126,5178 1140 106,7907 
MOBAT ColKey 1453 117,9790 1325 96,2909 
 
Table B-11. TPC-H 10 GB Query Workload Execution Time 
 Oracle 11g SQL Server 2008 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 5037 531,1588 4694 459,2833 
AES128 15191 1358,3464 14063 993,7016 
AES256 19073 1116,7794 16650 1276,2821 
3DES168 22053 2105,4593 18821 1447,4942 
OPES 17205 1205,4704 14155 1256,6578 
Salsa20 14623 965,2504 13540 1080,3754 
SES-DW128 9893 671,6570 9446 580,0519 
SES-DW256 12056 973,8139 10289 916,5035 
SES-DW1024 14976 1520,3692 13713 1153,3621 
 
Table B-12. Sales DW Query Workload Execution Time 
 Oracle SQL Server 
 µ σ µ σ 
Standard 1766 143,4475 1690 181,5121 
AES128 14101 1409,7929 13429 1117,5437 
AES256 15490 1160,3142 14180 1013,8596 
3DES168 15860 1645,6413 14898 1467,3108 
OPES 14189 1272,7239 12381 1149,5012 
Salsa20 11294 1078,3294 10019 868,6609 
SES-DW128 6396 374,6025 5682 434,3993 
SES-DW256 8998 512,0796 7806 612,9569 
SES-DW1024 12546 1131,3574 10032 980,1660 
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Appendix C 
Intrusion Detection Experimental 
Results 
In this appendix we present the experimental results on intrusion detection 
described in Chapter 6 of the thesis. Tables C-1 to C-4 show the results for 
the average (µ) and standard deviation (σ) of the number of true positives 
(TP), false positives (FP), true negatives (TN) and false negatives (FN) 
generated by DW-DIDS in each scenario (“number of true users”-“number 
of intruders”). 
 
Table C-1. DW-DIDS ID Results for Profiles built from 5 “True” User Workloads 
 TP FP TN FN 
Scenario µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ 
10-0 0 0 57 2,7358 1193 70,1898 0 0 
9-1 62 3,3922 54 2,5322 1076 58,6154 38 1,0416 
8-2 131 7,4332 76 4,2092 944 55,5715 69 2,9680 
5-5 327 20,9846 282 15,3613 378 21,0100 173 10,0307 
 
Table C-2. DW-DIDS ID Results for Profiles built from 25 “True” User Workloads 
 TP FP TN FN 
Scenario µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ 
10-0 0 0 14 0,9442 1236 66,7567 0 0 
9-1 81 4,8560 42 2,0296 1088 63,1729 19 1,9311 
8-2 167 7,9252 54 2,6129 966 57,5426 33 1,4605 
5-5 427 25,1637 221 12,8374 439 26,4010 73 3,9543 
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Table C-3. DW-DIDS ID Results for Profiles built from 50 “True” User Workloads 
 TP FP TN FN 
Scenario µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ 
10-0 0 0 12 0,7048 1238 65,5332 0 0 
9-1 85 4,4048 38 1,0416 1092 67,4688 15 1,1095 
8-2 177 11,1384 48 1,9226 972 53,1624 23 0,9102 
5-5 459 27,7095 204 11,5661 456 23,2852 41 2,3537 
 
Table C-4. DW-DIDS ID Results for Profiles built from 100 “True” User Workloads 
 TP FP TN FN 
Scenario µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ 
10-0 0 0 9 0,8625 1241 75,2322 0 0 
9-1 88 5,0469 32 1,2429 1098 65,9825 12 0,7329 
8-2 183 11,0307 43 2,0296 977 54,1515 17 1,4190 
5-5 477 28,3424 193 11,2083 467 28,4039 23 1,8280 
 
 
 
  
Appendix D 
Intrusion Detection Benchmark 
As current work under development, in this appendix we present a draft 
proposal for a DW Intrusion Detection Benchmark (DWID-Bench) for 
testing DIDS in DWs at the SQL level, given a controlled DW environment 
with mixed intrusion and non-intrusion SQL workloads.  
The benchmark’s main aim is to provide a feasible and objective mean of 
evaluating the efficiency of the intrusion detection processes and impact in 
database performance at the SQL level for DW DIDS. The proposed 
measures intend to produce insight for aiding developers in the 
improvement of their solutions and allow solution providers and clients to 
compare between different solutions. 
To accomplish this, we consider the typical DW user workloads and 
intrusion detection techniques described in Chapter 2 and the SQL 
intrusion action type classification in Chapter 6. The chosen “intrusion” 
workload covers a broad scope of distinct types of SQL intrusion actions 
against DWs. The “intrusion” workload is executed concurrently with 
defined “non-intrusion” workloads, which are selected from the well-
known TPC-DS benchmark to represent a typical decision support user 
workload, in order to simulate a scenario as close to reality as possible. 
The remainder of this appendix is organized as follows. In Section D.1 we 
present the benchmark and describe its setup. In Section D.2 we present 
the database schema used in the benchmark. Sections D.3 and D.4 
respectively explain the “non-intrusion” and “intrusion” workloads and 
how they are defined. Section D.5 describes the benchmark’s execution 
rules and procedures, while Section D.6 describes its proposed metrics. In 
Section D.7 we discuss open issues regarding the development of the 
benchmark and finally, Section D.8 summarizes the benchmark proposal 
and points out future work. 
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D.1. DWID-Bench: Data Warehouse Intrusion Detection Benchmark 
Figure D-1 shows the key components of the experimental setup required 
to run DWID-Bench. As in TPC-DS [TPC-DS], the main elements are the 
System Under Test (SUT) and the Driver System. The goal of the Driver 
System is to emulate the client applications and respective users and control 
all the aspects of each benchmark run. In the Driver System we include both 
the “non-intruder” and “intruder” users. Additionally, the Driver System 
also records the raw data needed to calculate the benchmark measures 
(which are computed afterwards by analyzing the data collected during 
each benchmark run).  
System Under Test (SUT)
NetworkDriver 
System
TPC-DS “Non-Intruder” 
SQL Commands
“Intruder” SQL Commands
Information on DIDS 
behavior
SQL Commands Response DIDS DBMS
Storage 
devices
 
Figure D-1. DWID-Bench experimental setup 
The SUT represents a client-server system fully configured to run both 
intruder and non-intruder workloads coming from the Driver System and 
includes the DIDS to be evaluated. From the benchmark point of view, the 
SUT is composed by the DIDS and the set of processing units used to run 
the workloads and to store all the data processed. In other words, the SUT 
can be any (hardware + software) system able to run the complete 
benchmark workload and execute the DIDS algorithms under the 
conditions specified by the benchmark procedure. The communication 
between the Driver System and the SUT may be executed through any type 
of LAN or WAN network infrastructures. 
D.2. DWID-Bench Database Schema 
In DWID-Bench, we partially use the data schemas proposed by TPC-DS. 
The TPC-DS has been released after we had partially executed the 
experiments presented throughout the thesis, and is the latest and 
probably the currently mostly used benchmark for measuring the 
throughput performance of Decision Support Systems (DSS). The TPC-DS 
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benchmark has been mapped to a typical business environment and claims 
to significantly represent DSS that: 
 Examine large volumes of data; 
 Give answers to real-world business questions; 
 Execute queries of various operational requirements and 
complexities (e.g. ad-hoc instructions, reporting actions, data mining 
operations, etc); 
 Are characterized by high CPU and I/O load; 
 Are periodically synchronized with transactional source databases 
through database maintenance functions. 
Assuming these features are common to a typical DW environment, as 
described in [Kimball and Ross, 2013], we accept the TPC-DS as 
representative of DSS and partially use its defined data schemas and 
workloads in DWID-Bench. The “intrusion” and “non-intrusion” DWID-
Bench workloads focus on users with ETL and DW End User privileges, 
since these are the type of actions covered by the TPC-DS benchmark. We 
also define a set of actions for simulating DBA users as a mix of ETL + DW 
End User actions, plus DDL commands relating to the creation of tables, 
constraints and indexes belonging to the chosen schema. 
The TPC-DS focuses on a generic retail business DSS for any industry that 
must manage, sell and distribute products. Its schema models the sales and 
sales returns process for an organization that employs three primary sales 
channels: stores, catalogs, and the Internet. Each of these channels has two 
fact tables, for storing the facts concerning sales and sales returns. There is 
also another fact table for modeling inventory for the catalog and Internet 
sales channels. Each fact table is linked with its respective dimensions in a 
star schema, which means the complete TPC-DS data schema is a set of 
seven star schemas, interlinked by their shared dimensions.  
In DWID-Bench, we chose to use the TPC-DS store sales star schema, 
illustrated in Figure D-2. We chose this particular schema because it 
represents a common business DW scenario for many enterprises, within 
the set of proposed star schemas in TPC-DS. Moreover, the Store_Sales fact 
table is the biggest sized fact table of all generated tables in the complete 
TPC-DS database. As shown in Figure D-2, it is composed of one fact table 
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and ten dimension tables. In the following sections, we explain how the 
“intrusion” and “non-intrusion” workloads are defined. 
 
Figure D-2. TPC-DS store sales E-R diagram [TPC-DS] 
 
D.3. DWID-Bench “Non-intrusion” Workload 
The TPC-DS models a database that is continuously available 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week, for data modifications against any/all tables and 
various types (e.g. ad hoc, reporting, iterative OLAP and data mining) of 
queries originating from multiple concurrent user sessions. This 
environment allows potentially long running and multi-part queries where 
the DBA cannot assume that the database can be inactive during any 
particular period. Queries and data maintenance functions may execute 
concurrently. Since we use the store sales star schema for our DW database, 
we use the predefined TPC-DS query and data maintenance workloads for 
the store sales star schema as our chosen “non-intruder” workloads in 
DWID-Bench. 
From the DWID-Bench perspective, each session with an open connection 
to the database refers to a given type of user (ETL, DW end user, or DBA, 
as described in Chapter 6 of this thesis). The benchmark expects each 
session to execute a stream of actions, which depend on the type of user 
and defined as the following: 
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 For sessions simulating “non-intrusion” users with ETL database 
privileges, data maintenance routines for all the tables of the store 
sales data schema are executed, exactly as defined in TPC-DS; 
 For sessions simulating “non-intrusion” DW end users (i.e. typical 
business managers, analysts and decision makers), each session will 
execute a query stream with the complete set of SQL queries defined 
in TPC-DS that request processing data from the store sales star 
schema, thus totalizing 32 distinct queries for each stream, taken 
from the total of 99 queries defined in TPC-DS. The complete set of 
selected TPC-DS queries for composing the DWID-Bench “non-
intrusion” workload is thus { Q3, Q6, Q7, Q8, Q13, Q19, Q27, Q28, 
Q34, Q36, Q42, Q43, Q44, Q46, Q47, Q48, Q52, Q53, Q55, Q59, Q61, 
Q63, Q65, Q67, Q68, Q70, Q73, Q79, Q88, Q89, Q96, Q98 }. For each 
benchmark run, each stream is expected to execute each distinct 
query once, in which their execution order is defined by the query 
ordering established in TPC-DS; 
 For sessions simulating users with DBA privileges, the workload 
definition is very difficult to define, given the dynamic and huge 
scope of actions they can execute. The TPC-DS benchmark does not 
have any type of approach on actions coming from users with this 
profile, and to present an abstraction that strictly defines a finite set 
of particular actions for this type of user may risk the 
representativeness of the workload for this type of users in what 
concerns the benchmark. From this perspective, we consider the 
DBA user as someone that has privileges to execute any type of 
action that can be performed by ETL and DW end users (i.e.,  DML 
commands – insert, update and select; delete is not considered, since 
typical DW maintenance involves only modifying or insertion of new 
data), plus common database object creation and maintenance 
actions such as creating, modifying and deleting tables and indexes 
(i.e., any sort of DDL commands – drop, create, etc). Thus, in DWID-
Bench we define the DBA workload as the mix of the ETL and DW 
end user workloads together, plus all the DDL commands needed for 
creating tables, constraints and indexes (i.e., primary and secondary 
indexes, possible bitmap join indexes, key and referential integrity 
constraint instructions) for the store sales star schema. 
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The execution matrix for the “non-intrusion” workloads can be seen in 
Table D-1, displaying the query order for the maximum of 20 DW End User 
streams that can be executed in DWID-Bench. It shows the order in which 
each of the 32 queries chosen from the TPC-DS queries (identified by their 
number in TPC-DS) should be executed, depending on which user (1 to 20) 
it refers to. The assumptions and rules on how each user workload should 
be executed for each user stream in each benchmark run will be explained 
further in Section D.5. 
Table D-1. “Non-Intrusion” DW End-User Workload – Query Ordering 
Query 
Sequence 
Number 
DW End-User Stream Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 96 98 98 89 79 73 34 70 98 88 43 7 68 61 46 27 48 61 42 47 
2 7 96 59 52 8 98 88 53 59 52 48 43 88 53 42 47 63 8 19 55 
3 44 13 88 53 89 88 44 6 70 13 53 13 44 98 79 73 61 67 47 13 
4 19 36 6 7 46 19 53 34 44 7 96 36 28 89 6 46 34 42 53 44 
5 43 63 27 63 48 65 7 13 73 27 63 98 3 68 96 13 36 88 7 73 
6 27 3 28 13 59 3 73 28 3 34 70 8 19 13 8 59 52 70 48 28 
7 36 6 68 19 19 79 36 98 7 65 36 88 53 43 89 88 53 13 79 27 
8 46 28 8 96 6 13 89 79 36 28 7 28 52 63 88 68 28 28 70 67 
9 63 27 63 8 28 6 28 48 61 42 98 59 27 36 28 36 88 46 36 34 
10 59 8 19 36 44 52 6 47 65 67 47 96 98 96 55 44 73 89 73 52 
11 98 52 55 43 88 7 65 46 67 36 28 55 67 65 48 19 42 6 59 36 
12 70 61 42 47 36 36 42 55 6 48 55 63 61 42 36 79 89 53 96 7 
13 67 88 53 3 61 61 47 52 47 6 44 3 8 19 47 53 67 34 65 6 
14 28 68 67 46 55 53 59 44 55 59 27 52 7 7 59 61 8 47 55 96 
15 47 67 44 59 52 68 8 3 42 61 59 47 55 44 27 3 59 79 44 88 
16 3 79 61 55 27 28 19 19 34 68 67 46 48 67 44 28 65 19 88 53 
17 89 43 73 27 63 42 61 42 79 47 52 53 63 3 65 6 6 48 63 8 
18 6 47 96 42 47 67 3 43 28 98 42 67 43 48 98 65 46 27 89 65 
19 52 19 36 34 70 48 67 61 89 70 65 27 42 55 19 52 68 52 27 79 
20 42 53 43 68 7 63 98 7 46 73 88 70 65 8 53 63 44 55 46 3 
21 8 55 52 44 96 8 48 73 19 3 34 61 59 88 68 98 43 96 28 63 
22 88 46 70 67 68 46 79 89 8 79 73 34 36 47 43 55 3 36 52 46 
23 65 65 7 6 43 55 46 36 96 89 79 73 70 52 3 96 98 59 68 59 
24 34 70 79 28 65 89 96 8 88 19 6 6 34 28 7 67 70 68 43 43 
25 48 59 65 65 98 96 68 63 43 96 68 89 79 70 34 43 96 98 61 61 
26 73 48 34 61 42 27 63 68 53 46 89 65 89 73 73 48 79 3 34 89 
27 55 34 3 73 34 44 27 67 52 53 61 44 46 79 70 7 55 73 3 42 
28 53 89 13 98 3 43 43 88 68 55 46 79 96 34 67 70 13 43 13 70 
29 79 7 46 70 13 47 52 65 13 44 13 42 73 27 13 34 19 63 6 68 
30 13 73 89 48 73 70 13 59 48 63 8 48 47 6 63 89 27 7 8 48 
31 68 44 47 79 67 59 70 96 27 43 3 19 13 59 52 8 47 44 67 19 
32 61 42 48 88 53 34 55 27 63 8 19 68 6 46 61 42 7 65 98 98 
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In the following section we define the benchmark’s “intrusion” workload. 
D.4. DWID-Bench “Intrusion” Workload 
The chosen intrusion actions intend to provide a wide coverage of the 
possible types of attacks described in Section 6.1 and most of the database 
threats discussed in published work [Schulman, 2007] that can be dealt 
with at the SQL level. Considering these threats, the types of attacks against 
DWs (described in Chapter 6), the classes of intruder actions presented in 
Table 6-1, and focusing on the specific business of the TPC-DS store sales 
data schema, we assume that the possible “intruder” profile is an attacker 
that has access to the database and pursues answers for the following 
generic questions: 
 How are the store sales DW data structures (i.e. table, indexes and 
column names and types) implemented in the database, and how can 
they be reached? (SQL intrusion action class B defined in Table 6-1) 
 How can the optimization data structures such as indexes be deleted 
so database performance is degraded? (SQL action class B and C) 
 How can the existing data structures such as tables and views be 
deleted so that DW availability is affected and business information 
is lost? (SQL action class C) 
 How to obtain the complete set of business values from the fact or 
dimension tables? (SQL action class D) 
 How to obtain the full set of business values for a certain item, item 
brand, class or category, time period, city, county or state? (SQL 
action class E and F) 
 How to obtain the grouped set (e.g. sum, average, count) of 
interesting business values for a certain item, item brand, item class, 
item category, time period, city, county or state? (SQL action class F) 
 How to flood the database services with requests that can overwhelm 
them by creating CPU and I/O server and network bottlenecks? (SQL 
action class G) 
 How can false data be inserted into the store sales fact table so that 
decision support may be compromised? (SQL action class H) 
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 How to modify or erase data so that decision support may become 
compromised? (SQL action class I and J) 
In DWID-Bench we assume a set of instructions that are able to respond to 
these questions as the set of representative “intrusion” actions for the 
chosen database schema.  
For each intrusion action in which there are parameter variables (shown in 
brackets []), these should be given a value as defined in the list of random 
parameter variables. Each parameter value should be refreshed for each 
query in each intrusion action stream, so that the same parameters which 
are used in more than one action in the stream does not have its value 
repeated amongst the remaining actions (e.g. ITEM_K should have five 
distinct values for actions IA06, IA12, IA17, IA22, and IA34, shown further 
on).  
The random generator is defined as a Mersenne Twister Pseudo-Random 
Number Generator8 [Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998], which is, by far, 
the most widely used PRNG [Marsland, 2011]. Its name derives from the 
fact that its period length9 is chosen to be a Mersenne prime. The most 
commonly used version of the Mersenne Twister algorithm is based on the 
Mersenne prime 219937−1 (alias MT19937). It has a period of 219937−1 iterations 
(≈4.3×106001), is proven to be equidistributed in (up to) 623 dimensions (for 
                                                     
8 A pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), also known as a deterministic 
random bit generator (DRBG) is an algorithm for generating a sequence of 
numbers that approximates the properties of random numbers [Barker et al., 
2012]. The sequence is not truly random in that it is completely determined by a 
relatively small set of initial values, called the PRNG's state, which includes a 
truly random seed. Although sequences that are closer to truly random can be 
generated using hardware random number generators, pseudorandom numbers 
are important in practice for their speed in number generation and their 
reproducibility. 
9 A PRNG can be started from an arbitrary starting state using a seed state. It will 
always produce the same sequence thereafter when initialized with that state. 
The period of a PRNG is defined as the maximum over all starting states of the 
length of the repetition-free prefix of the sequence. The period is bounded by the 
size of the state, measured in bits. However, since the length of the period 
potentially doubles with each bit of 'state' added, it is easy to build PRNGs with 
periods long enough for many practical applications. 
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32-bit values), and runs faster than other statistically reasonable generators 
[Marsland, 2011]. 
For DWID-Bench, the following piece of pseudocode is assumed as the 
PRNG, generating uniformly distributed 32-bit integers in the range [0, 
232 − 1] with the MT19937 algorithm (withdrawn from an original code 
listing written by Matsumoto and Mishimura and available at 
http://www.math.sci.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/~m-mat/MT/emt.html): 
 
/*  
   Extracted from a C-program for MT19937, with initialization improved    
   2002/1/26, coded by Takuji Nishimura and Makoto Matsumoto. 
 
   Before using, initialize the state by using init_genrand(seed). 
 
   Copyright (C) 1997 - 2002, Makoto Matsumoto and Takuji Nishimura, 
   All rights reserved.                           
 
   Any feedback is very welcome. 
   http://www.math.sci.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/~m-mat/MT/emt.html 
   email: m-mat @ math.sci.hiroshima-u.ac.jp (remove space) 
*/ 
 
#include <stdio.h> 
 
/* Period parameters */   
#define N 624 
#define M 397 
#define MATRIX_A 0x9908b0dfUL   /* constant vector a */ 
#define UPPER_MASK 0x80000000UL /* most significant w-r bits */ 
#define LOWER_MASK 0x7fffffffUL /* least significant r bits */ 
 
static unsigned long mt[N]; /* the array for the state vector  */ 
static int mti=N+1; /* mti==N+1 means mt[N] is not initialized */ 
 
/* initializes mt[N] with a seed */ 
void init_genrand(unsigned long s) 
{ 
    mt[0]= s & 0xffffffffUL; 
    for (mti=1; mti<N; mti++) { 
        mt[mti] =  
     (1812433253UL * (mt[mti-1] ^ (mt[mti-1] >> 30)) + mti);  
        /* See Knuth TAOCP Vol2. 3rd Ed. P.106 for multiplier. */ 
        /* In the previous versions, MSBs of the seed affect   */ 
        /* only MSBs of the array mt[].                        */ 
        /* 2002/01/09 modified by Makoto Matsumoto             */ 
        mt[mti] &= 0xffffffffUL; 
        /* for >32 bit machines */ 
    } 
} 
 
/* initialize by an array with array-length */ 
/* init_key is the array for initializing keys */ 
/* key_length is its length */ 
/* slight change for C++, 2004/2/26 */ 
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void init_by_array(unsigned long init_key[], int key_length) 
{ 
    int i, j, k; 
    init_genrand(19650218UL); 
    i=1; j=0; 
    k = (N>key_length ? N : key_length); 
    for (; k; k--) { 
        mt[i] = (mt[i] ^ ((mt[i-1] ^ (mt[i-1] >> 30)) * 1664525UL)) 
          + init_key[j] + j; /* non linear */ 
        mt[i] &= 0xffffffffUL; /* for WORDSIZE > 32 machines */ 
        i++; j++; 
        if (i>=N) { mt[0] = mt[N-1]; i=1; } 
        if (j>=key_length) j=0; 
    } 
    for (k=N-1; k; k--) { 
        mt[i] = (mt[i] ^ ((mt[i-1] ^ (mt[i-1] >> 30)) * 1566083941UL)) 
          - i; /* non linear */ 
        mt[i] &= 0xffffffffUL; /* for WORDSIZE > 32 machines */ 
        i++; 
        if (i>=N) { mt[0] = mt[N-1]; i=1; } 
    } 
 
    mt[0] = 0x80000000UL; /* MSB is 1; assuring non-zero initial array */  
} 
 
/* generates a random number on [0,0xffffffff]-interval */ 
unsigned long genrand_int32(void) 
{ 
    unsigned long y; 
    static unsigned long mag01[2]={0x0UL, MATRIX_A}; 
    /* mag01[x] = x * MATRIX_A  for x=0,1 */ 
 
    if (mti >= N) { /* generate N words at one time */ 
        int kk; 
 
        if (mti == N+1)   /* if init_genrand() has not been called, */ 
            init_genrand(5489UL); /* a default initial seed is used */ 
 
        for (kk=0;kk<N-M;kk++) { 
            y = (mt[kk]&UPPER_MASK)|(mt[kk+1]&LOWER_MASK); 
            mt[kk] = mt[kk+M] ^ (y >> 1) ^ mag01[y & 0x1UL]; 
        } 
        for (;kk<N-1;kk++) { 
            y = (mt[kk]&UPPER_MASK)|(mt[kk+1]&LOWER_MASK); 
            mt[kk] = mt[kk+(M-N)] ^ (y >> 1) ^ mag01[y & 0x1UL]; 
        } 
        y = (mt[N-1]&UPPER_MASK)|(mt[0]&LOWER_MASK); 
        mt[N-1] = mt[M-1] ^ (y >> 1) ^ mag01[y & 0x1UL]; 
 
        mti = 0; 
    } 
   
    y = mt[mti++]; 
 
    /* Tempering */ 
    y ^= (y >> 11); 
    y ^= (y << 7) & 0x9d2c5680UL; 
    y ^= (y << 15) & 0xefc60000UL; 
    y ^= (y >> 18); 
 
    return y; 
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} 
 
/* generates an integer random number on [0, x[ */ 
long random(long x) 
{ 
    return trunc(genrand_int32()*(1.0/4294967296.0)*x);  
} 
 
 
 
/* EXAMPLE OF USAGE – Generate first 10 random numbers in [0, 100[ */ 
/* 123456789 used as the initial seed */ 
int main(void) 
{ 
    int i, x=100; 
    unsigned long s=123456789; 
    init_genrand(s); 
    printf("10 random outputs in [0, 100[ \n"); 
    for (i=0; i<10; i++) { 
      printf(random(x)); 
      printf("\n"); 
    } 
    return 0; 
} 
 
The random function based on the Mersenne Twister should be used the 
following way: 
 For each benchmark run, the PRNG should be reinitialized using 
seed 123456789 (execute function init_genrand(123456789)); 
 Given random(x), where x represents a fixed integer value, the 
function result should be a randomized number belonging to range 
[0…x-1]; 
 Given random(x), where x represents a list of values, the function 
result should be one of those values randomly chosen from the list. 
All random values should be generated sequentially for all random 
parameters of the previous user workload, before moving on to generate 
the random values for the random parameters of the next user workload, 
i.e., the random values should be sequentially generated for the complete 
set of random parameters (R_TABLE, R_INDEX, ..., P_VALUE2) in the 
parameters’ order, for user 1, and then moving on to user 2, and so on and 
so forth. 
The complete list of defined used random parameter variable values is: 
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List of Random Parameter Variables 
DEFINE R_TABLE = random(’Store_sales’, ’Time_dim’, ’Date_dim’, ’Customer’, ’Item’, 
’Store ’, ’Customer_address’, ’Customer_demographics’, ’Household_demographics’, 
’Promotion’, ’Income_band’) 
DEFINE R_INDEX = random(select index_name from dba_indexes where table_name = 
[D_TABLE]) 
DEFINE ITEM_K = random(select max(i_item_sk) from item) 
DEFINE ITEM_N = random(select distinct i_product_name from item) 
DEFINE RD_DOM = random(14)+1 
DEFINE RD_MOY = random(12)+1 
DEFINE RD_YEAR = random(6)+1998 
DEFINE CA_TYPE = random(‘ca_state’, ’ca_county’, ’ca_city’) 
DEFINE CA_VALUE = random(select distinct [SS_CATYPE] from customer_address) 
DEFINE CA_STATE = random(select distinct ca_state from customer_address) 
DEFINE I_TYPE = random(‘i_brand’, ’i_class’, ’i_category’) 
DEFINE I_VALUE = random(select distinct [SS_ITYPE] from item) 
DEFINE SS_COLUMN = random(’ss_wholesale_cost’, ’ss_list_price’, ’ss_salesprice’, 
’ss_ext_discount_amt’, ’ss_ext_sales_price’, ’ss_ext_wholesale_cost’, ’ss_ext_list_price’, 
’ss_ext_tax’, ’ss_coupon_amt’, ’ss_net_paid’, ’ss_net_paid_inc_tax’, ’ss_net_profit’) 
DEFINE SS_VALUE = random(select max([SS_COLUMN]) from store_sales) 
DEFINE SS_TICKET = random(select max(ss_ticket_number) from store_sales) 
DEFINE SS_ITEM_T = random(select ss_item_sk from store_sales where ss_ticket_number 
= SS_TICKET) 
DEFINE SS_SDATE = random(select max(d_date_sk) from date_dim) 
DEFINE SS_STIME = random(select max(t_date_sk) from time_dim) 
DEFINE SS_SITEM = random(select max(i_item_sk) from item) 
DEFINE SS_SCUST = random(select max(c_customer_sk) from customer) 
DEFINE SS_SCDEMO = random(select max(cd_demo_sk) from customer_demographics) 
DEFINE SS_SHDEMO = random(select max(hd_demo_sk) from 
household_demographics) 
DEFINE SS_SADDR = random(select max(ca_address_sk) from customer_address) 
DEFINE SS_SSTORE = random(select max(s_store_sk) from store) 
DEFINE SS_SPROMO=random(select max(p_promo_sk) from promotion) 
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DEFINE SS_STICK = (select max(ss_ticket_number) from store_sales)+1 
DEFINE SS_ITICK = random(select ss_item_sk from store_sales where ss_ticket_number = 
[SS_STICK]) 
DEFINE SS_QUANTITY = random(99)+1 
For i = 1 to 12 
      DEFINE SS_VALUES[i] = random(9999999)/100 
Next 
DEFINE I_COLUMN = random(‘i_current_price’,’i_wholesale_cost’) 
DEFINE I_VALUE_2 = random(select max[I_COLUMN] from item) 
DEFINE P_COLUMN_1 = random(‘p_start_date_sk’, ’p_end_date_sk’, ’p_item_sk’, 
’p_cost’) 
DEFINE P_VALUE_1 = random(select max([P_COLUMN_1]) from promotion) 
DEFINE PROMO_K = random(select max(p_promo_sk) from promotion) 
DEFINE P_COLUMN_2 = random(‘p_start_date_sk’, ’p_end_date_sk’, ’p_cost’) 
DEFINE P_VALUE_2 = random(select max([P_COLUMN_2]) from promotion) 
The complete list of proposed intrusion actions that represent the 
“intruder” workload is as follows, composed by 34 SQL instructions 
(Intrusion Action IA01 to IA34. 
Intrusion Action IA01. Query for retrieving information on the tables and columns of the 
database schema. 
select table_name, column_name, data_type from user_tab_columns; 
 
Intrusion Action IA02. Deleting an index from the database. 
drop index [D_INDEX]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA03. Deleting the fact table. 
drop table store_sales; 
 
Intrusion Action IA04. Retrieving all data from the fact table. 
select * from store_sales; 
 
Intrusion Action IA05. Query flooding by requesting several joins on all data from the 
fact table to be processed and returned. 
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select * from  
      (select * from store_sales) a, (select * from store_sales) b, (select * from store_sales) c,  
      (select * from store_sales) d, (select * from store_sales) e, (select * from store_sales) f, 
      (select * from store_sales) g, (select * from store_sales) h, (select * from store_sales) i,  
      (select * from store_sales) j; 
 
Intrusion Action IA06. Query retrieving all sales, date, item and customer data for all 
sales of a given item. 
select * from store_sales, item, customer, date_dim 
where ss_item_sk = [ITEM_K] and ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and 
           ss_customer_sk = c_customer_sk and ss_sold_date = d_date_sk; 
 
Intrusion Action IA07. Query retrieving all sales, item and date data for all sales in a 
random period of two weeks. 
select * from store_sales, item, date_dim 
where ss_sold_date_sk = d_date_sk and 
            d_year = [RD_YEAR] and d_moy = [RD_MOY] and 
            d_dom >= [RD_DOM] and d_dom <= [RD_DOM]+14 
 
Intrusion Action IA08. Query retrieving all sales, customer address, date and item data 
for all sales in a given state, county or city. 
select store_sales.*, customer_address.*, item.*, d_year, d_moy, d_dom 
from store_sales, customer_address, item, date_dim 
where ss_addr_sk = ca_address_sk and 
           ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and  ss_sold_date_sk = d_date_sk and  
           [CA_TYPE] = [CA_VALUE]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA09. Query retrieving all sales, item, date and customer address data 
for all sales of a given item in a given state in a random period of two weeks. 
select store_sales.*, item.*, d_year, d_moy, d_dom, customer_address.* 
from store_sales, date_dim, item, customer_address 
where ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and 
           i_product_name = [ITEM_N] and  ss_sold_date_sk = d_date_sk and  
          d_year = [RD_YEAR] and d_moy = [RD_MOY] and  
          d_dom >= [RD_DOM] and d_dom <= [RD_DOM]+14 and  
          ss_addr_sk = ca_address_sk and ca_state = [CA_STATE]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA10. Query retrieving all sales, item and date data for all sales of all 
items of a given brand, class or category. 
select * from store_sales, item, date_dim 
where ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and ss_sold_date_sk = d_date_sk and  
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           [I_TYPE] = [I_VALUE]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA11. Query retrieving the total quantity and total value of a given sales 
column, per item, for all items. 
select ss_item_sk, i_product_name,sum(ss_quantity),sum([SS_COLUMN]) 
from store_sales, item  
where ss_item_sk = i_item_sk  
group by ss_item_sk; 
 
Intrusion Action IA12. Query retrieving the total quantity and total value of a given sales 
column as well as the row count of those sales, for a given item. 
select ss_item_sk, i_product_name, sum(ss_quantity), sum([SS_COLUMN]), count(*) 
from store_sales, item 
where ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and ss_item_sk = [ITEM_K]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA13. Query retrieving the total value of a given sales column as well as 
the row count of those sales, per day, in a given period of two weeks. 
select d_year, d_moy, d_dom, sum([SS_COLUMN]), count(*) 
from store_sales, date_dim 
where ss_sold_date_sk = d_date_sk and  
           d_year = [RD_YEAR] and d_moy = [RD_MOY] and  
           d_dom >= [RD_DOM] and d_dom <= [RD_DOM]+14 
group by d_year, d_moy, d_dom 
order by d_year, d_moy, d_dom; 
 
Intrusion Action IA14. Query retrieving the total value of a given sales column as well as 
the row count of those sales, per city per month, for a given state, county or city. 
select ca_city, d_year, d_moy, sum([SS_COLUMN], count(*) 
from store_sales, customer_address, date_dim 
where ss_addr_sk=ca_address_sk and ss_sold_date_sk=d_date_sk and  
           [CA_TYPE]=[CA_VALUE] 
group by ca_city, d_year, d_moy  
order by ca_city, d_year, d_moy; 
 
Intrusion Action IA15. Query retrieving the total quantity and total value of a given sales 
column as well as the row count of those sales, for a given item in a given state, per city 
per day, in a given period of two weeks. 
select ca_city, ca_county, ca_state, ss_item_sk, i_product_name, d_year,   
          d_moy, d_dom, sum(ss_quantity), sum([SS_COLUMN]), count(*) 
from store_sales, date_dim, customer_address, item 
where ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and i_product_name = [ITEM_N] and  
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           ss_sold_date_sk = d_date_sk and  
           d_year = [RD_YEAR] and d_moy = [RD_MOY] and  
           d_dom >= [RD_DOM] and d_dom <= [RD_DOM]+14 
           ss_addr_sk = ca_address_sk and ca_state = [CA_STATE] 
group by ca_city, d_year, d_moy, d_dom 
order by ca_city, d_year, d_moy, d_dom; 
 
Intrusion Action IA16. Query retrieving the total value of a given sales column for all 
sales of a given brand, class or category, per city per month. 
select [I_TYPE], ca_city, d_year, d_moy, sum(R_COLUMN) 
from store_sales, item, customer_address, date_dim 
where ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and [I_TYPE] = [I_VALUE] and  
           ss_addr_sk = ca_address_sk and ss_sold_date_sk = d_date_sk 
group by ca_city, d_year, d_moy 
order by ca_city, d_year, d_moy; 
 
Intrusion Action IA17. Modifying the values of a given sales column for all the sales rows 
of a certain item. 
update store_sales set [SS_COLUMN] = [SS_VALUE] where ss_item_sk = [ITEM_K]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA18. Modifying the values of a given sales column for all the sales rows 
of a certain item belonging to a certain ticket number. 
update store_sales set [SS_COLUMN] = [SS_VALUE]  
where ss_ticket_number = [SS_STICK] and ss_item_sk = [SS_ITICK]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA19. Modifying the values of a given sales column for all the sales rows 
of a certain state, county or city. 
update store_sales set [SS_COLUMN] = [SS_VALUE]  
where (select count(*) from customer_address where  
            ss_addr_sk = ca_address_sk and [CA_TYPE] = [CA_VALUE])>0; 
 
Intrusion Action IA20. Modifying the values of a given sales column for all the sales rows 
of a certain brand, class or category. 
update store_sales set [SS_COLUMN] = [SS_VALUE]  
where (select count(*) from item where ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and  
            [I_TYPE]=[I_VALUE])>0; 
 
Intrusion Action IA21. Modifying the values of a given sales column for all the sales rows 
of a certain day. 
update store_sales set [SS_COLUMN] = [SS_VALUE]  
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where (select count(*) from date_dim where ss_sold_date_sk = d_date_sk  
            and d_year = [RD_YEAR] and d_moy = [RD_MOY] and  
            d_dom = [RD_DOM])>0; 
 
Intrusion Action IA22. Deleting all the sales rows of a certain item. 
delete from store_sales where ss_item_sk = [ITEM_K]; 
Intrusion Action IA23. Deleting all the sales rows of a certain item belonging to a certain 
ticket number. 
delete from store_sales  
where ss_ticket_number = [SS_STICK] and ss_item_sk = [SS_ITICK]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA24. Deleting all the sales rows of a certain state, county or city. 
delete from store_sales where (select count(*) from customer_address where 
ss_addr_sk=ca_address_sk and [CA_TYPE] = [CA_VALUE])>0; 
Intrusion Action IA25. Deleting all the sales rows of a certain brand, class or category. 
delete from store_sales where (select count(*) from item where  
                         ss_item_sk = i_item_sk and [I_TYPE] = [I_VALUE])>0; 
 
Intrusion Action IA26. Deleting all the sales rows of a certain day. 
delete from store_sales where (select count(*) from date_dim where  
           ss_sold_date_sk=d_date_sk and d_year=[RD_YEAR] and   
           d_moy=[RD_MOY] and d_dom=[RD_DOM])>0; 
 
Intrusion Action IA27. Inserting false data in  the store sales fact table. 
insert into store_sales (*) values (SS_SDATE, SS_STIME, SS_SITEM, SS_SCUST,  
     SS_SCDEMO, SS_SHDEMO, SS_SADDR, SS_SSTORE, SS_SPROMO, SS_STICK,  
     SS_QUANTITY, SS_VALUE[1], SS_VALUE[2], SS_VALUE[3], SS_VALUE[4],  
     SS_VALUE[5], SS_VALUE[6], SS_VALUE[7], SS_VALUE[8], SS_VALUE[9],  
     SS_VALUE[10], SS_VALUE[11], SS_VALUE[12]); 
 
Intrusion Action IA28. Retrieving all data from any table in the database. 
select * from [R_TABLE]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA29. Retrieving the most sensitive customer data from all customer 
tables the database. 
select * from customer, customer_address, customer_demographics 
where c_current_addr_sk = ca_address_sk and c_current_cdemo_sk = cd_demo_sk; 
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Intrusion Action IA30. Retrieving a portion of sensitive customer data from all customers 
belonging to a given state, county or city. 
select c_customer_sk, c_first_name, c_last_name, c_birth_day, c_birth_month,   
           c_birth_year, c_email_address, customer_address.*, customer_demographics.* 
from customer, customer_address, customer_demographics 
where c_current_addr_sk = ca_address_sk and  
      c_current_cdemo_sk = cd_demo_sk and [CA_TYPE] = [CA_VALUE]; 
Intrusion Action IA31. Retrieving the data of all promotions concerning a given item on a 
given month. 
select promotion.*, item.*, d_year, d_moy, d_dom 
from promotion, item, date_dim 
where p_item_sk = i_item_sk and  
           i_product_name = [ITEM_N] and p_start_date_sk = d_date_sk and  
          d_year = [RD_YEAR] and d_moy = [RD_MOY]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA32. Modifying the current price or wholesale cost of a given item. 
update item set [I_COLUMN] = [I_VALUE_2]  
where i_product_name = [ITEM_N]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA33. Modifying the start date, end date, item or cost of a given 
promotion. 
update promotion set [P_COLUMN_1] = [P_VALUE_1]  
where p_promo_sk = [PROMO_K]; 
 
Intrusion Action IA34. Modifying the start date, end date, or cost of all promotions of a 
given item. 
update promotion set [P_COLUMN_2] = [P_VALUE_2]  
where p_item_sk = [ITEM_K] 
 
Table D-2 resumes the user types that may execute each instruction, the 
action class and affected security dimensions, as well as the tables targeted 
to be affected by the instruction. From observing the table it can be seen 
that each DBA “intrusion” workload is composed by all 34 intrusion actions, 
the ETL “intrusion” workload is defined by 28 intrusion actions (all except 
IA03, IA22, IA23, IA24, IA25 and IA26), and the DW end user “intrusion” 
workload is defined by 18 intrusion actions (all intrusion actions that can be 
executed by “Any” user type). The definition of the number of streams 
each type of user should be running for each benchmark run will be 
described in the next section. 
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The chosen instructions that compose the intruder actions were guided by 
the assumption that each table has its own relative sensitivity, given the 
importance and business knowledge revealed by its contents. Obviously, 
the Store_sales fact table is much more sensitive (and therefore, more 
important from the intruder’s perspective) than the Date_dim dimension 
table, since the first stores the operational secrets of the business and the 
second just serves as support for temporal definitions of the business. 
Thus, the majority of the defined intrusion actions were designed for 
targeting actions against the most important tables (which, for the store 
sales DW, concern the tables that store sales, items, promotions and 
customer information, namely tables Store_sales, Item, Customer, 
Customer_address, Customer_demo and Promotion). 
Table D-2. “Intrusion” Workload 
  TARGET TABLES 
Intrusion  
Action 
SQL  
Action  
Class 
User Type 
Store_ 
sales 
(facts) 
 Customer 
(dim) 
Item 
(dim) 
 Promotion   
(dim) 
Date_dim  
(dim) 
Time_dim 
(dim) 
Store 
(dim) 
Customer_ 
address  
(dim) 
  Customer_ 
demo  
(dim) 
Household 
_demo 
(dim) 
 Income_  
band  
(dim) 
IA01 A Any X X X X X X X X X X X 
IA02 B ETL, DBA X X X X X X X X X X X 
IA03 B DBA X           
IA04 C Any X           
IA05 F Any X           
IA06 D Any X X X  X       
IA07 D Any X  X  X       
IA08 D Any X  X  X   X    
IA09 E Any X  X  X   X    
IA10 D Any X  X  X       
IA11 D Any X  X         
IA12 E Any X  X         
IA13 E Any X    X       
IA14 E Any X    X   X    
IA15 E Any X  X  X   X    
IA16 E Any X  X  X   X    
IA17 H ETL, DBA X           
IA18 H ETL, DBA X           
IA19 H ETL, DBA X           
IA20 H ETL, DBA X           
IA21 H ETL, DBA X           
IA22 I DBA X           
IA23 I DBA X           
IA24 I DBA X           
IA25 I DBA X           
IA26 I DBA X           
IA27 G ETL, DBA X           
IA28 C Any X X X X X X X X X X X 
IA29 C Any  X      X X   
IA30 D Any  X      X X   
IA31 D Any   X X X       
IA32 H ETL, DBA   X         
IA33 H ETL, DBA    X        
IA34 H ETL, DBA    X        
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The Date_dim dimension table is also often used in the “intrusion” action 
instructions; however, it is a static table, i.e., it has fixed content and does 
not change over time. Furthermore, its content does not reveal any 
business information nor does it require external knowledge to be 
regenerated. Therefore, it can be easily and quickly rebuilt in case the 
content is damaged and is not so important as those previously mentioned. 
Table D-3 shows the order in which each intrusion action should be 
executed for each user “intrusion” workload stream. The number of 
intrusion actions in each benchmark run ranges from 28+18+34 = 80 (for a 
setup composed by 1 “Intrusion” ETL User + 1 “Intrusion” DW End User 
+ 1 “Intrusion” DBA User) to 28+180+34 = 242 (for a setup composed by 1 
“Intrusion” ETL User + 10 “Intrusion” DW End Users + 1 “Intrusion” DBA 
User). 
Table D-3. “Intrusion” Workload – Query Ordering 
Sequence 
Order 
 ETL 
User 
 DW End Users  DBA 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 IA02 IA05 IA07 IA31 IA10 IA16 IA28 IA07 IA29 IA05 IA28 IA01 
2 IA05 IA16 IA28 IA13 IA04 IA06 IA14 IA12 IA01 IA10 IA08 IA28 
3 IA09 IA15 IA06 IA15 IA15 IA31 IA29 IA29 IA04 IA08 IA09 IA14 
4 IA33 IA07 IA04 IA09 IA09 IA08 IA30 IA09 IA08 IA31 IA13 IA03 
5 IA17 IA06 IA13 IA16 IA08 IA07 IA13 IA14 IA15 IA12 IA29 IA22 
6 IA34 IA01 IA05 IA30 IA28 IA04 IA04 IA05 IA12 IA29 IA01 IA19 
7 IA14 IA10 IA30 IA05 IA13 IA13 IA01 IA08 IA11 IA01 IA15 IA05 
8 IA28 IA12 IA14 IA28 IA30 IA28 IA08 IA28 IA31 IA14 IA04 IA25 
9 IA16 IA28 IA08 IA06 IA06 IA11 IA09 IA13 IA30 IA06 IA06 IA34 
10 IA04 IA29 IA12 IA12 IA29 IA30 IA12 IA06 IA09 IA07 IA31 IA06 
11 IA31 IA31 IA01 IA08 IA01 IA15 IA06 IA31 IA13 IA30 IA11 IA12 
12 IA01 IA30 IA31 IA29 IA12 IA01 IA10 IA10 IA05 IA11 IA07 IA24 
13 IA21 IA09 IA16 IA01 IA11 IA05 IA05 IA04 IA14 IA16 IA12 IA31 
14 IA13 IA04 IA10 IA04 IA31 IA10 IA07 IA11 IA06 IA09 IA05 IA16 
15 IA06 IA14 IA11 IA11 IA16 IA09 IA15 IA16 IA07 IA04 IA16 IA15 
16 IA18 IA11 IA09 IA07 IA05 IA12 IA16 IA15 IA28 IA15 IA30 IA20 
17 IA30 IA13 IA15 IA10 IA14 IA29 IA31 IA30 IA16 IA13 IA14 IA23 
18 IA07 IA08 IA29 IA14 IA07 IA14 IA11 IA01 IA10 IA28 IA10 IA33 
19 IA27           IA32 
20 IA08           IA17 
21 IA32           IA21 
22 IA15           IA09 
23 IA20           IA11 
24 IA29           IA30 
25 IA12           IA08 
26 IA11           IA10 
27 IA10           IA27 
28 IA19           IA18 
29            IA26 
30            IA29 
31            IA02 
32            IA04 
33            IA07 
34            IA13 
Intrusion Detection Benchmark 
 
265 
D.5. DWID-Bench Rules and Execution Procedure 
In this section we define the rules for implementing the DWID-Bench setup 
and its execution procedure. The rules for implementing the benchmark 
are the following: 
 The store sales data schema should be implemented exactly as 
described in the TPC-DS benchmark; 
 The database maintenance routines should run exactly as described 
in TPC-DS, representing the “non-intrusion” ETL workload streams. 
Each of these ETL streams may execute concurrently with DW End 
User streams or DBA streams, or alone. The “non-intrusion” ETL 
streams do not overlap; all operations need to have finished on “non-
intrusion” ETL workload x before any procedure can start on behalf 
of “non-intrusion” ETL workload x+1. The first refresh data set can 
only start after 3*S (where S represents the number of running “non-
intrusion” DW end user query streams) “non-intrusion” queries 
have completed their execution. Each subsequent refresh set can start 
after completion of an additional 64 queries (the total number of 
instructions in two complete workloads). The purpose of linking data 
maintenance operations to completion of queries is so that the 
updates are interspersed among execution of queries in the 
benchmark runs, although concurrent execution of updates and 
queries is not required; 
 Each “non-intrusion” query instruction should be exactly as 
described in the TPC-DS benchmark, while each “non-intrusion” 
instruction should be exactly as defined in Table D-1 (including 
instruction modification and the substitution of query parameters for 
both types of workloads); 
 The same hardware and software should be used during the 
complete benchmark run without changes. The only allowed 
changes are those concerning the updating of both DW and DIDS 
databases and logs; 
 The DIDS cannot be specifically optimized a priori for the set of SQL 
actions defined in the intrusion workload, i.e., it may not know or 
take in account information regarding previous knowledge of the 
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intrusion workloads before the workloads’ execution in the 
benchmark run; 
 Each stream should be run only once, to avoid repeating instruction 
ordering; 
 The driver system shall submit “intrusion” and “non-intrusion” 
workloads through one or more sessions on the SUT. Each session 
corresponds to one stream composed by a complete “intrusion” or 
“non-intrusion” user workload; 
 If any of the workloads fails to execute, the benchmark results are 
invalid. 
The DWID-Bench benchmark is defined by the execution of the Training 
Phase, followed by the Testing Phase. The Training Phase includes all activity 
required to bring the SUT to the configuration that immediately precedes 
the execution of the “non-intrusion” and “intrusion” workloads that will 
measure the intrusion detection and performance metrics of the DIDS, 
which composes the Testing Phase. For fairness of the database performance 
measures, the database server should be restarted before starting the 
Testing Phase, in order to reinitialize the database cache. The benchmark 
methodology is shown in Figure D-3. The Training Phase includes: 
1) The execution of all SQL DDL commands that create the store sales 
DW data schema (datafiles, tables and views) and constraints, as well 
as any performance optimization objects (e.g. indexes); 
2) The execution of all data loading procedures to populate the DW 
with the initial data defined by TPC-DS for the chosen scale factor as 
defined in that benchmark; 
3) During the execution of the two previous steps, the DIDS can access 
and analyze the executed operations to build the “normal” ETL 
and/or DBA user profiles, in any way, if needed; 
4) The execution of one to five “non-intrusion” ETL data maintenance 
workload streams as the first one to five refresh sets as defined in 
TPC-DS and following the rules previously presented in this section, 
and one to ten DW End User “non-intrusion” workload streams, for 
allowing the DIDS to build the “normal” non-intruder ETL and DW 
end user profiles, in any way. 
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The Testing Phase includes: 
1) The execution of the same number of “non-intrusion” ETL and “non-
intrusion” DW End User workload streams as those used in the 
Training Phase; 
2) The execution of one “intrusion” DBA stream, one to ten “intrusion” 
DW End User streams, and one “intrusion” ETL stream, concurrently 
with the “non-intrusion” workloads. 
1. STORE_SALES DW CREATION
- Create database instance
- Create database datafiles 
(tablespaces)
- Create tables, primary keys and 
referential constraints
- Load data into tables
- Create bitmap join indexes (when 
allowed by the DBMS)
2. NON-INTRUSION WORKLOAD 
EXECUTION
- Execution of 1 to 10  non-intrusion  
DW End User workload streams with 1 
to 5  non-intrusion  ETL workload 
streams
3. NON-INTRUSION+INTRUSION 
WORKLOAD EXECUTION
- Execution of 1 to 10  non-intrusion  
DW End User workload streams with 1 
to 5  non-intrusion  ETL workload 
streams + 1 to 10  intrusion  DW End 
User workload streams + 1  intrusion  
DBA workload stream + 1  intrusion  
ETL workload stream
FINISH?
5. COMPUTE 
BENCHMARK 
MEASURES
Yes
Build DBA  Non-intrusion  
profiles (if needed)
Build ETL and DW End 
User  Non-intrusion  
profiles (if needed)
Run DIDS for test against 
intrusions and update user 
profiles (if needed)
4. GENERATE NEW  NON-
INTRUSION  AND  INTRUSION  
WORKLOAD
- Substitution of the random parameters 
based on the sequence generated 
values from the PRNG
D
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S
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a
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Figure D-3. DWID-Bench benchmark methodology 
 
Figure D-4 illustrates the execution sequence of the Testing Phase. Note that 
the “non-intrusion” ETL workload is executed as defined in TPC-DS, with 
the only difference that it refreshes the database after completing the 
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processing of a group of 64 queries instead of 192 (because the complete 
DWID-Bench “non-intrusion” workload has 32 queries, instead of 99 as 
defined in TPC-DS; 64 is an approximate proportional number). 
Non-intruder DW End User 1 Workload (32 queries)
Non-intruder DW End User 2 Workload (32 queries)
Non-intruder DW End User n Workload (32 queries)
Non-intruder 
ETL User 
Workload 1
Intruder DW End User 1 Workload (18 intrusion action instructions)
Intruder DW End User 2 Workload (18 intrusion action instructions)
Intruder DW End User ni Workload (18 intrusion action instructions)
Intruder ETL User Workload (28 intrusion action instructions)
Intruder DBA User Workload (34 intrusion action instructions)
Non-intruder 
ETL User 
Workload 2
Non-intruder 
ETL User 
Workload n/2
Non-intrusion 
DW End User 
Workload 
Streams
Non-intrusion 
ETL Streams
Intrusion 
Workload 
Streams
Time
3*n queries 
completed
64 queries 
completed
(n/2)-3 groups of 64 
queries completed
 
Figure D-4. Benchmark Testing Phase execution flow for n “non-intrusion” DW 
End Users and ni “intrusion” DW End Users 
The following section defines the benchmark’s metrics. 
D.6. DWID-Bench Metrics 
To evaluate the overall efficiency of a DIDS in a data warehousing 
environment, we propose focusing on the following aspects concerning 
intrusion detection in DWs: 
 The efficiency of the intrusion detection processes themselves, i.e., 
their ability to effectively detect intrusion actions (true positives) and 
minimize the number of false alarms (false positives), and minimize 
the number of intrusions that pass undetected (false negatives); 
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 How quickly after an intrusion action occurs is the DIDS able to 
produce an alert, given that in many cases it is critical to detect an 
intrusion as quickly as possible, before it may damage the DW; 
 The ability of the DIDS to evolve by improving its intrusion detection 
efficiency through time. 
Given this, in DWID-Bench we define the Data Warehouse Intrusion 
Detection Benchmark Coefficient (𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓) metric, which involves two 
main components that respectively measure a DIDS’ efficiency and speed 
in intrusion detection time, where ne represents the number of benchmark 
runs, F-scorei the F-score10 obtained by the DIDS in each benchmark run, 
tQWorkloads the total execution time (in seconds) of the “non-intrusion” and 
“intrusion” workloads of all benchmark runs, and tIDProcesses the total 
execution time (in seconds) of the DIDS of all benchmark runs: 
𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓 =  
∑ 𝑖∗𝐹−𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝑖=1  
∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖=1
∗  
∆𝑡𝑄𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠
∆𝑡𝑄𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠+ ∆𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
∗ 100 
Evaluates the intrusion 
detection efficiency 
through time, giving 
higher weight to the 
most recent F-scores 
Evaluates the impact of the time 
taken to execute the intrusion 
detection processes 
Given its expression, 𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓 will output a real value in the range 
[0...100]. A higher benchmark value indicates a better DIDS. To illustrate 
the outcome of the proposed metric, consider the following values shown 
in Table D-4 as fictional examples of three DIDS to be evaluated by DWID-
Bench. 
Table D-4. DWID-Bench DIDS benchmarking examples 
 1st Benchmark Run (ne = 1) 2nd Benchmark Run (ne = 2) 
 F-score1 ∆𝑡𝑄𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘  ∆𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐  𝑫𝑾𝑰𝑫𝑩𝑪 F-score2 ∆𝑡𝑄𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘  ∆𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐  𝑫𝑾𝑰𝑫𝑩𝑪 
DIDS 1 60% 1000 200 50.0 80% 2000 400 61.1 
DIDS 2 70% 1000 200 58.3 70% 2000 400 58.3 
DIDS 3 70% 1000 250 56.0 60% 2000 500 50.7 
                                                     
10 The F-score measure was explained in Chapter 6, Subsection 6.6.2. 
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Observing the table, it can be seen that after the first benchmark run, DIDS 
2 and DIDS 3 are those presenting the highest intrusion detection 
efficiency, i.e., they have higher F-score than DIDS 1, but since DIDS 2 takes 
less time in its intrusion detection processes than DIDS 3 it outputs a higher 
benchmark value, making it the best DIDS after the first benchmark run. 
Moreover, although DIDS 1 executes its intrusion detection processes 
faster than DIDS 3, this last DIDS presents a higher intrusion detection 
efficiency with an F-score that overcomes the fact that it is slower. 
However, after the second benchmark run, and assuming that they all take 
the same time in execution as the first benchmark run, DIDS 1 improves its 
intrusion detection efficiency to an F-score of 80%, which allows it to 
improve its benchmark value to a measure that makes it the best solution. 
And DIDS 1 is in fact the best solution after both benchmark runs, since its 
F-score average and running times are the same as DIDS 2, but its most 
recent intrusion detection efficiency has the best results of all DIDS. On the 
other hand, the fact that DIDS 3 presented worse results in the second 
benchmark run has made it the worst DIDS. 
Therefore, the 𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓 results shown in Table D-4 demonstrate that the 
benchmark metric is indeed able to track the efficiency of the intrusion 
detection processes and its evolution, along with the ability to also measure 
the impact of the required time spent by those processes. 
D.7. Discussion 
The proposed benchmark abstracts the diversity of the described classes of 
possible intrusion actions, while retaining custom normal user activity and 
DW environment requirements. As it is necessary to execute a large 
number of queries and data maintenance operations to completely manage 
any business analysis environment, no benchmark can succeed in exactly 
mimicking a particular environment and remain broadly applicable. We 
acknowledge that the definition and implementation of benchmarks is not 
a trivial task and that there are always discussable issues concerning the 
objectivity and effectiveness of each proposal. However, in DWID-Bench 
we have tried to provide a wide coverage of possible intrusion activity in 
DWs, while simulating their execution in a realistic-like data warehousing 
environment. Given the importance of intrusion detection in DWs and the 
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lack of both DIDS at the SQL level as available packages supplied by DBMS 
vendors as well as standard benchmarks to test them, we believe that the 
issues presented in this appendix are worthy of notice and hope that our 
work may drive the discussion around the subject in both the 
benchmarking and intrusion detection research communities, and possibly 
make way for a standardized benchmark for this purpose. 
D.8. Summary and Future Work 
In this appendix we have proposed a novel benchmark that focuses on 
evaluating DIDS at the SQL command level in DW environments. The 
proposed metrics provide an objective and comprehensive mean of 
evaluating the intrusion detection efficiency and ability to improve, as well 
as the impact on database response time, of proposed DIDS for DWs. The 
benchmark’s implementation procedures and metrics also comply with the 
principles of comprehensibility and reproducibility required in 
benchmarking proposals. 
While this benchmark offers a representative scenario of possible intrusion 
attacks on DWs, it does not reflect the entire range of possibilities. As future 
work, we intend to increase and develop the “intrusion” workload for 
widening the coverage of possible intrusion actions and therefore produce 
more thorough tests. 
 
